Military Aspects of the Spanish Civil War

From the Spanish Civil War to the Fall of France: Luftwaffe Lessons Learned and Applied

2011-12-05T19:11:00.000+08:00

By PETER H. OPPENHEIMER

Operation Magic Fire (28 July 1936 - 29 March 1939)

Hermann Göring proclaimed the existence of the reconstructed German Luftwaffe on 10 March 1935.[1] Within eighteen months, the new Luftwaffe embarked upon Operation Magic Fire, a program to assist the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. The war, which broke out in the summer of 1936, provided Hitler with an excellent opportunity to distract European attention from his machinations elsewhere on the Continent while at the same time enabling the fledgling Luftwaffe to field test its air warfare doctrine and equipment in military action.[2] The Luftwaffe learned much from the Spanish War in the way of strategy, tactics, logistics, and operations. These lessons were reinforced by the Polish Campaign in September 1939 and applied in Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France in 1940.

Condor Legion was the name given to the German military units dispatched in November 1936 to fight in Spain. The task of this paper is to address issues surrounding the Condor Legion in Spain. Specifically, what lessons did the Luftwaffe learn from the Spanish War? What was the role of the Condor Legion in that war? Was the Luftwaffe helped or hampered by the experience of the Spanish Civil War? Did the Spanish War play a decisive role in influencing the Luftwaffe operational doctrine that contributed to Germany’s defeat in World War II? By answering these questions, I hope to show that the Spanish War provided ambiguous benefits to the nascent Luftwaffe. Although the Condor Legion involvement in Spain proved an invaluable training and testing opportunity, the lessons it taught were occasionally interpreted erroneously. On the whole, however, the Condor Legion experience in Spain established a wellspring of variegated experience from which the Luftwaffe was to draw heavily at the beginning of the Second World War.

Small Beginnings

On 18 July 1936, Adolf Hitler approved the Spanish Nationalist request for military assistance in the civil war that had begun one day earlier.[3] Within ten days, twenty Junker Ju52s had been dispatched to Spain, flown by Lufthansa (Germany’s commercial airline) pilots and Luftwaffe volunteers. Shortly thereafter, six Heinkel He51 biplane fighters were shipped to Spain, along with twenty 20mm flak guns.[4] Although many historians have claimed that Germany entered the Spanish conflict without reservation, this is untrue. Hitler supported Franco over the objections of every ministry in his government.[5] However, the initial German assistance was restricted in both men and materiel. Indeed, only 85 Luftwaffe volunteers were sent originally to serve in Spain under the command of Major General Hugo Sperre, and the designated mission explicitly excluded direct military participation in combat operations.[6] The Freiwillige (volunteers) released from the Luftwaffe were under orders only to train Spanish men to fly the German planes. In less than a week, however, one of the Spanish trainees killed himself and destroyed a plane, while two other Spaniards crashed on their first mission.[7] Because of these mishaps, the German pilots sought and received permission to fly combat missions.[8]

The international reaction to German intervention in Spain was both immediate and hostile. Great Britain lodged a formal protest against the German volunteers and began to support the Spanish Republicans.[9] The Soviet Union subscribed to a French non-intervention plan in principle, but then demanded that Germany immediately cease aid, and began to aid the Republicans themselves.[10] Göring, having succumbed to Hitler’s desire to intervene in Spain; demanded that the Luftwaffe expand yet faster.[11]

Hitler’s true reasons for intervening in Spain had little to do with Franco’s need of assistance or the simple desire to test and develop military equipment; rather they were strategic.[12] A Nationalist-controlled Spain, as Antony Beevor points out, “would present a threat to France’s rear as well as the British route to the Suez Canal.”[13] There was also the tempting possibility of U-boat bases on Spain’s Atlantic coast (Spanish ports were actually used occasionally by the Germans during World War II). Hitler also viewed the war as a way to forge the Axis with Italy while distracting Mussolini’s attention from Austria and the Balkans. The idea of the war as a testing ground for German equipment was secondary at best. Yet as the equipment initially provided to the Legion demonstrated itself deficient, Berlin responded by supplying new, untested aircraft.[14] Spain became a testing ground for the Luftwaffe by chance, not design.

In Spain, the Condor Legion was divided into six parts: a command staff (S/88), one bomber wing with three squadrons of Ju52s (K/88); one fighter wing with three squadrons of He51s (J/88), a reconnaissance squadron of twelve He70s and four heavy flak batteries of 88mm guns (A/88), two 20mm light flak batteries (F/88), and a communications detachment (Ln/88).[15]

Pre-Spanish Civil War Luftwaffe Doctrine

The air war theoreticians most influential in the West in the 1920s and the 1930s were Douhet in Italy, Mitchell in the U.S.A, and Trenchard in England. Basically, these men postulated that airplanes could be the decisive factor in the next major war. The air provided a third dimension in which the static trench warfare in World War I could be avoided.[16] The essence of their idea lay in “strategic” bombing. Countries would possess large numbers of long-range bombers capable of destroying the enemy’s cities and industrial base. Large-scale destruction would quickly lead to the collapse of the enemy’s economy, the demoralization of his people and a quick end to the war. Inherent in this theory was the belief that “the bomber always gets through”. In other words, fast, long-range, heavily armed bombers were invincible and unstoppable. Some of Douhet’s extreme adherents even claimed that air warfare made the army and navy superfluous.[17]

Germany’s air war visionary during this period was Walther Wever, head of the Luftwaffe until his death in 1936. Wever studied Douhet’s teachings but believed that a broadly based air strategy was superior to “strategic” bombing, [18] and he argued that the air force should complement the army and navy.[19] his death left the Luftwaffe with less capable men in charge. Nonetheless, the doctrine governing Luftwaffe air power was formulated by Wever before he died. Fundamentally, the three military services were to co-operate in order to achieve the foremost goal of any war, that of destroying the enemy armed forces. “It is the task of the air force in leading the war in the air within the wider framework of the whole war to serve this goal.” [20] More specifically, Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung (Luftwaffe Service Regulation 16: Conduct of the Air War) laid down three points: (1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority; (2) support of the army and navy; (3) attack against the enemy industry.[21]

These three points implied that the Luftwaffe should destroy the enemy air force over its own territory, if possible when it was still on the ground. For good measure aircraft factories ground installations, and air fields were also to be bombed. Secondly, support of the army was critical. Bombers were to clear the way for tanks and infantry by destroying depots, harassing enemy troops, and disrupting communications. Already, Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16 hinted at the future subordination of the Luftwaffe to the Army. Once these two primary tasks had been accomplished, airplanes were to bomb production centers, food supplies, railroads, ports, traffic centers, military recruiting centers, and Government administrative centers.[22]

Luftwaffe doctrine presumed that the defense of the homeland would be the responsibility of the flak batteries. This was no nearsighted daydreaming. Prewar anti-aircraft units were highly trained and extremely effective, perhaps the best in Europe.[23]

Therefore, the prescription for aircraft production prior to the Spanish War, based on the assumption that fighters were not required for homeland defense, was three bombers to every fighter.[24] When, as a result of the Spanish War, Colonel Ernst Udet, head of the Luftwaffe’s technical department and Office of Air Armament, decided to change the Luftwaffe’s force structure from a three bomber to one fighter ratio to two bomber to one fighter ratio, it was for purely offensive reasons.[25] As far as German naval air theory was concerned, an independent naval air arm was to be created, consisting of floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes.[26] This arm would co-operate with the Navy, both offensively and defensively. Inexplicably, no aircraft carriers were completed by the Germans, although two were planned and construction on the Graf Zeppelin was begun. This strategic error indicated the myopia of the Navy general staff, which did not expect a general war until 1943-4, the landlocked nature of German air power thinking, and the fierce interservice rivalry within the Wehrmacht (armed services).The psychological component of air warfare was not neglected by Luftwaffe theorists. As early as 1933, the Luftwaffe began to plan for war. Most strategists argued that the next war would be total, entailing the complete mobilization of the civilian population and the engagement of all the country’s resources. Under these conditions, many people argued that the unity created by the Nazis would better enable Germany to withstand an all-out struggle. Terror bombing of cities by the Luftwaffe would result in the collapse of the enemy’s morale and his consequent surrender. The same people assumed that a totalitarian society like National Socialist Germany would more easily endure bombing attacks than the fractured societies of France and Britain. This attitude oriented Luftwaffe thinking throughout the 1930’s.[27]

In spite of the explicit air power doctrine laid out by Wever in Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16, the Luftwaffe had little opportunity to field test its aircraft and theory in the years between its inception in 1933 and the beginning of the Spanish War in 1936. Thus, the Luftwaffe’s overriding theory was “to employ maximum forces at the decisive point of the battle.” [28] The course of the battle would necessarily dictate changes in both strategy and tactics, but this was something the Luftwaffe was prepared to do.

Tactical Lessons from the Spanish Civil War

It was in the realm of tactics, among other areas, that the German military excelled, and it was in the realm of air tactics that the Luftwaffe benefited the most from the Spanish War. The key individual in this area was Werner Mölders. During the Spanish War, Mölders grasped the change in airwar brought about by the monoplane’s increased speed and maneuverability, and he developed the Rotte and Schwarm fighter formation (called the finger-four by the British and Americans), which in one form or another is still in use today. Instead of the World War I fighter group locked in tight wing-to-wing “V” formation, the Rotte consisted of two planes, one tailing the other to protect the lead plane’s rear.[29] A Schwarm consisted of two Rottes, and the Schwarm configuration mimicked that of the Rotte.[30] When several of these units of four joined to make a Staffel (squadron), the units were staggered at different altitudes as a means of mutual search and protection.[31] This formation possessed several advantages. The increased distances between the planes allowed for greater maneuverability and higher plane speeds. This in turn gave pilots greater flexibility when confronting opponents and enabled them to use their firepower more effectively against those opponents.

The Spanish War also indicated how difficult it was for conventional bombers to hit targets both at day and night.[32] This difficulty led the Luftwaffe command to favor the more accurate dive bomber over conventional bombers. The Germans’ failure to develop an accurate bombsight further reinforced support for the dive bomber. Night attacks pointed to the difficulty of not hitting targets, but finding them as well. As a consequence, the Luftwaffe placed great emphasis on the development of navigational aids essential for bad weather and night operation. The ultimate result was the Knickebein system, first used in the Battle of Britain. Knickebein was a blind-bombing system which utilized radio direction to assist aerial navigation.

Low-level attacks were another result of conventional bombing’s inherent inaccuracy. A First World War development refined during the Spanish conflict, low-level attacks enabled pilots to judge their bombing runs more accurately and to conduct strafing attacks which demoralized enemy troops, disrupted enemy communications, and pinpointed enemy artillery. The one great disadvantage of ground level attacks was that they exposed aircraft to ground fire. No less significantly, ground level attacks increased the chance of crashes since there was very little time for a pilot to deal with an engine stall, unexpected terrain features, or any similar disastrous surprise.

The Spanish conflict revealed the importance of communications as well. The Luftwaffe realized that the signal corps needed to be equipped with radios to maintain close contact between air and ground forces. Furthermore, the new Rotte formation dictated an increase in the distance between planes. Although hand signals had sufficed in the past, German pilots perceived that air-to-air radio communications had become critical to the success of the new tactics.

Yet in order to understand the influence of the Spanish War on the Luftwaffe, several other areas of air warfare tactics must be addressed in greater detail. They are the development of close ground support of infantry by the Condor Legion, the evolution of fighter tactics, bombing, and reconnaissance.

Close Ground Support

Low-level attacks and close support of the infantry were tactics developed by Wolfram von Richthofen during the Spanish War.[33] During the first battle of Madrid in 1936, German air tactics proved inadequate, primarily because they were experimental.[34] The Legion acted as airborne artillery, bombing and strafing Republican strongpoints and then quickly fleeing.[35] This proved ineffective. However, by functioning as airborne artillery, the Germans learned the importance of close coordination with the ground forces so as to avoid attacking friendly troops. The Legion developed extensive communications, linking planes and ground forces, to avoid just this danger. A Legion officer was assigned to the assault troops and linked by radio to the Legion Command Post. An advantageous relationship resulted. Because the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the Germans from having an air force, almost “all future Luftwaffe officers, in the early period, had extensive training and experience in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry, and held a great knowledge and appreciation for the problems of ground commanders. ” [36] In addition, Nationalist troops often attached white panels to their backs so they could be easily identified from the air. When necessary, they used flares and smoke pots as well.[37]

The equipment initially supplied to the Condor Legion also impelled close ground support. Condor Legion pilots soon discovered that their He51 biplanes were outclassed by the Russian Polikarpov I-16 monoplanes and took pains to avoid direct combat confrontation.[38] Moreover, the Nationalists were deficient in artillery.[39] As a result, the He51 was assigned the role of low-flying artillery in support of Nationalist infantry.

Ground support tactics did not develop immediately, nor did they ever attain the simplicity of textbook formulation. Rather, experience illustrated the necessity of a flexible response to local conditions. The general pattern was for German 88mm guns to bombard enemy strongpoints, followed by bomber and fighter attacks. The infantry advanced directly behind the low-flying planes.[40] There were many variations of this basic pattern. For instance, during the Battle of Brunete in July 1937, General Sperrle divided his squadron into four flights of two planes each. Successive flights swept in abreast of the enemy flak batteries, opening fire with their machine guns while still a good distance away. Over the batteries, they salvoed their bombs and pulled up as quickly as possible to avoid their own bomb blasts.[41] It was essential to neutralize the enemy flak batteries because the cumbersome Ju52 bombers which followed the fighters were easy targets.[42] Low altitude attacks also helped ensure that the Ju52s would not bomb friendly infantry. By dispatching successive relays of air attacks, the Legion wore down Republican defenses and shattered the morale of Republican forces.[43]

In the North, tactics perfected during the attacks against the Basques were put into practice. Heavy artillery and aerial bombardments destroyed the enemy defenses while He 111 bombers escorted by Bf109s penetrated deep into Republican territory, bombing important enemy targets.[44] During the Nationalist attack on Madrid in late 1936, the Republican chief of staff complained of the devastating air strikes launched against him. “The machine gun fire kept (his] men pinned to the ground to the point where they could not man their guns, and attacks in the rear caused great confusion.” [45]

Mass formation of bombers was yet another revision of tactics prompted by the well-fortified enemy strong points in the Basque North. Because an attack by only one or two aircraft simply drove the enemy into his dugouts, safe to reappear after the planes had passed overhead, the Condor Legion pilots approached the enemy from the rear, dropping their bombs all at once. The combined explosive power of the bombs was often sufficient to destroy the fortified dugouts. This innovation the pilots dubbed, “the little man’s bomb-carpet.” [46] Thus carpet-bombing was born.[47] The talent for responding flexibly to local circumstances characterized the Legion’s development of close ground support tactics, and it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that Colonel von Richthoften deserves the primary credit for the development of these tactics.

Evolution of Fighter Tactics

Fighter tactics in World War I were crude in form, constrained by the slow and unwieldy triplanes then available and limited by the lack of knowledge about aerial combat in general. As the war progressed, pilots gained experience, armaments were developed, and airplane designs advanced. But relative to World War II, airplanes and tactics in World War I were primitive. Usually, each side massed its planes to maximize total firepower in twisting dogfights. With the advent of fast monoplanes, however, tactics changed to accommodate and exploit the improved capabilities of the single-winged aircraft. Raymond Proctor explains that monoplanes

'emphasized the elements of maneuver to firepower in formations. With speed and maneuver came closure, and with it the need to sight the enemy first and to protect the vulnerable tail areas. 80 % of all aerial kills are attained with the aircraft shot down never knowing the enemy is there and the attack usually comes from dead to the rear (or the 6 o’clock position). In the traditional formation the pilot of the new high-speed aircraft had far too much of his attention distracted by guarding against crashing into his wingman and was thereby vulnerable to enemy attack.[48]'

As a consequence of the increased vulnerability of the monoplane fighter, particularly when utilizing biplane tactics, Werner Mölders devised the Rotte and Schwarm configurations described above. Yet until the Condor Legion received advanced equipment, fighter tactics in Spain differed very little from those of World War I, indeed, the slowness of the He51s in comparison to the Russian monoplanes was not an overwhelming handicap in most instances. Only when the pilot of an He51 broke off combat with an enemy monoplane fighter did the relative slowness of his biplane become potentially fatal.[49]

On 29 October 1936 the decision was made in Germany to send modern equipment to Spain, including the Bf 109 monoplane fighter.[50] The Bf109 enabled the Condor Legion to drive the Soviet I-15s and I-16s from the skies, conclusively establishing German air superiority in Spain.[51] The offensive and defensive advantages of Mölder’s finger-four fighter formation soon proved extraordinary successful. Each Rotte, when necessary, could act as an independent entity in search, defense, and attack. Cooperation between two Rottes - as a Schwarm - increased total firepower and visual protection. When one Rotte was attacked, the other Rotte of the Schwarm, some 600 feet from its companion, was able to turn in on the enemy, bringing all its guns to bear. When attacking the leader assumed the role of a gunship while his wingman flew in a “cone” pattern to his rear, effectively protecting the leader plane’s 6 o’clock position.[52] The increased distance between the planes of a Rotte allowed the pilots to focus their attention on scanning the sky rather than on striving to maintain close formation.[53]

At times, He51 s were used as bait in Spain. The biplanes flew several thousand feet below a squadron of Bf109s, which waited until Russian I-16s attacked the He51s. The I-16s were then attacked by the Bf109s. During an attack, the Bf109 sought to dive from a superior altitude and pass the enemy aircraft from below, coming up behind the intended victim in his blind spot. If the pilot missed, he could use his diving velocity to escape with speed, or climb again and attempt another pass.[54] Another particularly innovative fighter tactic involved a good measure of foresight and a careful calculation of “aloft” time. Several German planes would circle in the sky near the Soviet airfields. Soon, Soviet fighters scrambled to challenge the Condor Legion pilots, who intentionally stayed out of range until the Soviet interceptors ran low on fuel. Then, another Legion flight, carefully timed to arrive over the enemy airbase as the Soviet planes refueled, bombed and strafed the grounded aircraft.[55] Eventually, the Soviets responded with appropriate defensive measures, but not before they had lost many planes.

Bombing

The effectiveness of bombing in the Spanish Civil War remained uncertain and for that reason provided the Condor Legion with lessons of dubious value. Spain was an unusual war because by mid-1937 the Condor Legion had achieved an infrequently contested dominance of the air, an advantage rarely enjoyed by an air force.

Throughout the war, German bomber pilots usually flew sorties without a fighter escort deep into enemy territory. The Republicans possessed little artillery, and what they had was generally ineffective. The freedom to bomb the enemy, unhindered by opposition, either in the air or from the ground, led the Germans to believe that a fast, heavily armed bomber was the decisive weapon in a military conflict involving aerial attacks. In many ways, the German experience seemed to support Douhet’s concept of “strategic” bombing in that it illustrated the ability of unescorted bombers to penetrate deep into enemy territory and inflict great destruction in mass bombing attacks. Yet the Germans did enlarge upon Douhet’s theory. Rather, they attempted to combine the elements of both fighters and bombers into one plane on the assumption that the resulting aircraft would be better than either its precursors.[56] Close ground support tactics also uncovered the desirability of combining both bombing and strafing capabilities into one airplane. In this way, the Germany military expenditures for the Luftwaffe could be economized, thus burdening the economy to a lesser degree. However, this was one of the many erroneous lessons drawn from the Spanish Civil War experience. The German experience with daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing must be more fully examined to explain the development of Legion bombing tactics in Spain.

From the beginning of the war, the Legion used classical bombing tactics, adapting their methods whenever necessary to meet local contingencies. Basically, classical tactics entail close ground support of friendly infantry, interdiction of enemy supplies, and bombing attacks against enemy strongholds, troop formations, transportation, and communications. Occasionally, fighter escorts were assigned to the bombers, but this became less necessary as the Legion attained air supremacy. During the attack on Bilbao in the summer of 1937:

German bombers and other air groups dropped heavy bombs in daily attacks, from morning till night, on hill positions, tunnels, command posts, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. Also, they continually bombed the passes north of Miravelles to interrupt all traffic. All air groups were ordered not to bomb, under any circumstances, villages or populated areas.[57]

The latter order, forbidding the bombing of populated areas, was soon violated. Madrid was the first European capital city in history to suffer aerial bombardment. The Germans bombed most of the residential districts of the city in a vain attempt to break the morale of the civilian population. According to Antony Beevor, this methodical experiment in psychological warfare “served only to make the populace more defiant.” [58] The Stuka was to alter that.[59] But until dive bombing received greater emphasis, the Germans concentrated on low altitude bombing runs to compensate for the difficulty Legion bomber crews encountered in accurately placing their bombs on target. Even if the Germans had possessed an accurate bombsight, it is unlikely that it would have made much difference. Bomber crews required exhaustive training to learn precision bombing, and the Condor Legion airmen could afford neither the time nor the effort for such training. Yet, because of the minimal opposition encountered by Legion aircraft, daylight bombing was very effective. The Heinkel He111, a fast, heavily-armored medium bomber, arrived in Spain in 1938 and admirably fulfilled the role prescribed by the Spanish situation.[60]

Because of the He111’s successful performance in Spain, the Luftwaffe deduced that the medium bomber could be improved simply by designing a larger version. When the Ju52 demonstrated itself inadequate as a bomber, [61] the Luftwaffe Technical Office staff requested a plane that would both correct the deficiencies of the Ju52 and extend the capabilities of the He111. More specifically, they ordered a medium bomber that:

had a flight time of five rather than three hours
had a bomb capacity of at least two tons
had a fully glazed nose for better visibility
had heavier armaments (i.e., more defensive machine guns)
had improved radios
had a stronger landing gear and fuselage
had larger engines to cope with the increased weight and to provide improved flight performance.

The plane ultimately developed was the Ju88 the so-called ’super’ medium bomber.[62] Initially, this plane proved a failure, and saw little combat action in Spain.[63] Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe had wed itself to the medium bomber concept embodied by the He111, a concept that though spectacularly successful in Spain, eventually contributed to the Luftwaffe defeat several years later.

Night bombing was practiced infrequently in Spain due to the virtually insurmountable difficulties night operations posed. Yet during the early stages of the conflict, when the Republicans were still capable of mustering a significant fighter defense, General Sperre decided to engage the enemy in hours of darkness only.[64] Over Madrid the Legion bomber flights could gauge distances and destinations accurately because the truck traffic, upon which the city depended, was illuminated by its own headlights. Perceptively, Legion bombers struck when truck progress was slowed by bottlenecks at bridges and by the narrow roads of small towns. Weather permitting, the pilots flew sorties every night. However, the results left no doubt that it was difficult to hit small bridges with poor bomb sights at night. Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Albert Kesselring, Walther Wever’s successor, drew the obvious conclusion: night bombing was effective only when the crews possessed a high degree of discipline and technical competence.[65]

Night bombing was also extraordinarily demanding in terms of training, navigation, and mission execution. As a result, bomber research and development were directed toward two distinct goals. Men like Colonel Ernest Udet were convinced that every bomber should have a dive bombing capability. Others pushed Luftwaffe scientists to experiment with radio directional systems to aid navigation and answer the problem of bombing at night and in poor weather conditions. To fulfill the latter goal, the Knickebein system was developed and then tested for the first time in the Battle of Britain. The former goal, that of dive bombing, received a great deal more attention during the Spanish Civil War, where it was elaborated and refined.

The Spanish Civil War suggested to the German Air Staff that dive bombing was the single most accurate bombing method. As elucidated above, the special circumstances that existed in Spain enabled the Condor Legion to operate virtually uncontested in the skies over the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, the equipment with which the Legion was provided proved unsuitable for “strategic” bombing missions. At first the Germans attempted to use the Ju52 as a bomber, but it was slow and lumbering, and thus an extremely vulnerable target for Republican anti-aircraft batteries. Not until later, in 1937, did the Legion receive aircraft, such as the He111, which was more adequate for “strategic” bombing missions. In any event the unqualified success of close ground support operation underlined the need for an aircraft that could drop bombs with pinpoint accuracy — something conventional bombers proved unable to do — so as not to scatter bombs on friendly forces. The plane that fulfilled these requirements was the Junker Ju87 dive bomber, first used during the Battle of Teruel in 1938.[66] The plane had peculiarly angled wings which gave it the appearance of an ugly vulture, and Luftwaffe officers in Spain claimed that the Stuka could drop its bomb load within five meters of a target.[67]

Wolfram von Richthofen discovered the Ju87 not only to be an accurate bomber but a psychologically demoralizing weapon as well. A technician suggested attaching sirens to the landing gear, a development which gave the Stuka its trademark whistling sound as it hurtled down on its target. Perhaps more so than the bombs themselves, the Stukas‘ sirens scared Republican forces, sometimes creating such a panic that the troops abandoned their weapons and fled. As the Stuka proved the value of dive bombing, the emphasis in production in Germany shifted toward the Ju87, confirming the belief among the military staff that the bomber was a tactical offensive weapon.[68] Precision bombing replaced “strategic” bombing for the Luftwaffe in Spain, and this partially explains why the Air Staff neglected the development of a heavy, four engine conventional bomber so sorely needed in later years.

For the Germans, the story of naval bombing in the Spanish Civil War was characterized by minimal results. German naval air theory in the years 1935-1939 supported the idea of an independent naval air arm with floatplanes, flying boats, and naval fighter planes cooperating directly with the Navy. However, the theory was rarely applied. Initially, land-based attacks by planes also proved ineffective. In late October 1936 Franco urged the Condor Legion to bomb Republican naval and supply ports. It did so with disappointing results.[69] Over a year later in the Mediterranean, another attempt was made at maritime bombing to interdict Soviet shipping. This time the Condor Legion enjoyed greater success, its seaplanes raiding shipping at sea by day and in harbor by night. On Franco’s orders, the maritime bombing attacks escalated into a full-scale offensive. As Willard C. Frank notes, “Raids became continuous, severely reduced the supplies needed to maintain the [Republican] civilian population, and did serve to undercut morale.” [70] By the end of the war in 1939. Italian and German aircraft had sunk 115 Republican and 51 foreign merchant ships, a total equal to nearly 75 percent of all enemy ships destroyed by those two countries during the entire war. Another 225 bombing sorties during this period damaged or delayed many Republican cargoes. choking off a source of the besieged population’s food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies and producing increased misery and despair.

Dive bombers were intended as the basic instrument of enemy shipping’s destruction. However, the only plane available at that time, the Ju87, originally had only a one-hundred mile operational radius, a factor which limited flight time. Legion pilots did ascertain that torpedo attacks and dive bombing were very promising.[71] But the Luftwaffe developed neither a long-range dive bomber nor a torpedo bomber. The He59 and He115 floatplanes were intended to be torpedo bombers, but they never carried out an operation. The Germans were aware of their limitations, but because of their indifferent attitude, they failed to exploit the equipment at hand. The Air Staff believed that the larger German warships received adequate service from their Arado and Heinkel floatplanes. This helps to account for the nearsighted decision not to complete the German aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppelin.[72] In any case, the High Command in 1937-39 believed that war with Great Britain could be avoided, and men like Ernst Udet did not believe that Germany would wage war against a maritime power like Great Britain.[73] As an result of the maritime air war during the Spanish War, the Germans falsely deduced that ships underway did not need to fear aerial attack. Consequently, naval officers procrastinated dangerously on improvements for shipboard anti-aircraft defenses.[74] Overall, the Luftwaffe concluded that a separate naval air arm was unnecessary, and by 1940, it had begun to be reabsorbed into air force land-based squadrons.

Reconnaissance was ultimately the most successful element of German naval air policy in Spain. Initially, reconnaissance, both over land and sea, was viewed negatively because of the scanty results obtained.[75] It was believed more important to wear the Republicans down through continual bombing. But this anti-reconnaissance attitude changed as the reports obtained through aerial observation demonstrated their value. Observation planes located the enemy, thereby conserving resources by eliminating the wasteful practice of simply sending bombers on haphazardly planned and implemented missions. Given the nature of the conflict, with the great mobility of ground forces, it was important to know the enemy’s exact location at any given time. At the Battle of Brunete, Nationalist observation planes were sent aloft. Within thirty minutes of sighting the enemy concentrations. Legion bombers appeared to strike and strafe the Republican troops.[76]

The Republican Air Force always made a great effort to shoot down the Nationalist reconnaissance craft, and these observation planes were forced to engage in evasive tactics to preserve themselves. As a general rule, observation planes were less heavily armored and armed than combat aircraft. Speed was most important. When attacked, the reconnaissance planes made for a cloudbank to hide. If none was available, the planes went into a dive to gain sufficient speed to escape their pursuer, or at least limit them to one attack. Another tactic practiced by the reconnaissance planes was to begin firing their machine guns long before they were in range of enemy fighters, occasionally causing the enemy to break off his attack too early. “Considering its technical disadvantage, the Legion lost few reconnaissance planes.” [77]

Logistics & Operations

Mobility was the key logistical lesson taught the Luftwaffe by the Spanish War. The need for mobility had been demonstrated by the Italian military experience in Ethiopia in 1935-36. Mobility was frequently the key to the success of the Italian forces against the well-armed and well-trained Ethiopian Army. Yet, for the Germans in Spain, mobility meant more than just rapid deployment of men and equipment. It found its essence in ground-staff mobility.[78] The use of air transport and railroads to move entire unit installations quickly lay the groundwork for the Blitzkrieg as later practiced in Poland. The Wohnzug (railroad caravan) was the quintessential example of mobility in practice. The Wohnzug consisted of approximately eleven railway cars, two of which were locomotives attached at either end of the train, eliminating the need for turn-arounds. One-third of the cars contained sleeping compartments for officers and enlisted men. At a moment’s notice, the Wohnzug could be underway with all the squadron’s equipment and support personnel. The flight crews flew their planes to the next designated base of operations to await the rest of the railroad-transported squadron. By 1939, each Condor Legion squadron was also assigned two Ju52s to be used both as transports and as radio direction-finding stations.[79] The Ju52s proved reliable workhorses, perfectly suited to the task which was set for them.

In operations, the Condor Legion learned how important ground support personnel were, particularly in the inhospitable environment of Spain. The men who fueled the motors, tinkered with the engines, and replaced broken or damaged parts played an indispensable role in the Condor Legion. At first, the Legion underestimated the number of personnel required to care for the aircraft properly as well as the number of reserves needed to replace over-tired, injured, or killed front-line pilots. The exertions demanded of the men, including long, irregular hours frequently under harsh, stressful conditions indicated that the workload had to be more evenly distributed among more men. The Legion had not realized at the beginning of the conflict that air warfare is continual. But it soon became clear that the squadrons had to carry out many tasks without resting, a feat which quickly exhausted supplies and men.[80]

The lesson in operations typified the manner in which the Luftwaffe took advantage of the war not only to evaluate its practices but also its organization. During the course of the war, the flight elements of the battle squadrons and their ground personnel were reorganized, forming the basis for what later became standard operational configurations.[81] A special combat reporting team was set up in Berlin and dispatched to Spain with orders to send back periodically for analysis and evaluation.[82] In addition, the Lehr Division (Technical Development Flying Unit) was formed at Greifswald in 1937.[83] Its purpose was to discover the lessons of the Spanish conflict and distill the experience derived from air competitions and factory research. Essentially, the Lehr Division functioned as a post-graduate flight school and advance operational training center devoted to absorbing and teaching new tactical air lessons, many of which came from Spain. Not surprisingly, much of what was learned was subsequently adopted as standard procedure to be used by the Luftwaffe throughout World War II.

Air Theory Applied in Spain

The theory of air doctrine described by Giulio Douhet in his book, The Command of the Air (1921), postulated a concept of “strategic” bombing which simply did not apply to the conflict raging on the Iberian Peninsula between 1936 and 1939. Douhet’s theory was predicated on the premise that the static trench warfare epitomized by World War I set the pattern for all future ground wars and that “strategic” bombing provided the only means to avoid bloody wars of attrition. In Spain, the contest between the Nationalists and the Republicans was of a fluid and mobile nature, covering many different types of terrains and climates, constrained by delicate political circumstances. and limited by the available equipment. Douhet suggested the way to win a war was to destroy the enemy’s cities and industrial base. In Spain, however, there was very little large-scale, heavy industry. It was perhaps to be expected that Spain was not, and, indeed, could not be, the war to verify Douhet’s theory. Except for the unusual circumstances that enabled Condor Legion bombers to attack the Republicans virtually unmolested, there was little proof that a well-organized fighter defense would be unable to check “strategic” bombers.

The development of close ground support tactics arose naturally, then, from the peculiar situation in Spain, as did the emphasis placed on dive and medium bombers. Many other factors contributed to the course of these developments, but they were of a more secondary nature.

On 1 May 1937 Richthofen wrote a letter to the Luftwaffe High Command stating “Spanish [Nationalist] artillery is always late in arriving; it fires too slowly and too poorly to keep the enemy pinned down. The load of the battle rests with the flyers; first by inflicting casualties, second, by holding him down, making him run, destroying his spirit to fight, and hindering his resupply and reinforcement.” [84] Here was a cogent summary of Condor Legion air doctrine as practiced in Spain. The air force, claimed Richthofen, bore the primary responsibility for executing the attack. Intrinsic to his belief was the desirability, indeed necessity. of close coordination between the army and the air force. The goal of the Legion flight elements was threefold: (1) seek out the enemy air force in order to remove the threat to the army, (2) attack the enemy army, harass his troops, transport and communications, and (3) protect ground troops and infantry from enemy air attack.[85] After air superiority had been established, the air force could then switch from air-to-air to air-to-ground attacks.

The Luftwaffe High Command was unaware of the efficacy and applicability of close ground support tactics at the outset of the Spanish War. It was still enthralled by the concept of “strategic” bombing. Von Richthofen slowly but surely weaned the High Command from its strategic airpower beliefs and persuaded it that close support tactics had great potential.

Some authors argue that Germany came to have an air force based on tactical air power rather than general air power because of the influence and predominance of the German Army.[86] For such authors, it was natural that the fledgling Luftwaffe be subordinated to the long-established army. But in truth there was such general opposition to anything but “strategic” bombing that it was only Richthofen’s perseverance and determination that led to the acceptance of tactical air power.[87] The first close support operations in Spain took place in March 1937 when He51 fighter bombers made a low-level attack on the Republican front at Bilbao with great success.[88] For the Germans. tactical air power as an operational doctrine and a strategy dates from this incident, and in retrospect, changed the course of the next war and all future wars.

Other forms of bombing were not precluded as a strategy merely because Richthofen developed close ground support tactics. But that bombing was included in strategic planning does not mean the same thing as “strategic” bombing. As indicated above, high altitude “strategic” bombing was practiced infrequently by the Condor Legion during the Spanish War because of the various political, economic, and structural circumstances. Yet the Spanish Civil War was not spectacularly successful with interdictory bombing. Its pilots discovered that conventional, high-level precision bombing was difficult in the best of conditions and virtually impossible against heavily defended or pinpoint targets.[89]

The lack of an accurate bombsight contributed to this inadequacy. Therefore, the move towards dive bombing was natural. The putative effects of “strategic” bombing - destruction of industrial bases, devastation of morale among the working population, and psychological demoralization of the civilian populace- as the 1938 Luftwaffe Yearbook indicates simply had not occurred.[90] In this light, it became apparent that “strategic” bombing was not only difficult to carry out, but was ineffective as well. Dive bombing, with its promise of great precision, seemed to portray the future. Another reason for the demise of “strategic” bombing in Spain was inextricably linked to the death of Walther Wever. Wever’s belief on the heavy, four-engined “Ural” bomber died with him, and there was no one else in the High Command willing to put through a costly and hypothetical program without sure knowledge of its ultimate result.

Personalities also exerted influence on the direction of Luftwaffe air theory. For example, Ernst Udet maintained a hold upon Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff from February 1939 onwards.[91] Udet’s preoccupation with speed propelled German Air Staff policy in the direction of a fast light bomber, rather than Wever’s “Ural” bomber.[92] As a consequence, Germany never manufactured the equivalent of the United States Air Forces’s Boeing B17, a blunder that contributed to the Luftwaffe’s failure to bomb England into submission during the course of 1940.

The intermingling of hard-headed doctrine and vain desire, economic constraints, and overrated successes led to an erroneous application of fighter forces in the defense of the Reich in 1943-44. Spain engendered a belief in the quasi-omnipotence of the flak batteries. Germany had produced an extraordinarily effective anti-aircraft gun in the 88mm, a weapon used with repeated success in the three years of the Spanish War. The 88mm gun was used in Spain not only to protect against enemy aircraft but also to attack ships, tanks, troops, or any other ground targets. The confidence in the flak batteries was reinforced by the elite nature of the men that operated the guns. Pre-war anti-aircraft units constituted an independent, highly-trained body of men.[93] Total reliance was placed upon these men to protect against intruding enemy aircraft. As a result, the Luftwaffe neglected to develop early warning radar, as the British did, or fighter control, by the outbreak of war. This weakness was partially compensated by the excellent aircraft reporting system linking flak and fighter units (cf. Richthofen and close support tactics), but it was hardly sufficient. Because of the success of the flak batteries in Spain and the influence of Douhet’s theory of attack, as well as Hitler’s belief that the noise and the flash of the batteries had a salutary political and psychological effect on civilians. the Luftwaffe rested defense of the Heimat (Homeland) on these 88mm batteries, and manufactured fighters and bombers heavily weighted in favor of the latter. 40 percent of the pre-war Luftwaffe units were bombers and dive bombers and only 25-30 percent were fighters.[94] In the short-run this imbalance of fighters and bombers was not a problem in Spain. But in the long-run, it subjected Germany to the “strategic” bombing envisioned by Douhet. Once again, the German military aptitude for brilliant short-term tactical problem-solving undermined the long-term strategic planning imperative to the successful prosecution of war.

Summary of the Luftwaffe Lessons from Spain

From the broadest perspective, the Condor Legion intervention in the Spanish Civil War quickened the pace of rearmament in Germany. As Edward Homze states, the war “encouraged the Reich leadership to speed up the introduction of new models as rapidly as possible even though reductions in total output and a vast increase in expenditures would result. The Spanish Civil War, coupled with the Austrian and Czech crises of 1938, also removed the last vestiges of resistance in the more conservative camp that argued for a slowdown of rearmament.”[95]

At peak strength in Spain in the late summer of 1938, the Condor Legion had 40 Heinkel He 111s, 3 Junker Ju 87s, 45 Messerschmitt Bf109s, 5 Dornier Do 17s, 4 He 45s, 8 He 59s and 8 batteries of light and heavy flak.[96] In addition, the Nationalist air units at that time contained 146 Spanish and 134 Italian planes. Upon returning to Germany in May 1939, the Condor Legion counted 281 officers, 4,383 men, and 412 civilian technicians. In total, approximately 19,000 Germans served duty in Spain. The Legion shot down 386 enemy aircraft, of which 59 were downed by the anti-aircraft batteries. The Germans lost 72 aircraft by direct enemy action and 160 through accidents. In terms of lives, 298 Germans were killed while serving in Spain; 131 were killed by the enemy and 167 died from illness and vehicular accidents.[97] Those wounded by the enemy totaled 139. Though a comparatively small price to pay in relation to what the Luftwaffe hoped to gain, German losses were substantial because of the diminutive size of the youthful air force and the materiel constraints imposed by the German economy and military-industrial complex on aircraft production.

In the concrete realm of day-to-day operations, the Spanish War furnished a mother lode of knowledge, although at time; this knowledge was misapplied. The combat experience gained by Condor Legion pilots was invaluable particularly because many of these pilots became instructional officers in pilot training schools in Germany.[98] The pilots also learned the importance of detailed maps, the benefits from rapid, positive target identification and the need for adequate radio communications.[99] As a catalyst for the development of technology, the conflict emphasized the value of weather forecasting. radio directional systems (i.e. Knickebein), the use of pathfinder aircraft, and incendiary flares for effective night bombing. With regard to aircraft. Spain was a very helpful testing ground and incubator. The He51 biplane demonstrated its obsolescence as a fighter when matched against the Russian monoplanes and fruitfully exchanged that role for one of close ground support. The Ju52 proved an extremely reliable transport aircraft but a limited bomber, so it too assumed a role it was to fulfill more than adequately. During the course of 1937, the Bf109 fighter, the Ju87 Stuka dive bomber and the He111 and the Do17 bombers were introduced in Spain and all showed their value as combat aircraft.

The mistakes engendered by the Spanish War, more than the successes, indicate the difficulty in drawing general conclusions from an unusual and specific conflict. Because Legion bomber squadrons rarely encountered much opposition after the Nationalists attained air supremacy, the introduction of the He111 fast bomber suggested incorrectly that bombers required only a light armor and little fighter protection. The high command mistakenly believed that bombers could rely on speed alone to penetrate the enemy’s defenses.[100] Berlin failed to perceive that even high performance, well-armed bombers in mass formation could not protect themselves against determined fighter opposition, particularly during daytime missions. This oversight caused the Luftwaffe to neglect the coordination of fighter and bomber development. After realizing that bombers needed fighter escorts. the Luftwaffe command discovered that their fighters lacked the range to protect the bombers during the missions. A similar nearsighted rationale approved of the concept of an all-purpose aircraft for strategic and tactical operations. Indeed, Hitler demanded that heavy, multi-engined bombers possess both a strategic and dive bombing capability.[101] The resulting hybrid aircraft, the Ju88, was unable to carry out either mission properly. The success of the 88mm flak guns in Spain suggested that flak cannons were the best weapon for air defense, and that therefore little attention need be paid to a fighter defense system to protect Germany. The horrific losses inflicted on Germany by USAF and RAF bombers attest to the inaccuracy of this belief. The most valuable lessons taught in the laboratory of the Spanish War was the tactical concept of combat operational doctrine. The Spanish experience established within the Luftwaffe the belief in close ground support tactics as the preeminent and foremost task of the German air force. This belief produced both the Luftwaffe’s most spectacular success in Poland and later contributed to the Third Reich’s utter defeat.

The Polish Campaign (1 September - 27 September 1939)

In many ways, the Polish campaign justified the principles which had been enumerated and developed in Spain. The first of these principles was the concentration of all available effort on one task at a time. The second principle was the elimination of any obstacle that might hamper the movement of the ground forces.[102] The German Air Staff planned the military operations against Poland, Fall Weiß (Case White), largely according to these principles, and was rewarded with a spectacular success.

The strategy and tactics applied in Poland to implement the two principles elucidated above were taken from Condor Legion experience in Spain. Basically, the Luftwaffe supported infantry, and mechanized armor units, clearing the path of obstacles and seeking to achieve air superiority. The Polish Campaign demonstrated the efficacy of the lessons learned in Spain: close ground support tactics, air transport, and dive bombing. The Polish Campaign also provided the first opportunity to combine the full might of the Army and the Luftwaffe. Blitzkrieg (lightning war), as this new type of warfare was termed, was the close cooperation between tactical air and mechanized ground formations to penetrate deeply and rapidly into enemy territory.[103] The basic elements of Blitzkrieg had been developed in Spain. In Poland, they were fully implemented for the first time.

Prior to the attack on Poland, the Luftwaffe comprised 370,000 men grouped in three unequal divisions. The air force alone had 208,000 men, of which 20,000 were aircrew and 1,500 were paratroopers. The flak had 107,000 men, and the air signal units 58,000 men.[104] The Luftwaffe had amassed over 2000 aircraft in preparation for Fall Weiß, a number far in excess of the Polish Air Force’s 500 mostly obsolete fighter planes.[105] Of the German aircraft, 1000 were bombers and 1050 fighters. Despite the Spanish Civil War, the Luftwaffe was not prepared to embark upon a campaign against Poland, or any other country for that matter. In September 1939 the Luftwaffe had stocked only enough bombs for three weeks and ammunition for six weeks.[106] Moreover, the Luftwaffe lacked a long-range strategic bomber, an adequate night bomber, bombs heavier than one thousand pounds, air torpedoes, modern mines, modern armament, and accurate bombsights. Bombers and escort fighters still lacked the means to communicate with one another.[107] Luckily, the campaign against Poland was short. It did not last long enough to reveal Germany’s underlying inventory and supply weaknesses, nor did it fully test the limited capabilities of a still unprepared Luftwaffe.

Within the context of the overall German military strategy of Fall Weiß, the Luftwaffe’s first and foremost objective was the destruction of the Polish Air Force in order to attain air superiority.[108] Only with the attainment of air superiority could the Luftwaffe hope to provide unhampered support of the Army. As part of this objective, the Luftwaffe was to dislocate the entire Polish Air Force support, supply and organization and to disrupt the Polish aircraft industry. Secondarily, the Luftwaffe would take part in the destruction of the Polish Army by bombing and strafing strong points. artillery batteries, and concentrations of ground troops. The combination of planes and mechanized ground units of the Army was to prove extremely successful, as the course of the campaign illustrated.

The German attack against Poland began at 4:45 AM on 1 September 1939.[109] Fog and low cloud cover delayed the morning air operations, but by afternoon, the Luftwaffe was heavily committed. The Luftwaffe’s primary targets were Poland’s airfields. Those at Kattowitz, Krakow, Lwow, Lublin, Wilna, Kida, Glodno, and others received a thorough pounding. The out-dated Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters which managed to take off were easily intercepted and repulsed by the Bf109s and Bf110s.[110] Nevertheless, the Polish pilots exhibited great courage and determination in the air. The Germans did not know, however, that the Polish planes that rose to meet them were decoys fighting a feinting action. Though the Luftwaffe had hoped to catch all of Poland’s planes on the ground, Polish intelligence had discovered signs of the imminent German attack, and the Polish Air Force had transferred most of its operation aircraft to camouflaged emergency airstrips.[111] The Germans naturally attacked Poland’s well-known permanent airfields. Thus, they succeeded only in destroying outmoded fighters and a number of training craft not immediately serviceable. The bulk of the Polish Air Force escaped, giving the Polish Air Command time to improvise a plan for the defense of Warsaw.[112]

On the assumption that it had obliterated the Polish Air Force, the Luftwaffe shifted part of its efforts on 3 September to secondary targets and operations in support of the army. These operations followed the plans laid out prior to the campaign. The Luftwaffe bombed and strafed strong points, artillery batteries, and troop formations. To dislocate enemy supply organization, the bombers focused on factories, barracks, ammunition dumps and depots. Further behind enemy lines, aircraft attacked railway stations, bridges, tracks, and road junctions to disrupt communications and to prevent the Poles from moving up reinforcements.[113]

Cooperation between the air force and the army was excellent, due mostly to Wolfram von Richthofen.

So concerned was Richthofen with providing the army with what it needed from the air that he offered to share his quarters and command post inside Schönwald Castle, six miles from the front, with General Walther von Reichenau, commanding the l0th Army. It was a happy arrangement, for Reichenau’s armor was scheduled to punch holes in the Polish defenses while Richthofen’s ground attack formations blasted a clear path ahead. This was interservice cooperation at its closest, a thing Richthofen had learned to value while dealing with some of Franco’s generals in Spain.[114]

Richthofen also stayed current on the ground situation by stationing himself as close to the front as possible. Whenever feasible, he flew over enemy territory in his Fiesler Storch to engage in personal reconnaissance. Indeed, on the first day of the attack, he was downed by anti-aircraft fire, but he crash-landed and returned unharmed. Aside from his own fly-overs, Richthofen had at his disposal specially equipped signal units and a reconnaissance squadron to furnish him with timely intelligence information.[115]

The Battle near Kutno from 9-18 September is a good example of the effects produced by the Luftwaffe in Poland. Under General Kutzreba, the commander of the Army of Poznan, the Poles successively launched a surprise attack in the area around Kutno. To counter the Polish Army’s movement, the Luftwaffe was called in to blunt the attack. Thirty Henschel Hs123s swarmed over the Army of Poznan at low levels, utilizing their wide range of armaments to bomb, strafe, and generally disrupt the enemy troops.[116] The Hs123s were followed by Stukas, Dorniers, and Heinkels. The attack was so demoralizing that some of the Polish troops threw down their weapons and fled.[117] On 18 September 50,000 Polish troops surrendered and on the next day, another 105,000 capitulated. Herbert Molloy Mason Jr. describes vividly the inferno inflicted on the Poles.

To Kutzreba’s men, almost none of whom had been under air attack before, the next twenty minutes were like a nightmare in hell. The machine guns cut swaths in the ranks of men and horses; hundreds of light weight scatter bombs flamed and exploded; the heavier detonations of the 110-pounders tore gouts out of the earth, ripped through trees and flung jagged metal shards thudding into men and animals. Even when the last of the various missiles had been delivered, the 123s were not finished with low-level attacks. The pilots discovered that when the BMW engine was pushed to 1800 r.p.m., the resultant effect on the three-bladed, variable pitch airscrew produced an ear-splitting and indescribable sound that was both inside and outside of the man subjected to it. Even hardened soldiers were unnerved, and ran in all directions to escape. Horses simply went insane.[118]

The Polish planes so cleverly removed before the surprise attack to be used in the defense of Warsaw, never stood a chance against the Luftwaffe’s overwhelming numbers. In the skies above the capital, Polish P.Z.L. P.11 fighters rose to meet the Bf109s, only to be outgunned by the faster and more maneuverable German aircraft. Occasionally, a Polish pilot by dint of bold determination, shot down an enemy fighter or bomber, but for the most part, the Polish fighters succumbed in the face of the larger numbers, the greater firepower, and the more modern equipment of the Luftwaffe fighter force.

Before bombing the Polish capital, the Luftwaffe dropped thousands of leaflets, requesting the city’s surrender. When the request was refused, the Luftwaffe’s bombers went into action. Thereafter, the skies over Warsaw were never clear of German aircraft as the Luftwaffe bombed the city. The operation began on 23 September with swarms of Stukas stacked up in groups several thousand feet apart, diving in systematic relays on the city. Following the dive bombers, Ju52 transport planes, jury-rigged to serve as bombers, blasted the city as crewmen literally shovelled loose themite incendiary bombs out of the cargo doors.[119] No city or people could withstand such a devastating attack, and on 27 September 1939 the Polish Government surrendered the capital.

Despite the success of the Luftwaffe, it was the Army which accounted for the quick and overwhelming German victory in Poland. The Army’s rapid advance overrun the Polish early warning systems and forward bases, preventing a coordinated direction of Polish fighter aircraft. The army’s advance also engulfed depots and dumps, thereby cutting off the supply of spare parts to the remaining operational Polish aircraft. It was not until 14 September that the Luftwaffe succeeded in surprising most of the Polish bombers at an airfield near Hutnicki.[120] The Polish Air Force was broken primarily by internal collapse, not external pressure. The Luftwaffe’s major contribution was not so much the destruction of the outmoded Polish Air Force as it was the effective close support of ground troops and the destruction of the Polish Army.

Fall Weiß proved a costly campaign for the Luftwaffe. Of the 10,761 Germans killed during the campaign, 189 were pilots and aircrew. 261 aircraft of all types were lost — 7.6 percent of the Luftwaffe force structure — mostly to anti-aircraft defenses against close ground support operations.[121] Among these 261 aircraft were 47 Bf109s (5.6 percent of force structure). 81 bombers (6.5 percent of force structure) and 50 close support craft (13.2 percent of force structure). In Poland, the Luftwaffe suffered grave, though not irreparable damage.

The Polish campaign showed beyond doubt the value of the lessons learned in Spain. The Ju52s demonstrated their utility as transport aircraft, supplying the Wehrmacht’s Panzer (armor) and mechanized units, and providing the Bf109 squadrons with spart parts, ammunition, and aviation fuel.[122] Carpet-bombing was practised occasionally, as at the Krakow airfield by 60 He111s.[123] The He111s were followed by the plane that conclusively proved its worth in Poland, the Ju87 dive bomber. At Krakow, thirty Ju 87s plummeted down upon the airstrip to unload over thirty tons of bombs on hangars, parked aircraft, and runways. The Ju87 achieved astounding results because the Polish Air Force mustered little opposition to hamper it. Lacking effective opposition, the Stukas were able to exploit the very high inherent accuracy of the steep diving attack while simultaneously demoralizing the infantry with their piercing sirens.[124] The Stukas‘ success reinforced the belief among the German High Command that the airplane should be used primarily for ground support.[125]

The overall result of the Polish campaign was to entrench firmly the notion within command circles that the air force was an exceedingly powerful weapon. At the time, much was made in the press and elsewhere of the vital role played by the Luftwaffe and the new type of Blitzkrieg war made possible by the air force. The success of Fall Weiß was overwhelming, perhaps deceptively so.

The Polish Air Force was outdated and outmoded, and those planes which managed to get airborne were outnumbered by the Germans almost four to one. Yet the campaign led to wild claims regarding the Luftwaffe’s ability. In retrospect, such declarations accounted in part for Göring’s claim prior to Dunkirk that the Luftwaffe alone could win the battle, and perhaps the war. Albert Kesselring wrote,

Beyond all other military arms, the Luftwaffe, by virtue of its mobility in space accomplished tasks which in former wars had been inconceivable … The Polish Campaign was the touchstone of the potentialies of the German Air Force and an apprenticeship of special significance. In this campaign, the Luftwaffe learned many lessons … and prepared itself for a second, more strenuous and decisive clash of arms.[126]

Denmark and Norway (7 Apri1-10 May 1940)

After Fall Weiß the warring countries entered a period that became known as the “Phony War.” Military engagements occurred infrequently. During this time, the Luftwaffe units that had participated in the Polish campaign returned to their bases in Germany. Aircraft were repaired, serviced, and refitted. and the air force continued to expand in anticipation of the spring campaign in the West. Luftwaffe operational activity was reduced to a minimum, restricted to occasional bombing runs on shipping and reconnaissance sorties. Fighter units, especially those stationed near France’s highly touted Maginot Line, were discouraged from engaging in combat.[127] The Luftwaffe was concerned primarily with repairing the damage suffered in Poland and preparing itself for the next attack.

In the spring of 1940, the Phony War ended abruptly. Instead of pushing westward, Germany launched a surprise attack northward against Scandinavia. The attack was intended to pre-empt British plans to secure Scandinavia as a military base as well as to protect crucial iron ore imports from Sweden.[128] Furthermore, the Germans wished to gain Scandinavia for themselves as a strategic base for future air and naval attacks on the British isles.

Luftwaffe strategy for Weserübung (Exercise Weser), as the campaign against Norway and Denmark was code-named, was based on the same two principles that had dictated the course of action in Poland. Denmark, bordering Germany’s northernmost province of Schleswig-Holstein, presented much less of a problem than Norway. Norway had a lengthy coastline that made the country easily accessible to intervention by the Royal Navy. As a result of these concerns, Germany needed to act covertly and with complete surprise. For the first time in modern warfare, paratroopers were used to achieve this element of surprise. Notwithstanding some tactical innovations, the Luftwaffe’s first goal was still attainment of air superiority followed by support of the army. Once these objectives had been accomplished, the Luftwaffe could begin its secondary tasks: supply and reinforcement of ground and motorized units, reconnaissance of coastal areas, attacks on British naval forces, support of troops operating in Norwegian valleys, and protection by fighters and flak of territory already taken.[129]

The attack against Denmark and Norway began on 7 April 1940. Ju52s dropped airborne troops on the periphery of the Danish capital as well as at two airfields at Ålborg. Land forces crossed the Danish frontier at the same time as seaborne forces landed on the Danish coastal islands. Within several hours, King Christian X had ordered his troops to cease fire, awed by a display of He111s and Do17s flying in massed formations over Copenhagen.[130] Germany had conquered Denmark with the loss of only twenty men killed and wounded.

The attack on Norway, which began concurrently with the attack on Denmark, quickly became the focus of extensive military action. German troops occupied the towns of Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, but they encountered determined opposition from Norwegian troops. Paratroops dropped on Oslo overwhelmed harbor forts that had sunk the German heavy cruiser Blücher as she had entered the fjord. Luftwaffe bombers knocked out forts at Christiansand protecting the harbor entrance so that the Kriegsmarine (Navy) could land troops. Large numbers of Ju52s delivered airborne troops to the strategically vital airfields at Fornebu (outside of Oslo) and Sola (near Stavanger). Long range twin-engined Bf110 fighters escorted the lumbering Ju 52s, but opposition was slight.[l31] Much of the small Norwegian fighter force, its equipment largely obsolete, was destroyed by attacks on the airfields that preceded the paratroop drops. The Germans soon occupied the airfields and rushed in additional reinforcements by air.

The operation did not continue unopposed. The Royal Navy stepped up pressure on the coastal towns occupied by the Germans. At Narvik the besieged Germans under General Eduard Dietl had to be supplied and then reinforced by air.[132] British troops landed at Narvik, Namsos, and Andalsnes on 15-17 April. The Luftwaffe was forced to redirect its efforts against the British landing, the amphibious transports, and their naval escorts. Level and dive bomber units mounted continuous sorties. In the face of negligible air opposition, they inflicted serious damage on the British force.[133] German control of the airfields, a result of their successful surprise attacks, was crucial to turning back the British landing force. Indeed, the British had to call off a direct seaborne attack on the Trondheim area because the fleet would have been subject to air attack.[134] The distances were too great for the RAF to maintain a sizeable air contingent, and this prevented the British from establishing a force inside Norway. Luftwaffe reconnaissance planes spied an attempt by the RAF to operate old Gladiator fighters from frozen lakes. Shortly, German bombers arrived, unloading explosives which broke up the ice and destroyed the landing surface. Towards the end of the campaign, a small number of Hurricanes appeared, but it was too late for them to have much of an effect on the fighting.

At maximum strength, the Luftwaffe in Norway (Fliegerkorps X) comprised over 700 aircraft There were 360 long-range bombers (He 111s and Ju88s), 50 dive bombers (Ju87s), 50 single-engined fighters (Bf 109s), 70 twin-engined fighters (Bf 110s), 60 reconnaissance craft (Do17s) and 120 coastal types (He 115s, He 59s, Do 18s).[135] In addition to these aircraft, 500 Ju52s were made available for transport, supplemented by a small number of four-engined Ju90Bs [136] and Focke Wolf Fw200 Condors.

Throughout Weserübung, the Germans made extensive use of air transport to move, supply, and reinforce troops. Indeed, the primary function of the Luftwaffe in the seizure of Scandinavia was that of a transport service. The German expedition’s commander, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, wished to execute a friendly invasion, and for this reason, the Luftwaffe’s role as an air shuttle service was emphasized. German air transport theory was fully and successfully tested. Other lessons learned during the Scandinavian campaign stressed the importance of fighter escorts for bombers striking targets protected by fighters. Air superiority was crucial, enabling the Germans first to establish and then to maintain troops in isolated and otherwise inaccessible areas. Furthermore, the Germans inflicted grave damage on the Royal Navy ships protecting the attempted seaborne landings at Trondheim. As Sims notes, “Air power properly installed and employed could force even the most powerful ships and navies from waters within aerial bombing range.” [137] The surprise occupation of towns like Oslo and Stavanger was made possible only by the use of paratroops and air-landed units. Air reconnaissance, carried out extensively over the broad reaches of the Scandinavian peninsula, facilitated communications in areas where roads were poor. Reconnaissance also pinpointed the location of the Royal Navy, enabling the Luftwaffe and the German Navy to sink several British transport- and warships.

In short, the Luftwaffe learned five lessons in Scandinavia. Paratroops and airborne operations rendered surprise easy, caused confusion among enemy troops, and invested the attacking German troops with the initiative; the air force intervened effectively in ground fighting in the rugged terrain of the peninsula; reconnaissance aircraft facilitated communications between pockets of isolated infantry and furnished accurate information on the whereabouts of enemy concentrations; air transport proved invaluable in delivering, supplying and maintaining troops from the air; and air power inflicted great damage on naval ships lacking aerial escort. Many of these lessons served well in the planning of the next German move, an attack against the Low Countries and France.

Battle in the West (10 May - 26 June 1940)

The German attack against Holland, Belgium, and France began on 10 May 1940. The Luftwaffe arrayed over 4,000 planes against the Allies 1,700, a mismatch that to a large extent indicated the course of the battle. Against 1,680 bombers, France and England could gather only 830 fighters, while the Luftwaffe could put over 800 Bf 109s into the air to escort their bombers.[138] Of the total German planes available for the attack, there were 1,300 long-range bombers, 380 dive bombers, 860 single-engined fighters, 350 twin-engined fighters, 640 reconnaissance planes, 475 transport aircraft, and 45 assault gliders.[139]

For the fourth time in as many campaigns, the Luftwaffe’s role in the Battle against France and the Low Countries was primarily that of support and transport. Initially, the Luftwaffe was to gain control of the air. Then, it was to clear the way for airborne operations by powerful attacks on enemy airfields. In conjunction with airborne attacks, Ju52s were to transport paratroops to their destinations. Subsequent to and subject to the success of these objectives, the Luftwaffe was to support the Wehrmacht’s armored thrust westward. Finally, the Luftwaffe was to supply the advancing mechanized and ground troops, keeping disparate forces in motion and in contact with command headquarters.[140] Hitler added, perhaps superfluously, that “the air force will prevent attacks by the Anglo-French air forces on our army and will give all necessary direct support to the advance.” [141]

The meticulously prepared and well-integrated attack of the German army and air force in the Low Countries was overwhelming. The Luftwaffe bombed and strafed Dutch and Belgian airbases, destroying the meager and obsolete equipment those countries possessed. Luftwaffe paratroops seized bridges and road junctures, while glider forces assaulted the Belgian fortress of Eban Emad. This fortress, an underground system of fortifications manned by 1,200 Belgian soldiers and reputed to be impregnable, was besieged by 85 German assault pioneers until German reinforcements arrived on 11 May, forcing the garrison to capitulate.[142] The element of surprise was achieved by means of airborne gliders, which had been towed by Ju52s from Cologne and released over Aachen, 15 miles from the fortress.[143] At the Hague, airborne troops captured the three main airfields and took the important Moerdijk bridge near Rotterdam. However, a plan to capture the Dutch Royal family and government failed.[144] The Willems bridge, spanning the Meuse River in the center of Rottertlam, was seized in an unorthodox attack by troops landed on the river by He59 floatplanes. Holland surrendered on 15 May and the Belgian Army laid down its arms thirteen days later.

The focus of the battle then shifted towards France and the all-important Meuse River crossing. The west bank of the Meuse was strongly fortified, for the river marked the last natural boundary and impediment between the advancing German forces and the French countryside beyond. On 13 May at 4 PM, the Luftwaffe began to bombard French positions on the west bank. As the battle got underway, the Luftwaffe acted as a mobile artillery barrage, providing powerful and direct air support for ground troops. The French Air Force, in the process of converting to a new generation of aircraft, proved less than a match for the Luftwaffe. Operational ready-rates in the Armée de l’Aire squadrons were as low as 40 percent.[145] German reconnaissance gave the German High Command a detailed picture of the British and French forces. In the remaining hours before darkness, the Luftwaffe carried out over 500 sorties by dive and level bombers. As in Poland, when Richthofen had shared his quarters with the army’s General Reichenau to facilitate close interservice cooperation, General Heinz Guderian carefully worked out a plan ahead of time with General Bruno Loerzer, head of Fliegerkorps II (Air Force Corps II), to coordinate the attack.[146] The two men decided that continuous support by the Luftwaffe would best serve the troop movements. Continuous dive bombing attacks prevented French artillerymen from firing at the German infantry crossing the Meuse. By nightfall, the troops had established a bridgehead on the west bank.

An example of the devastation wreaked by the Luftwaffe took place at the town of Sedan, situated on the banks of the Meuse. On 13 May, Do17s accompanied by He111s unloaded explosives on the town for over four hours, demolishing telephone lines, roads, railroad tracks, and many buildings. Following the conventional bombers, Stukas stacked in layers dove on the city for a total of five more hours, dropping 500 pound bombs which penetrated reinforced bunkers, upended artillery pieces, and flattened barracks. The bombers were effectively guarded by Bf109s and Bf110s which fended off British and French fighters.

The following day, as the tanks prepared to cross the Meuse, Bf109s shot down half of a French bomber squadron which had launched an attack on the pontoons spanning the river. A second attempt by the RAF Advanced Strike Force under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, with 71 Blenheims and Battles, and an assortment of 250 French Moranes, Curtisses, and Dewoitine fighters, suffered a similar fate. The attack was decimated by flak and Bf109s which broke through the fighter screen to shoot down 40 bombers. In the aerial melee, 50 of the Allied fighters also perished. “No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the RAF.” [147] The advancing German Panzers forced the French Army divisions to retreat and resistance along the river disappeared.

The rapid deployment of troops and equipment essential to the mobile warfare practiced by the Germans was made possible by the Ju52 transport planes. Fuel, spare parts, ammunition, and ground personnel were flown to their destinations because the Meuse bridge crossings were often congested. Thereafter, as the mechanized Panzer corps advanced, the supply lines lengthened dangerously. The Ju52s again played a vital role, transporting all the necessary supplies. The lumbering craft themselves had to be moved forward to new airbases every day. The rapid German advance was indicative of the course of the fighting, which became a rout of the Allied forces.

As the German troops moved northwest towards the English Channel some 200 miles away, long-range bombers with fighter escorts attacked a broad spectrum of targets, from railway marshalling yards to all movements of the Allied armies. The French and British forces were subject to incessant bomber and fighter attacks, usually conducted at low levels to achieve surprise and accuracy. Bf109s and Bfl10s rained a veritable hail of machine gun and cannon fire on enemy troops. Bombers followed closely behind with explosives fused for a delay of several seconds to ensure ground level explosion.[148]

The French and British armies retreated towards the coastal town of Dunkirk. Göring pleaded with Hitler to permit the Luftwaffe to be the sole instrument of the Allied armies’ destruction. Hitler acceded, and ordered General Guderian’s tanks to halt outside of Dunkirk. What followed was the first rebuff of the Luftwaffe in World War II. British fighters, operating closer to their bases than the German planes, could remain over the Dunkirk beaches for a longer period of time than the BF109s and Ju87s. The Spitfire fighters proved a match for the snout-nosed 109s, and as a result, the Luftwaffe failed to achieve air superiority.[149] During the nine days between 26 May and 3 June, the Luftwaffe lost 240 planes to the RAF’s 177.[150] Poor weather also prevented the German fighters and bombers from achieving the prolonged concentration of attack essential to success.[151] Frustrated by the quantitatively and qualitatively equal British fighters, the Luftwaffe also discovered that bombing the beaches was ineffectual. “Dropping 110 and 550 pound bombs into the soft sand was like stuffing firecrackers deep into sawdust.” [152] To deprive the Luftwaffe of the visibility afforded by daylight, British and French troops were evacuated under cover of darkness. Countered at almost every turn, the Luftwaffe focused on the ships transporting the Allied armies across the English Channel. 243 of the 861 ships involved in the evacuation from Dunkirk were sunk by German bombers.[153] Nevertheless, the bulk of the Allied troops escaped -338,226 men - and the Germans had to be content with the mass of equipment left behind.

Although France capitulated on 26 June 1940, the Luftwaffe’s failure over Dunkirk contained ominous signs for the future aerial attack on Britain. Yet, the air doctrine applied by the German Air Force in the last continental campaign of 1940 had not been rendered invalid. The air support throughout the 46 day battle was fundamentally a large scale application of the lessons learned in Spain and improved in Poland. The validity of those lessons was, if anything, strengthened. The Luftwaffe successfully attained air superiority until Dunkirk, and control of the air proved to be an element essential to the success of the ground troops. The Luftwaffe followed through on its close cooperation with the mechanized ground forces, delivering, supporting, supplying, and reinforcing paratroops and infantry. The reputation of the Stuka was further enhanced in the campaign. as it destroyed enemy dugouts, fortifications, pill-boxes, and tanks with frightening accuracy. The potential logistical problems brought about by the rapid advance of the army was averted by the dependable Ju52 transport plane.

Luftwaffe failures in the West taught the Germans that formations of unescorted bombers could not survive in the face of a well-equipped and determined fighter opposition, such as the British mustered over Dunkirk. The German bomber crews who believed their Do17s to be as fast as British fighters, and were therefore possessed of a reasonable chance of success in a dogfight, were quickly disillusioned.[154] The German fighter crews also realized that the twin-engined Bf110 could not confront the single-engined British fighters.[155] The Luftwaffe had been dealt a sobering lesson at Dunkirk. This lesson was soon followed by an even more disastrous defeat in the skies over the British Isles.

Conclusion

Despite the Luftwaffe’s failure over the beaches of Dunkirk, the lessons derived from the Condor Legion experience in the Spanish Civil War were not invalidated. Rather, the aerial battles over Dunkirk finally revealed that some of the lessons the Luftwaffe drew from the Spanish War experiences had been misinterpreted and misapplied.

Luftwaffe air warfare doctrine was encapsulated in Luftwaffedienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung. Throughout the course of the Spanish War and the campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France, the Luftwaffe adhered faithfully to three basic air warfare rules. The first was the subjection of the enemy air force and the attainment of air superiority. Second was the support of the army and the navy (especially of the army). Third was the destruction of the enemy’s industrial base and the disruption of his means to wage war.

In Spain, the Condor Legion followed only the first two rules. Spain had very little industry, and the nature of the civil war often precluded attacks on Spain’s meager industrial base. Nevertheless, the application of these two rules resulted in success, and within the context of those rules, tactics were conceived and bore fruit. Close ground support tactics were developed by Wolfram von Richthofen. Fighter tactics evolved, primarily under the tutelage and perseverance of Werner Mölders. Daylight bombing, night bombing, dive bombing, and naval bombing were practiced and refined. The Condor Legion learned and absorbed the advantages afforded by mobility and rapid deployment of men and equipment. The structure and organization of the Condor Legion was rationalized and improved. When the Condor Legion returned to Germany in March 1939, it brought with it experienced pilots who taught and trained new Luftwaffe recruits. Inevitably, the Condor Legion brought back to Germany combat lessons and field experience which nourished the minds planning the next Luftwaffe campaign, the assault on Poland.

The Polish campaign demonstrated on a larger scale the value of the lessons learned in Spain. As in Spain, the Luftwaffe concentrated on destroying the enemy’s air force and attaining air superiority. This accomplished, the Luftwaffe proceeded to the second rule, support of the army. The Blitzkrieg, first employed in Poland, combined mechanized Panzer units and air power to devastate the Polish Army. Reflecting the rapidity of the German advance, the Poles surrendered after four short weeks, their army and air force crushed. The Luftwaffe’s major contributions were close ground support tactics, dependable air transport, and accurate dive bombing. Luckily for the Luftwaffe, the Polish Campaign was too short to reveal its supply and equipment deficiencies. Nevertheless, its strategy and tactics proved spectacularly successful, and it had time to recuperate before the next campaign.

The Weserübung against Scandinavia followed the basic pattern established in Poland. The Luftwaffe quickly attained air superiority and used paratroops for the first time in modern warfare to achieve complete surprise. The Luftwaffe then supported the German ground forces, providing reconnaissance and transport services to bolster the army’s assault. By the end of the campaign on 10 June, the Luftwaffe had learned the importance of fighter escorts for bombers, the ability of air power to force naval ships from waters within aerial bombing range, the necessity of air reconnaissance, the surprise rendered by airborne assault, and the positive services provided by air transport. These lessons formed the foundation for Germany’s last continental victory.

Against Holland, Belgium, and France, the Luftwaffe applied its well-tested air warfare doctrine, again achieving success. Gliders delivered airborne troops, an innovation which enabled 85 men to capture the fortress of Eban Emael. The army and air force cooperated closely, relentlessly forcing the Allied army to retreat. The French Air Force, like the Polish, Norwegian, Belgian and Dutch air forces before it, failed to halt the Luftwaffe, while suffering grievous losses trying. At Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe was finally rebuffed by the Royal Air Force, which enjoyed qualitative and quantitative equality.

Over four years, the Luftwaffe showed the world air power unexcelled. The essence of its strategy was air superiority. Without superiority in the air, troops could not be easily transported, motorized ground units could not move rapidly, enemy troop concentrations could not he disrupted, and enemy fortifications and communications could not he destroyed. When the Luftwaffe failed to attain air superiority, as at Dunkirk, it failed to win. The lessons learned in Spain, and enlarged and elaborated in the succeeding European campaigns, were faithfully though not always correctly applied. After the fall of France, the Luftwaffe’s neglect of heavy bombers, long-range fighters and radar manifested itself. The British began to out produce the Luftwaffe, and the Russian quagmire swallowed entire squadrons. There can be no question that the Spanish Civil War decisively affected the development of Luftwaffe operational doctrine. There can also be no question that initially, the result of that doctrine was success, demonstrated as the Luftwaffe rendered indispensable assistance in the triumphs over Germany’s enemies. At the same time, the Luftwaffe’s deceptively easy victories hid the seeds of its defeat. Although this defeat was a long time in coming, often masked by brilliant German inventions and innovations, come it did. Like the air forces it had helped vanquish, the Luftwaffe too learned defeat.

Notes

[1]	Alfred Price, A Pictorial history of the Luftwaffe, 1933-45 (London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 11.
[2]	Hauptmann Dr. (E) Eichelbaum, Die Lüftmächte der Welt: Ein Bilderwerk. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1939, p.16.
[3]	Edward L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry. 1919-1939. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1976, p.l70.
[4]	Flak is a contraction of the Flieger abwehr kanone (anti-aircraft gun).
[5]	Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler’s Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), p.252.
[6]	David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Luftwaffe Marshal Erhard Milch. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1973), p.49.
[7]	Homze, p.170.
[8]	Jesus Salas Larrazabal, Air War Over Spain. Trans. Margaret A. Kelley (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969), p. 68.
[9]	Irving, p. 50.
[10]	Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War. (London: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 330.
[11]	Irving, p.50
[12]	Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1982), p.113
[13]	Beevor, p. 113
[14]	Proctor, p. 255
[15]	Homze, p. 170.
[16]	Paul Deichmann, Der Chef im Hintergrund: Ein Leben als Soldat von der preußischen Armee bis zur Bundeswehr. Hamburg: Stalling Verlag GmbH, 1979.), p. 58. Also see Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation publishing Company of America, Inc., 1985), pp. xi-xiii (Introduction) on Douhet’s doctrine of “strategic bombing.”
[17]	Deichmann, p. 58.
[18]	Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe. (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1978.), pp.46-7. Wever had thought about the creation of a “strategic” air force of which a long-range four-engined bomber was to be the mainstay. This was reflected by a project to develop the “Ural” bomber, a long-range bomber to be used to strike eastward at Russia’s industrial base. After Wever’s death, the “Ural” bomber project was scrapped.
[19]	Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 9.
[20]	R.J. Overy. The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day. 1980), p.10
[21]	Deichmann, pp. 60-6l.
[22]	Irving, p. 72.
[23]	Great Britain Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: 1933-45. With an introduction by H.A. Probert (London Arms & Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd.. 1983). p. 45.
[24]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 42.
[25]	Williamson Murray, “The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West,” p.8.
[26]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 44.
[27]	Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 11.
[28]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 43.
[29]	Homze, p. l7l.
[30]	Edward Jablonski, Terror from the Sky (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company. Inc. 1971), p.15
[31]	Edward H. Sims, Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1939-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, publishers. Inc. 1972), p.92.
[32]	Beevor, p. 18.
[33]	Jablonski, p. 15.
[34]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
[35]	Proctor, p. 90.
[36]	Proctor, p. 257.
[37]	Proctor, p. 90.
[38]	Heinkel He51 biplane performance statistics: SPEED - 205 m.p.., CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 242 miles, ARMAMENT - two machine guns.(from Proctor, p.89.)
[39]	Proctor, pp. 256-57.
[40]	Proctor, p. 242.
[41]	Proctor, p. 149.
[42]	Junkers Ju52 performance statistics: SPEED - 165 m.p.h., CEILING - 18,000 feet, RANGE - 800 miles, TROOP CAPACITY - 17, CARGO CAPACITY - 2,000 pounds. Three-engined transport plane used to carry cargo or troops and to tow gliders.[from Gurney, p. 340.]
[43]	Proctor, p. 153.
[44]	The Bfl09 was designed by Willy Messerschmitt who worked for the Bayerishe Flugzeugwerke (Bavarian Aircraft Company). This explains why the prefix “Me” is occasionally used in place of the “Bf.”
[45]	Proctor, p. 153.
[46]	Proctor, p. 165.
[47]	Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe: Forging the Secret German Air Weapon, 1918-1940 (New York: The Dial Press, 1973), p. 236.
[48]	Proctor, p. 256.
[49]	James J. Halley, The Role of the Fighter in Air Warfare, ed. Charles W. Cain (New York: Ziff-Davis Flying Books, 1978), p. 34.
[50]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 49. Messerschmitt Bf109 performance statistics: SPEED - 354 m.p.h. at 12,300 feet, CEILING - 37,500 feet, RANGE - 412 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 3,100 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - two 20mm cannon and two 7.9mm machine guns.[from Sims, p. 90.]
[51]	Homze, p. 171.
[52]	Proctor. p. 256. The lead plane flew at the tip of a cone-shaped figure, while the wingman flew in a large two-dimensional circle some distance behind, drawing an imaginary “cone” in the air.
[53]	Jablonski, p.15.
[54]	Sims, p. 139.
[55]	Proctor, pp. 82-3.
[56]	The attempt to combine elements of both fighters and bombers in one plane began in 1934. The Luftwaffe wanted a multipurpose, high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance aircraft that could fulfill a battle-plane function. This Kampfzerstörer was to have a speed of 240 m.p.h., a range of 1,200 miles, and a night-flying capability. The Focke-Wulf FW57 and the Henschel Hs124 were developed to fulfill these requirements. However, the Luftwaffe Technical Office soon recognized the difficulties in reconciling the dual assignment, and terminated the program. The requirement for a speed bomber were ultimately met by the Ju88.[from Homze, pp. 127-8]
[57]	Proctor. p.136.
[58]	Beevor, p.139.
[59]	In this instance, Stuka refers to the Junkers Ju87 dive bomber. However, the word is a contraction of the German Sturzkampfflugzeug (dive bomber), and thus actually describes all dive bombers, not any particular one.
[60]	Heinkel He1ll performance statistics: SPEED - 255 m.p.h., CEILING - 27,500 feet, RANGE - 1,100 miles, BOMB LOAD - up to 4,000 pounds.[from Gurney, p. 339.]
[61]	The plane was too slow, too heavy, unmaneuverable, lacked power reserve, had poor climbing characteristics, an excessively dispersed and poorly co-ordinated crew and unsuitable radios.
[62]	Homze. p. 173.
[63]	The Junkers Ju88 was designed in 1935 according to requirements set down by Walther Wever for a conventional high-speed bomber. The first operational model could carry two tons of bombs at 300 m.p.h and had a range of 2,000 miles. After Spain showed the failure of horizontal bombing. Junkers was ordered to redesign the plane with a dive-bombing capability. The resulting plane was a catastrophe. It was slower than the obsolescent He111, take-offs were difficult with full tanks and the plane had a nasty habit of catching on fire while in flight. Eventually after many modifications, the plane proved very successful.[from Irving. pp. 107-8.]
[64]	Proctor, p. 82.
[65]	Beevor, p. 18.
[66]	Proctor. pp. 182-3, Junkers Ju87 (”Stuka”) dive bomber performance statistics: SPEED - 254 m.p.h, CEILING - 24,000 feet, RANGE - 600 to 1,200 miles.[from Gurney. p. 341.]
[67]	Beevor. p.22. The Luftwaffe training wing, the Lehrgeschwader, conducted extensive high-altitude bombing exercises at Greifswald with disappointing results. Bombing from an altitude of 13,000 feet, experienced crews with no opposing ground fire in He111 and Do17 level bombers placed only 2 percent of their bombs inside a circle with radius of 330 feet. At 6,500 feet, their average increased to between 12-25 percent. The Ju87 dive bomber proceeded to put 25 percent of its bombs in a circle with a radius of only 165 feet [from Mason. p.254.]
[68]	Allen Andrews, The Air Marshals: The Air War in Western Europe (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1970). p.30.
[69]	Willard C. Frank. Jr., “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War. 1936-1939.” Naval War College Review, January-February, 1984. p.33.
[70]	Frank, p.46.
[71]	Homze, p.173
[72]	Great Britain Air Mirustry. p.44.
[73]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 17. In a conversation with Dr. Ernst Heinkel in April 1940. Ernst Udet, Director of Air Armament said, “I never really thought there would be a war with Britain.” [from Irving, p. 83.]
[74]	Frank, p.48.
[75]	Proctor, p.91.
[76]	Proctor, p. 150.
[77]	Proctor, p. 30.
[78]	Andrews, p. 30.
[79]	Homze, p.l73
[80]	Overy, p.9.
[81]	Proctor, p.96
[82]	Homze, p.171.
[83]	Great Britain Air Ministry, pp.17-18.
[84]	Proctor, p. 134.
[85]	Overy. pp 89.
[86]	Proctor, p.45.
[87]	Murray, Luftwaffe. p. 17.
[88]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p. 14.
[89]	Homze, p.172.
[90]	Murray, Luftwaffe, p.17.
[91]	Macksey, p.55.
[92]	Andrews, p.29.
[93]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p.45.
[94]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p.42.
[95]	Homze, p.174.
[96]	Homze, p.171.
[97]	Proctor, p.253.
[98]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p.14.
[99]	Homze,p.171.
[100]	Air Ministry, p.17.
[101]	Beevor, p.258.
[102]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p.53.
[103]	Murray, p.31.
[104]	Irving, p.81.
[105]	Gurney, p.43.
[106]	Andrews, p.8l.
[107]	Irving, p. 81.
[108]	Great Britain Air Mnistry, p.54.
[109]	Irving, p.18.
[110]	The Polish Air Force in 1939 numbered only about 400 aircraft, all but 160 of which were fighters. The majority of the fighters were P.11s, gull-winged monoplanes of a design dating back to 1931; performance statistics; SPEED - 240 m.ph. at 18,000 feet, 186 m.p.h at sea level, ARMAMENT - initially two, and later four light machine guns. The Bfl09s surpassed the P. 11s in every performance category. (from Mason, p.293.)
[111]	Halley, p.56.
[112]	Mason, p.293.
[113]	Price, p.18.
[114]	Mason, pp 288-89.
[115]	Mason, p.293.
[116]	The Henschel Hsl23 had a 880 hp BMW radial engine with a 210 m.p.h. top speed. The plane was designed to operate at altitudes under 500 feet. Four types of armament were possible: (1) two twin machine guns firing through the propellor, (2) two 20mm cannon in pods under the wings, (3) underwing containers holding 94 small 4.4 pound anti-personnel bombs, or (4) four 110-pound high-explosive bombs. Additionally, the plane carried a small auxiliary fuel tank underneath the fuselage that could be jettisoned with a napalm-like effect.[from Mason, pp 297-299.]
[117]	Murray, p.32.
[118]	Mason, p. 298.
[119]	Mason, pp.301-02.
[120]	Macksey, pp. 62-63.
[121]	Murray, “The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West,” p.16.
[122]	Murray, “The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West,” p.17.
[123]	Mason, p. 291.
[124]	Price, p.19.
[125]	Gurney, p.43.
[126]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p 57.
[127]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p 57
[128]	, p.38.
[129]	Great Britain Air Ministry. pp. 63-64.
[130]	Mason, pp. 319-21.
[131]	Halley. pp. 64-65.
[132]	Mason, pp. 334-35.
[133]	Price, pp. 20-21.
[134]	Sims, pp.116-17.
[135]	Price, pp. 20-2l.
[136]	These were Lufthansa derivatives of the scrapped “Ural” bomber design.
[137]	Sims, p. 116.
[138]	Mason, pp. 340-1.
[139]	Price, p.22.
[140]	Murray, p.38.
[141]	Murray, p.38.
[142]	The fortress Eban Emael was completed in 1935. It was 1/2 mile long, almost that wide, and festooned with 3″ and 5″ gun turrets, supplemented by machine gun cupolas. Its reputation of impregnability was similar to that of the Maginot Line in France. See also Bekker, Cajus. The Luftwaffe War Diaries. Ed. and Trans. Frank Ziegler. Garden City, NY; Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968., pp.93-100.
[143]	Mason,p.344.
[144]	Price, p.22.
[145]	Murray. pp.41-42.
[146]	Murray, p.41.
[147]	Mason, pp.352-53.
[148]	Great Britain Air Ministry, p.70.
[149]	The Spitfire model J had performance characteristics very similar to the Bf109 (see above). SPEED - 362 m.p.h. at 19,000 feet, CEILING - 35,000 feet, RANGE - 395 miles, INITIAL CLIMB RATE - 2,500 feet/minute, ARMAMENT - eight .303 inch machine guns. (from Sims, p.90.)
[150]	Murray, pp.42-43.
[151]	Macksey, pp. 73-74.
[152]	Mason, p.358.
[153]	Mason, p.358.
[154]	Sims, pp. l00-01.
[155]	Though the Bfl10 was designed as a long-range fighter, it was easily outmaneuvered by the nimble British Spitfires. In any case, the Luftwaffe never had enough of them. Drop tanks designed to extend the range of the Bf109s, though initially tested in Spain, were not widely used, nor were aircrews trained in their employment. A reluctance on the part of pilots to experiment with the drop tanks was understandable in light of the pilots’ inexperience with them, and because usage had not yet become routine or standardized. (from Murray, “The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West,” p.9.)

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Secondary Sources

Alegi, Gregory. “Italian Fighters in the Spanish Civil War.” Yale University term paper, History 428b, Spring 1985.
Andrews, Allen. The Air Marshals: The Air War in Western Europe. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1970.
Beevor, Antony. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Peter Bednek Books, 1982.
Collier, Basil. A History of Air Power. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974.
Deichmann, Paul. Der Chef im Hintergrund: Ein Leben als Soldat von der preußischen Armee his zur Bundeswehr. Hamburg: Stalling Verlag GmbH, 1979.
De Seversky, Major Alexander P. Victory Through Air Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1942.
Faber, Harold, ed. Luftwaffe: A History. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, Inc., 1977.
Frank, Willard C., Jr. “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.” Naval War College Review, January-February 1984, pp. 25-55.
Galland. A., K. Ries and R. Ahnert. The Luftwaffe at War, 1939-1945. Trans. D. & I. Dunbar. Ed. David Mondey. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972.
The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force. 1933-1945. Intro. Air Commodore H.A. Probert. By the Great Britain Air Ministry. London: Arms & Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1983.
Gurney, Major (USAF) Gene. The War in the Air. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1962.
Halley, James J. The Role of the Fighter in Air Warfare. Ed. Charles W. Cain. New York: Ziff-Davis Flying Books, 1978.
Homze, Edward L. Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry. 1919-1939. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1976.
Irving, David. The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Luftwaffe Marshal Erhard Milch. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1973.
Jablonski, Edward. Terror from the Sky. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971.
Kosin. Rüdiger. Die Entwicklung der deutschen Jagdflugzuege. Koblenz: Bernard & Gräfe Verlag. 1983.
Larrazabal, Jesus Salas. Air War Over Spain. Trans. Margaret A. Kelley. Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969.
Macksey, Kenneth. Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe. London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1978.
Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr. The Rise of the Luftwaffe: Forging the Secret German Air Weapon, 1918-1940. New York: The Dial Press, 1973.
Murray, Williamson. Luftwaffe. Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1985.
Murray, Williamson. “The Luftwaffe against Poland and the West.” Unpublished Article.
Nowarra, Heinz J. Fernaufklärer 1915-1945: Entstehung, Entwicklung, Einsatz. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1982.
Overy, Richard J. The Air War. 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1980.
Price, Alfred (Flight Lieutenant). Pictorial History of the Luftwaffe, 1933-1945. London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1969.
Proctor, Raymond L. Hitler’s Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983.
Ries, Karl. Luftwaffen-Story, 1935-1939. Mainz, Verlag Dieter Hoffman, 1974.
Sims, Edward H. Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1914-1970. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1972.
Sims, Edward H. The Fighter Pilots: A Conparative Study of the RAF, the Luftwaffe, and the USAF in Europe and North Africa, 1939-1945. London: Cassel & Company, Ltd., 1967.
Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965.
Völker, Karl-Heinz. Die Deutsche Luftwaffe, 1933-1945: Aufrau, Führung and Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Ansalt GmbH., 1967. Vol. XIII.
Von Forell, Fritz. Werner Mölders. Flug zur Sonne: Die Geschichte des großen Jagdfliegers. Leoni am Stamberger Sec: Druffel Verlag, 1976.
Weal, Elke C. Combat Aircraft of World War II. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1977.

Summary of Major Campaigns and Offensives

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Advance of the Army of Africa: August 5-October 23, 1936. With clandestine Italian and German help, General Franco was able to circumvent the Republican fleet's blockade and bring his elite Army of Africa from Morocco to Andalucia in southern Spain. There, under General Yagüe, the army began to subdue the region, capturing cities and towns, securing a supply line and ultimately linking the two main Nationalist regions with the bloody capture of Badajoz on the Portuguese border. Driving toward Madrid, the Nationalists turned aside only to relieve the besieged garrison of the Alcázar. At no time were the Republican militias able to halt the drive, though taking thousands of casualties in the attempt.

Siege of the Alcázar: A small Nationalist garrison under Colonel Moscardó had withdrawn into the Fortress of the Alcázar accompanied by their families and some Republican hostages. Immediately the Republican government sought to reduce this Nationalist enclave so close to Madrid but despite shelling, bombings and explosive mines, the defenders were able to hold out until relieved by a Nationalist force diverted from the drive on Madrid. Franco was criticized for his decision to turn aside, but the decision to rescue the brave defenders, who had endured 69 days of siege and starvation, galvanized the Nationalist cause. The ruins of the ancient fortress had become a Nationalist symbol.

Battle of Cape Espartel: September 29, 1936. Attempting to end the Republican blockade of Spanish Morocco, a Nationalist naval squadron sailed from El Ferrol, comprising two cruisers, the Almirante Cervera and the Canarias under Captain Francisco Moreno. The cruisers surprised a number of Republican destroyers and sank one, the Almirante Ferrándiz, and damaged the Gravina. Nationalists took over the Strait of Gibraltar and began ferrying men from Morocco to Spain. This Nationalist supply route was maintained until the end of the war, despite the numerical superiority of the Republican navy.

The Battle of Madrid: October 29 - November 23, 1936. Nationalist offensive designed to take the capital and end the war. Led by their best troops, severely outnumbered Nationalist forces entered the Casa de Campo park and from the start faced fanatical resistance from their poorly trained and poorly armed foes. Casualties were heavy on both sides as the Nationalists seized the park and tried to force their way across the Manzanares river into the city. Captured plans found on a dead Nationalist officer in a destroyed Italian tankette gave the Republican Head of Armed Forces, General Miaja, the knowledge that the main drive would be through the Casa de Campo and into the University City and that other drives would be feints. He repositioned his forces and the Nationalists attackers found themselves facing hastily prepared positions and the best militia units the Republic had to offer. Still, determined Moroccan soldiers were able to break through at times. At one point, the communist orator, Dolores Ibarruri, known as "La Pasionara", arrived at a breakthrough and rallied the fleeing troops. At another time, General Miaja arrived at another breakthrough and exhorted the fleeing militia, "Cowards! Die in your trenches! Die with your General Miaja!" In both instances, the militia rallied and drove back the attackers, saving Madrid. Translated to Spanish, the cry of the French at Verdun, ¡ No Pasarán!(They shall not pass!) became the rallying cry of the city. The arrival of the first and best International Brigades bolstered the Republican line just at the time when the Nationalists had achieved a major breakthrough at the University City. Fighting within the medical clinic and lecture halls and classrooms of the complex, the Internationals and Spanish fought the Army of Africa to a bloody standstill. The battle was a stalemate and though house to house fighting would continue in the slum district of the Carabanchel, Madrid stayed in Republican hands until the end of the war.

The Battle of Villarreal: November 30 - December 5, 1936. The only Basque offensive of the war was designed to recapture Vitoria, capital of their southern province, ´Alava. The Basques attacked at Villarreal de ´Alava and surrounded the town but, spotted by Nationalist planes, the Nationalists were forewarned enough to prepare their own counteroffensive which drove the Basques off, aided by superior artillery and air support. The Basques retreated with heavy losses.

The Battle of the Coruña Road: December 14, 1936 - January 15, 1937. Frustrated in their attempt to directly take Madrid, the Nationalists launched the first of their major flanking offensives that would culminate in the Battle of Guadalahara. The Nationalist attack, designed to cut Madrid off from the Sierra Guadarrama and surround it from the north began with heavy bombardments and fierce infantry advances backed by light tanks. The Nationalist managed to seize about ten miles of highway, and the towns of Villanueva de la Cañada, Boadilla, Majadahonda, and Pozuelo. International Brigades were rushed to the front as shock troops and helped stem the advance until Spanish units could also be brought up. Republican counterattack was confused and though causing great casualties had no effect. Republicans lost about 15,000 men. Nationalist lost about the same and gained a small amount of territory. This battle was another frustrating stalemate for the Nationalists.

Battle of Málaga: January 17 - February 7, 1937. A combined Spanish and Italian offensive that reduced the Republican bulge into Nationalist lines along the Andalucian coast by taking the city of Málaga. Republican forces consisted of untrained militia as army reforms had not yet affected this backwater of the war and these proved incapable and unwilling to stand up to the tanks and aggressive troops of the Nationalists and their Italian allies. Nationalist forces were easily able to capture the city, whereupon executions of suspected Republican sympathizers began that would run into the thousands. Nationalist and Italian casualties were light, while the Republic lost thousands, only a small portion of which were in battle. A clear and humiliating defeat for the Republic which had many political repercussions in their government.

Battle of the Jarama: February 6-28, 1937. In another Nationalist bid to cut off Madrid, Nationalists attacked south of the city in the Jarama river valley, seized crossing points across the river and attempted to break through to Arganda. Stubborn resistance by the International Brigades and pure luck helped stall the offensive. Republican counteroffensive was largely ineffective and as costly an action as attacking was for the Nationalists. The best units of both sides, the Nationalist Army of Africa and the Republican International Brigades were attritioned very heavily. The result was a stalemate with the Nationalists capturing more territory at high cost while the Republicans prevented the severing of the Madrid-Valencia road, a vital lifeline to the city. Republicans lost 25,000 while the Nationalists lost 20,000. Two subsequent attacks on the 23rd of February and March 1st by the Nationalists to renew the Jarama offensive were ineffective and cost the Nationalists another 6000 casualties.

The Battle of Guadalahara: March 8-18, 1937. Italian offensive designed to cut off Madrid from the Northeast by capturing the provincial capital of Guadalahara. Supported by one Spanish Infantry Division, Italian units launched a motorized offensive that smashed Republican lines. Failure to aggressively exploit the breakthrough and bad weather, which confined attacking force to roads, allowed Republicans to build up and stop the drive. Republican counterattack recaptured some territory and routed the bulk of the Italian forces while Republican aircraft, flying from fields unhampered by bad weather, hammered the fleeing Italians from the air. Republican losses were about 2000 killed, and 4000 wounded. Italians lost 2000 killed, 4000 wounded and 400 captured. They also lost large amounts of equipment, trucks, artillery and tanks, some of which was captured by the Republic. Though technically a draw, based on the poor performance of the Italians and the successful Republican counterattack, Guadalahara was seen as a clear Republican victory.

The Basque Campaign: March 31 - June 19, 1937. Nationalist offensive of the Army of the North to conquer and seize Basque territories and industry. Supported by Italian troops, Italian Expeditionary Force and German Condor Legion aircraft, tanks, and an abundance of artillery, Navarrese Carlists of the Army of the North attacked poorly equipped Basques. Bad weather delayed offensive after initial gains but despite stubborn resistance, Basques were beaten and their capital, Bilbao, was taken. Nationalists captured their first industrial region when Basques refused to follow scorched earth policy that would leave their people destitute. Terror bombings of Guernica and Durango occurred during this campaign. Basques and allies suffered more than 30,000 casualties of which about a third were fatalities. Nationalists suffered about the same with approximately 4000 being killed.

Segovia Offensive: May 30 - June 3, 1937. Diversionary attack to relieve pressure on Basque front, Republican forces broke through Nationalist lines at San Ildefonso, reaching as far as La Granja before Nationalist counterthrust retook all of lost territory. Offensive delayed conquest of Basque provinces by only two weeks as Nationalists were forced to divert aircraft for counterattack. Republicans lost 1460 men (inc 360 Franco-Belgians from Commune de Paris Battalion). Nationalists lost 1100 men.

Huesca Offensive: June 13-18, 1937. Second offensive designed to divert Nationalist forces from Basque front, International and anarchist troops launched attack in Aragon, supported by armour deployed piecemeal. Attack was torn up by artillery and Republicans retired with 10,000 casualties and nothing to show for it. The Basque capital fell the next day.

The Battle of Brunette: July 6-25, 1937. Republican offensive designed to cut off units threatening Madrid through an offensive in the Estremadura region aimed at capturing the town of Brunette. Though well planned, command and supply problems manifested themselves at once and Republican insistence on reducing stubborn pockets of resistance rather than bypassing them allowed Nationalists to bring up reserves and counterattack. After counterattack, Republic retained conquests of Quijorna, Villanueva de la Cañada, Villanueva del Pardillo, and fifty square kilometers of territory. Republican losses amounted to 25,000 casualties, over a hundred tanks (80% of the armoured force), about 100 planes and a tremendous number of artillery and equipment. The Nationalists lost 10,000 men and 23 planes. Other losses are unspecified. Though Republicans claimed Brunette as a victory, the high losses of men and materiel for insignificant gains marked it as a clear setback for the Republic.

Santander Campaign: August 14-27, 1937. Continuing with their northern drive, Nationalists fought their way into the Northern Castillian region of Santander, defeating the Santandaristas and their disillusioned Basque allies, now homeless. Italian ground troop participation, which had been minimal against the Basques, was more pronounced and helped secure a quick Nationalist victory. 60,000 Republican prisoners were captured along with their material. A good number of these went on to join the Nationalist army.

Republican Aragón Offensive: August 24-September 27, 1937. Intended as another Republican showpiece, Republicans launched a full scale attack with some their best units designed to finally capture the main rail junction of Saragossa and secure all of Aragón for the Republic. Again, stubborn heroic Nationalist stands at places like Belchite preoccupied Republican attentions, allowing the Nationalists to build up countermeasures. Disastrous attack by Republican armour at Fuentes del Ebro again cost the Republic many precious tanks, including many new BT-5's. Stubborn and capable in defence, the Republic had still not managed to undertake a successful offensive.

Asturias Campaign: September 1-October 21, 1937. Final phase of Nationalist campaigns designed at the conquest of the Northern Republican territory that had begun with the reduction of the Basques. Though initially able to resist the Nationalists and Italians in bitter mountain contests, the Asturians, and their Santandarista and Basque allies were ultimately overwhelmed and the Republican forces were routed. Though the bulk of Nationalist forces were now freed for use elsewhere, large guerrilla bands continued to plague Nationalists and necessitate placing troops in this region for some months afterward. Guerrilla activity continued even after the war in some places.

Battle of Teruel: December 15, 1937-February 20, 1938. Republican offensive designed to forestall Nationalist offensive against Madrid by reducing the Nationalist Teruel salient which had penetrated Republican lines since the beginning of the war. Largely fought in miserable weather and bitter freezing cold where the climate was as much an enemy to both sides as they were to each other. Overwhelming Republican attack against a spirited and stubborn Nationalist defense goaded Franco into forestalling his planned Madrid offensive and retaking Teruel after it was lost to Republicans. Bitter defense of the Republicans failed to prevent advance of Nationalists and a Nationalist flanking attack at Alfambra with a spectacular cavalry charge helped turn the tide and trap the Republicans themselves in Teruel. Republicans were able to break out only after heavy losses. Initially designed as a showcase of Spanish endeavour, the Republicans had withheld the International Brigades from this battle but as the situation became more critical, the Internationals were deployed, however performing no better than other Republican troops. Insignificant in terms of territory, this battle again resulted in devastating manpower and material losses for the Republic, whose Aragón armies were so weakened as to be unable with withstand the following Nationalist counteroffensive into Aragón. Losses Nat - 50,000, a third due to cold, many aircraft to crashes and cold. Republicans - 60,000

Battle of Cape Palos: March 6, 1938. Inconclusive battle when two forces accidentally met in the Mediterranean, near Cape Palos. Nationalist cruisers Balares, Canarias and Almirante Cervera were escorting a convoy when happened upon by Republican cruisers, Libertad and Méndez Núñez and five destroyers. Republican torpedoes sank the Balares with nearly all hands, including Rear Admiral Manuel de Vierna. The two forces then separated and no further result was derived.

Nationalist Aragón Offensive and March to the Sea: March 9-July 19, 1938. Capitalizing on the weak state of the Republican Aragón armies after Teruel, the Nationalists and Italians launched a motorized offensive backed heavily by German and Italian air and well supported by Italian artillery. The depleted Republican forces were utterly routed and the Nationalists were able to march to the sea, cutting the Republican territory in two, crushing anything in their path. Widening the breach, Italians and Spanish Navarrese troops attempting to take Valencia ran up into well prepared, albeit untried, divisions unaffected by the Aragón collapse. In this defensive battle, the Nationalists lost 20,000 men and were halted short of Valencia, partly because of the Republican defense and partly because of the new Republican offensive across the Ebro. Other than for the defense of the territory before Valencia, this campaign marked a clear Republican disaster and, unless France intervened, heralded the beginning of the end for the Republic.

Battle of the Ebro: July 24-November 16, 1938. Growing impatience with German and Italian violation of non-intervention agreements convinced France to reopen her border with Republican Spain for a brief time. Until forced by the British, who were afraid of starting a new European war in Spain, to reclose the border, masses of waiting arms shipped by the Soviet Union, France and other nations were allowed to pour across. This enabled the Republicans to resupply the army devastated by the failure at Teruel. Instead of adopting a defensive position, the Republic planned a new offensive designed at relinking the two sundered Republican areas and prolonging the war until a general European conflict should force France and England to come to the Republic's aid. Accordingly, Republican commandos swam across the Ebro river at midnight and secured bridgeheads across to which were built several pontoon bridges during the night. Other than a failed assault by French Internationals in the south, the maneuver was successful and Republican troops crossed to engage the surprised Moroccans of the 50th Division. The 50th disintegrated, 4000 of its men captured and the rest dead or reeling backwards in confusion. Nationalist General Yagüe, who had nearly been captured, ordered the 13th Division to make a desperate forced march to meet the Republican tide at the town of Gandesa. Concentrating most of their armour and artillery, the Republicans failed to shake the hold of the 13th. Rather, forced by the Nationalist reaction, the Republicans determined to hold on by sheer determination, more for propaganda than tactical reasons. Nationalists, having the advantage of air and artillery superiority hammered away at Republican positions, forcing their way back to the Ebro at an incredibly slow pace. The Republicans adopted a stand and die attitude, ordering sergeants to shoot any officers who ordered retreat. By such sacrifices, it took the Nationalists well over three months to reconquer what the Republicans had taken in two days. But the cost to the Republic had been devastating. The Republicans lost 70,000 men, 200 aircraft and most of their material. Nationalists casualties amounted to 23,000 men.

Catalonian Campaign: December 23, 1938-February 9,.1939. Final major Nationalist offensive of the war, Nationalists armies overwhelmed tired Republican units who only made a few meaningful stands. Hordes of refugees poured into France. Nationalists captured Barcelona, then all of Catalonia, sealing the French frontier.

Casado Coup: March 4-12, 1939. The last major fighting of the war occurred solely between units of the Republican army when General Casado, commanding units in Madrid, attempted to oust the communists, who wanted to prolong the war until the bitter end. Casado, who wrongly believed the Nationalist command would give better terms of surrender to a fellow army officer, arrested or ousted several communist leaders. When Casado made his move to take over Madrid, Communist divisions left their lines and began to fight their way back into the city. The coup appeared failed when the anarchists of General Mera's 4th Army Corps came to the rescue, engaging the communist troops in street battles and forcing them back out of Madrid. The communists, by now highly unpopular in the army, were ousted from the Republican political scene and their influence was ended. Casado failed to secure any terms better than unconditional surrender, but did manage to bring the war to a close by April, stopping any further slaughter on the battlefield, though the pogroms of retribution would still go on.

"España en llamas"

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"España en llamas" is a special issue of Spanish magazine "Wargames, soldados y estrategia", which also has an English language version called, of course, "Wargames, Soldiers and Strategy".

The magazine has 138 pages and it adapts the Spanish Civil War to the "Flames of War" miniatures rules system.

The first pages are a historical introduction to the conflict,while the rest has several army lists, scenarios and missions for the game.

The magazine also includes an extra boardgame about the Spanish Civil War too, "El eco de los pasos"

CANT Z.501

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Dornier Do JIId Wal

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Breguet Bre. 19A.2

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Hawker Spanish Fury

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Grumman GE-23 Delfin

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Nieuport-Delage Ni-D 52

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ANALYSIS (2): HOW DID THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES AND THE USSR AFFECT THE COURSE AND OUTCOME OF THE WAR?

2010-05-30T21:16:00.002+08:00

The crash of revolution against reaction in the summer of 1936 resonated far beyond Spain. In the process, it produced responses that ranged from the altruistic to the Machiavellian. In the context of the Spanish Civil War, the concept of ‘foreign volunteer’ embraced a wide variety of beliefs and goals. This discussion will focus on the role of the International Brigades and the USSR, and contrasting views of their impact on the Spanish conflict.

The connections between the International Brigades and the USSR are open to interpretation. Was it with the approval of the Soviet government that the Comintern recruited the IBs (Alpert) or did Moscow request the Comintern to do it (Smyth)? Whatever its origins, the process of IB recruitment was organized by national Communist Parties and Comintern agents. That there were no Soviet names attached to these brigades is not surprising, since the Comintern ‘line’ was that this was an anti-fascist war for Spanish democracy, not a revolutionary war waged by the working class against capitalism. In this way the democracies abroad might be actively engaged in the Republican cause. On the other hand, the Comintern also ensured that Communists played a pivotal role in the IBs, not least as political commissars.

Contemporary perceptions of the International Brigades varied widely. Franco himself referred to the decisive part played by ‘foreign, perfectly organized units’ in the Nationalists’ failure to capture Madrid in 1936–7. In contrast, International Brigader Jason Gurney was deeply critical of IB organization and described André Marty, the French Comintern supremo at Albacete, as ‘quite literally mad at this time’. Soon disillusioned by his experiences, Gurney came to see himself as a pawn in a propaganda game. But for Gurney and his fellow-idealists, the Spanish Civil War per se was a prophetic metaphor for their own national liberation, an episode in a long and continuing crusade against the right’s abuse of power. Black Sea and Invergordon mutineers, victims of racism and the dole, leftists persecuted by fascist regimes, free-speech campaigners, pro-Bolshevik veterans of the Russian Civil War and intellectuals of all classes nailed their colours to the mast and would in later conflicts affirm the same spirit of commitment, despite the hostility of their national governments. The 35,000-plus IB volunteers in Spain operated within the Republican People’s Army and were, from 1937, formally integrated into it. They comprised 15 per cent of the forces defending Madrid in late 1936 and 18 per cent of the Republican army brigades at Brunete in July 1937.

Since Franz Borkenau’s sweeping assertion in the spring of 1937 that, ‘In fact, not Miaja but Kléber [Commander of the Eleventh IB], not the Spanish militia but the international brigades, had saved and still continued to save Madrid’, historians have evaluated and re-evaluated the IBs’ role in that military sector. Writing in the mid-1970s, Gabriel Jackson highlighted the IBs’ example to the militias in not wasting ammunition and in defensive tactics. For Stanley Payne, however, their role was secondary: Madrid’s defence was mainly achieved by the leftist militias. For Hills, although the IBs helped delay the Nationalists’ advance and crossing of the River Manzanares, their role in the capital’s defence was ‘important but not decisive’. Though Thomas affirms that the IBs limited the Nationalist advance in the University City, he and Mitchell concur that the Nationalists’ momentum had already been checked before the IBs arrived. More recently, Preston has re-emphasized the Eleventh Brigade’s vital defensive role and the Internationals’ importance in weapons training and morale-building. Whatever qualifications may be made, it is undeniable that a role in the saving of Madrid can be ascribed to the IBs.

The International Brigades, Borkenau had written, ‘continued to save Madrid’. The defence of Republican territory in the Battles of the Jarama and Guadalajara formed part of this process. In Crusade in Spain, written in the early 1970s, Jason Gurney threw a searchlight on to the IBs’ experience at Jarama: comradeship, heroism and individual cases of inspired leadership set against incompetence, squalor and tragedy. But despite appalling losses on the Republican side, including the British and American battalions of the IBs, the Nationalists failed to cut communications between Madrid and Valencia. Nor, at the Battle of Guadalajara in the following month, did they succeed in their advance on Madrid from the east. Borkenau went so far as to describe the Eleventh and Twelfth IBs as ‘the best brigades in the whole Spanish army’. But the humiliating success of the Garibaldi Battalion’s Italian exiles against the CTV may well have reinforced Mussolini’s resolve to hold out for a Franco victory by any means possible. Whatever the case, the CTV were to have their revenge against the IBs in Aragón, while, more immediately, the Nationalists’ failure at Guadalajara was to spell a grim future for the Republican north – soon to be the focus of Mola’s wrath by land, sea and air.

Of the Battle of Brunete (July 1937), Hills asserts, ‘This battle, unlike Brihuega [part of the Battle of Guadalajara] was overwhelmingly between Spaniards; especially at the most important and basic level of all, the infantry private.’ Indeed, though all five IBs took part (Eleventh to Fifteenth), there were also twenty-three Spanish brigades in the field. Yet Brunete was in some senses the IBs’ battle. They established a key bridgehead east of the Guadarrama River, and the British Battalion was in the thick of the desperate fighting, at the end of which only 7 per cent of its force of 600 were still battleworthy. Amid bitter recriminations, the British Battalion leaders were summoned to Communist Party HQ in London, while the Thirteenth IB mutinied and was eventually dissolved. Nevertheless, thanks to Brunete, Franco’s offensive in the north was disrupted.

A description of the Republican success in capturing Teruel (late December 1937) as ‘a bloody victory for an objective of little significance’10 can be challenged. The logic of Republican strategy could not be faulted – to pre-empt a Nationalist attack, ease communications with Aragón, and obstruct Nationalist routes out of Zaragoza. Similar rationality underpinned the Ebro Valley Offensive, launched by the Republic in July 1938 and the IBs’ last great confrontation with fascism in Spain: namely, to reconnect Catalonia with Spain’s central heartland and deflect the Nationalists from Valencia. But in both campaigns the Nationalists ultimately prevailed. Having suffered terrible losses in its attempt to take Hill 481, the British Battalion was finally withdrawn from the Ebro Campaign, and the war, in late September 1938, along with the nearly 13,000 other foreign volunteers operating in IB units. Neither the Condor Legion nor the CTV would follow their example.

The left-wing French historians Broué and Témime wrote in 1961, ‘Whatever their political views, journalists and writers have always stressed the influence of the commitment of the International Brigades in the stiffening of Republican resistance. They formed a corps d’elite involved in all the fighting of any importance until the end of October 1938.’ Enrique Lister suggested in the early 1980s that the IBs were ‘ambassadors representing millions of people in the world who were on the side of the Republic, on the side of Spanish democracy. Additionally, they played an important part in this or that battle.’

The Spanish Civil War became a phenomenon of history in which the International Brigades stand out in sharp relief. If Britain, France and the United States were not persuaded that Spanish democracy was a cause to which their own armies or armaments should be committed, who else was there apart from the brigaders to assist the Republic? Moreover, the IBs played a prominent role in defining the images we have of the Spanish Civil War, in written, oral and visual form. The names of their battalions and companies – Thaelmann, Garibaldi, Louis Michel, Lincoln, Dombrowski and Attlee – are testimony to the historical and moral imperative they embraced then and continue to personify now.

Buchanan has pointed out that it was the international communist movement that made the IBs possible. The Third Communist International, or Comintern, had been established in Moscow in 1919 to promote international revolution. However, it adopted a Popular Front policy in 1935 – an anti-revolutionary stance that was consistent with Stalin’s Socialism in One Country doctrine and appropriate to Spain’s need for a broad pro-democracy front against fascism. Apart from organizing the International Brigades, the Comintern had already inspired the Fifth Regiment (which Lister described as ‘a powerful preparation for the communist approach to the war’), which in turn invoked a new professionalism in the Republican army. Comintern officials such as Marty and Togliatti sat in on PCE executive meetings just as Soviet generals participated in those of the General Staff. The PCE and PSUC were Comintern affiliates; both welcomed a wide range of potential members.

The American Cold War historian and diplomat George F. Kennan wrote in 1960, ‘Eventually the Comintern gained strength and came to command the loyalty, and even obedience, of a sizable left-wing minority among the European labour movement. It remained, however, under strictest domination of the Russian communists, and soon became . . . a vehicle for the policies of the Soviet leaders rather than a political instrument and mouthpiece of international communist sentiment.’ But in the context of Spain, Kennan’s apparent inference that its ‘policies’ were motivated by Soviet imperialism is wide of the mark. For Soviet intervention was primarily, at least in the short and medium term, defensive; as Denis Smyth has pointed out, it was intended to encourage British and French intervention in Spain to defend the Republic and also their partnership with the Soviet Union in an anti-fascist European bloc.

Whatever British and French perceptions were, the USSR intervened in Spain with vitally timed matériel and military advisers who, monitored by Orlov’s NKVD, were attached to the staffs of Republican generals and played a significant part in the field, for example, at Guadalajara. Russians helped to implement the Republican war in the air, and, on the ground, to train the mixed brigades; Líster and Kléber had attended military training school in Moscow. The quid pro quo for such assistance was a political, economic and diplomatic presence in Spain, ‘constructive’ or ‘insidious’ depending on the perspective adopted; indeed, gratitude for Soviet food and state-of-the-art aircraft was paralleled by resentment of ‘Russian police methods [which], like Russian propaganda, were crude and offended patriotic susceptibilities’.

At government level, both Largo Caballero and Prieto had complicated relations with the USSR and PCE. But the line of argument advanced by historian Burnett Bolloten to the effect that Largo’s successor Negrín (Prime Minister May 1937–March 1939) was a puppet both of an imperialistic Stalin and a power-hungry Stalinist PCE has been disputed. Such writers as Angel Viñas in Spain and Helen Graham in the UK are concerned to place Negrín and the PCE in a more three-dimensional context: thus, the PCE was a coherent force in consolidating the Republican war machine, just as Negrín’s government needed all the Soviet aid Stalin could be persuaded to give, especially after the grave setbacks of 1938, whatever the price. Negrín also hoped that aid could so prolong the war that Britain and France would intervene when the conflict in Spain fused with the anticipated mass assault by European (including Spanish) fascism. But Colonel Casado believed Negrín’s reliance on the PCE was endangering the hope of a negotiated settlement with Franco. Hence his coup against Negrín and the ‘resisters’ in March 1939.

In the final analysis, the impact of the USSR can be perceived on at least four levels: that of an ‘alien’ ideology that engendered Franco’s crusade; that of direct intervention, crucial to the Republic’s survival; through the Comintern and the International Brigades; and through the PCE and PSUC with whom the USSR had close contact. The gradual withdrawal from the Republic of direct Soviet support was one of several factors subverting the Republic’s ability to wage war effectively. After the end of the war, Franco remained committed to his long standing anti-communist crusade. In Spain he had defeated an enemy but not a doctrine; abroad he would assist Hitler in his equally obsessive project. But in the latter case neither the Soviet army nor Soviet ideology would succumb to the Caudillo’s and the Führer’s zeal.

ANALYSIS (1): DID THE NATIONALISTS WIN, OR THE REPUBLICANS LOSE, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR?

2010-05-30T21:15:00.002+08:00

This question carries echoes of the Government and Politics ‘standard’: ‘Oppositions do not win elections. Governments lose them.’ Discuss. What is inferred is that mistakes on the part of those in power impose the ultimate price: defeat. In the context of the Spanish Civil War, did the Republic, through a catalogue of errors, lose to the Nationalists? Had it, moreover, seized defeat from the jaws of victory? Two hypotheses, admittedly qualified by hindsight, suggest that the Republic might have done just that. Hills, for example, argues that the Republic could have defeated the rebels by August 1936 had it executed a workable masterplan for cordoning Franco in Morocco and Mola in Navarre. Preston suggests that, had the government promptly armed the proletariat, revolt could have been turned into rout. Did a combination of mistakes and misfortune cost the Republic the war? Or were the Nationalists such brilliant tacticians and strategists, with such superior logistics and leadership, that the Republic had no hope of victory?

Payne has written of how Francisco Franco was ‘keenly aware of the importance of politicopsychological factors in civil war that made it dangerous not to annul immediately any leftist triumph’.2 Hence, for example, the relief of the Alcázar, Toledo, in September 1936 and the retaking of Teruel in February 1938 and, by that November, the Republican bridgeheads on the Ebro.

Franco was normally well served by his generals. These included the tireless Dávila, who succeeded Mola in June 1937 as Commander of the Army of the North; Orgaz, efficient overlord of mass conscription from March 1937; and Yagüe, a field commander skilled in rapid movement and the annihilation of resistance, as shown by the Army of Africa’s bloody advance from the south in August–October 1936 which brought the Nationalists close to Madrid.

Nationalist air supremacy was gained in 1937, and was decisive in the Northern campaign. On the ground, Franco’s speed in deploying reinforcements was put to critical use in July 1937 at Brunete, where the Republic’s ultimate failure was to have grave consequences for their position in the north, already jeopardized by the loss of Bilbao. Though the Italian CTV played an important role in this now-renewed Nationalist offensive, the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano was exaggerating matters when, referring to the Catalonian campaign in early 1939, he wrote, ‘[Our] General Gambara has luckily assumed the role of leader of all Spanish forces.’ Nevertheless, German and Italian aid throughout the war was both more abundant and more continuous than that accessible to the Republic. And its timing could be critical, as was the case from October 1938, and Franco’s counter-attack on the Ebro and the Catalonia Offensive that followed. Inexorably, the Nationalists strengthened their grip on Spain’s domestic resources – human, agricultural, mineral and industrial.

Critically, despite some self-inflicted damage to their moral standing abroad, for instance, Guernica, the Nationalists won the diplomatic war. November 1936 brought recognition by Hitler and Mussolini. Germany and Italy were also represented on the Non-Intervention Committee – which barred its doors to the Spanish Republic. The Nationalists had a sympathetic network in the League of Nations. This buttressed nonintervention and neutralized attempts by the Spanish Republic to make the League confront international aggression against it. In February 1939 came recognition of the Franco regime by Britain and France.

In Spain itself the Nationalists had the high-profile support of the Catholic Church, while the ‘old oligarchy’ was returned to power and influence, notably in the countryside. However, did Franco believe that he had fully vanquished Marxism, Freemasonry and pluralism by the end of March 1939? If not, when would he be confident enough to terminate the bloody repression of the post-war years? And when this closed regime began to open, could the process ever be reversed?

The Republic, notably in defence, certainly showed prowess during the Civil War: for example, in Madrid during late 1936 and in the hinterland north of Valencia when in the summer of 1938 the Republican Army of the Levante held back the Nationalist advance. General Rojo conceived brilliant plans for offensives during which Republican forces, including the International Brigades, at first struck forward incisively. However, political and military in-fighting often undercut the initial advantage, as at Brunete. At Belchite in Aragón, observes Payne, orders were so detailed as to discourage initiative among field officers, while the Nationalists’ recapture of Teruel in February 1938 led to debilitating recrimination within the Republican hierarchy. Whether officers were politically ‘sound’ was decided by the army’s Information and Control Department, which meant that skilled personnel spuriously dubbed ‘class enemies’ were excised from the war effort. On the other hand, the inadequacy of Republican field officers has been blamed for the loss of Málaga, a working port on the Andalusian coast, in February 1937.

The Republic held numerical advantage at sea but failed to capitalize on it. Many officers had been murdered by their crews in July 1936 and the engineers’ and sailors’ committees who commandeered the ships did not produce a disciplined strategy for victory at sea. The smaller Nationalist fleet gained naval supremacy and helped deter the transport of much-needed matériel to the Republican zone, for example, to Catalonia in early 1939. On the ground, indiscipline contributed to the fall of Málaga and the north (‘sudden collapses of weak units which rendered useless the resistance of heroic units’),4 and to the Nationalists’ successful march to the Mediterranean in the spring of 1938, when front-line Republican units disintegrated under the impact of ground and air attack.

If the mobilization of the Republican armed forces was flawed, what of its civilian population? The issue of Republican ‘unity’ can still be posed: Was it enough to be anti-fascist? The script of one anarchist propaganda film described the restaurants of collectivized hotels: ‘These large halls which once housed frivolous girls, tycoons, captains of industry, lazy aristocrats and international adventurers are now full of humble men and women living in a new society. Barcelona works and eats. That is its strength and its virtue.’ But morale-sapping divisions in Republican Catalonia, along with savage police repression, had long been endured. And by early 1939 Barcelona was starving.

Collectivization of industry and agriculture was and is highly controversial. Carr has argued that, along with the Basques’ and Catalans’ resolve to protect their autonomy, collectivization ‘restricted the creation of a planned economy and hampered the war industry’. Speaking in the early 1980s, José Antonio’s sister Pilar Primo de Rivera contrasted what she saw as the ‘chaos, the jumble of weird ideas’ in the Republican zone with the ‘order and tradition’ on the Nationalist side. However, she does not mention Negrín’s attempts to hammer out a more rational strategy for a war economy.

The Republic had to face many problems, not least the discontinuity in support from the Soviet Union and France. Aid was insufficient to match, let alone prevail over, the Nationalists’ strength. It has been said that Negrín’s hope was to activate British and French support in a wider war against international fascism. However, the first possible occasion in 1939 when such a war might in theory have broken out was after the Nazis’ occupation of Prague on 15 March. Yet fifteen days earlier Britain and France had recognized Franco as de facto Head of State.

The Republic lost the war of morale, experiencing a declining faith in victory. However, the Spanish Republic could be said to have won the propaganda war – though this was to prove a pyrrhic victory. Whatever the case, there is a problem in defining who exactly the ‘Republicans’ were as the war drew to its close in March 1939 – divided as they were between those loyal to Negrín and those determined to bring him down, preferring to ‘lose’ to Franco rather than to communism. If, however, it is true that the Nationalists ‘won’ the Spanish Civil War, then Franco soon added vindictiveness to victory – though in the long run democracy would be vindicated over dictatorship.

The bombing of Guernica

2010-05-30T21:14:00.002+08:00

GUERNICA Source A: From G.L. Steer’s report published in The Times and New York Times, 28 April 1937.

Monday was the customary market day in Guernica . . . At 4.30 p.m., when the market was full and peasants were still coming in, the church bell rang the alarm for approaching aeroplanes, and the population sought refuge in cellars and in the dugouts prepared following the bombing of the civilian population of Durango on March 31, which opened General Mola’s offensive in the north . . .

In a street leading downhill from the Casa de Juntas [next to the Sacred Tree and where the Basque parliament sometimes sat] I saw a place where 50 people, nearly all women and children, are said to have been trapped in an air raid refuge under a mass of burning wreckage. Many were killed in the fields, and altogether the deaths may run into hundreds. An elderly priest named Aronategui was killed by a bomb while rescuing children from a burning house.

The tactics of the bombers . . . were logical: first, hand grenades and heavy bombs to stampede the population, then machine-gunning to drive them below, next heavy and incendiary bombs to wreck the houses and burn them on top of their victims.

The only counter-measures the Basques could employ, for they do not possess sufficient aeroplanes to face the insurgent fleet, were those provided by the heroism of the Basque clergy . . .

Source B: the Conservative MP Sir Arnold Wilson rebuts the testimony of G.L. Steer.

The news of the destruction of Guernica, and the statement that it was the direct result of an air attack on a market day, was contained in a telegram to The Times from its special correspondent, Mr G.L. Steer. The wording suggested that he had been an eye-witness of the events he described. Subsequent messages made it clear that he had not, in fact, been within many miles of Guernica at the time of its destruction, and that he had relied for his vivid narrative upon the panicstricken reports of refugees. He did not, on his own showing, reach Guernica till 2 a.m. on April 27th, some six or six and a half hours after the alleged bombardment had ceased, and even then be was not allowed in the centre of the town. Having claimed that it had been destroyed by air, Mr Steer stuck to his story, and has since published a book in which without adducing any new evidence, he repeats his version of events.

Source C: from Searchlight on Spain by Katharine Atholl, 1938.

The effect of this holocaust on public opinion all the world over was so tremendous that . . . attempts were made by the insurgent authorities to disclaim responsibility . . .

[Three] British journalists, Mr Steer, Reuters’ correspondent, and Mr Noel Monks of the Daily Express, have described how they were all machine-gunned together from ’planes that afternoon, some miles from Gernika, and how they saw ’planes in the direction of Gernika and heard the sound of bombing. Mr Gerahty, the Daily Mail correspondent with the insurgents, also from Vitoria saw their bombers flying into the Basque country on the 26th . . . There is no question, therefore, that insurgent ’planes were ‘up’ and over or near Gernika on the day of its destruction.

It has since been suggested on behalf of the insurgents that, though a few bombs may have been dropped on the town, the fires which finally destroyed it were caused by Basque or [Asturian] incendiaries. But the testimony of many people questioned in Gernika that night . . . was unanimous as to the causes of the tragedy, and the Star correspondent, who was actually watching the bombardment from 5 p.m. states that German ’planes ‘dropped a succession of incendiary and high-explosive bombs for three hours’.

Source D: from Father Alberto Onaindía’s eyewitness report.

The aeroplanes came low, flying at two hundred metres. As soon as we could leave our shelter, we ran into the woods, hoping to put a safe distance between us and the enemy. But the airmen saw us and went after us . . . The milicianos and I followed the flight patterns of the aeroplanes and we made a crazy journey through the trees, trying to avoid them. Meanwhile women, children and old men were falling in heaps, like flies, and everywhere we saw lakes of blood.

I saw an old peasant standing alone in a field: a machine-gun bullet killed him. For more than an hour these eighteen planes, never more than a few hundred metres in altitude, dropped bomb after bomb on Guernica. The sound of the explosions and of the crumbling houses cannot be imagined . . . Bombs fell by thousands. Later we saw the bomb craters. Some were sixteen metres in diameter and eight metres deep.

The aeroplanes left around seven o’clock, and then there came another wave of them, this time flying at an immense altitude. They were dropping incendiary bombs on our martyred city. The new bombardment lasted thirty-five minutes, sufficient to transform the town into an enormous furnace . . . I realized the terrible purpose of this new act of vandalism. They were dropping incendiary bombs to try to convince the world that the Basques had fired their own city.

The destruction of Guernica went on altogether for two hours and forty-five minutes. When the bombing was over, the people left their shelters. I saw no one crying. Stupor was written on all their faces. Eyes fixed on Guernica, we were completely incapable of believing what we saw.

Source E: ‘Juana Sangroniz’, the pseudonym of a Carlist living in Guernica, interviewed by Ronald Fraser in the 1970s. Our consciences were uneasy about it. After living through the raid, we knew only too well that the destruction had come from the air. The reds had hardly any planes, we knew that too. Amongst our own we’d admit the truth: our side had bombed the town and it was a bad thing. ‘But what can we do about it now?’ we’d say; it was better simply to keep quiet. The propaganda was so patently untrue.

The bombing of Guernica, lying to the north-east of Bilbao and twenty kilometres from the military front, was the first destruction by carpet bombing of an undefended civilian town. Being the ancient capital of the Basque Country, Guernica was rooted deep in the Basque psyche. Source A refers to the parliament building (Casa de Juntas), home of Basque democracy. At the nearby Sacred Tree, Spanish monarchs swore to respect Basque laws.

On market day, 26 April 1937, over fifty German and Italian aircraft, at the bidding of Franco’s High Command, carried out a deliberate act of terror designed to break Basque morale at this historic point of their identity. Source A describes a brutally logical scheme of attack with which to cause maximum death and destruction; the Star correspondent cited in Source C saw three hours of high-explosive and incendiary bombing, low and high level respectively, according to the eyewitness in Source D. Three thousand incendiaries fell on Guernica, Source D adding that they were used so that the Nationalists could pretend arson by the town’s inhabitants. By their onslaught on Guernica, the Condor Legion could, without risk of counter-attack, perfect the use of new combat aircraft. George Steer (Source A), who arrived soon after the bombing and so could not give a conclusive figure, said deaths ‘may well run into hundreds’, and he noted the large number of non-combatants killed; Source D also refers to the machine-gunning of defenceless civilians and to incredulous survivors of the raid. Altogether there were perhaps 1,600 deaths and 900 wounded, one-third of the town’s population. Sir Arnold Wilson in Source B is contemptuous of the evidence of ‘panic stricken refugees’, but why should their evidence be ipso facto unreliable? Source E, in contrast, accepts guilt. ‘Hardly any planes’ suggests that the town was defenceless, while demolishing the feasibility of a deliberately self-inflicted Republican attack. In 1997 the Basques received an official apology from the German state for ‘the most terrible atrocities’ committed by German aircraft against their spiritual capital. Source C describes Guernica as a ‘holocaust’ with a ‘tremendous effect’ on world opinion. Devout Catholic Basques had been murdered in the name of self-professed defenders of the Roman Catholic Church. Many churchmen, Catholic and Protestant, condemned the atrocity, and for weeks there were high-profile reports in the international press. The subsequent evacuation of 13,000 Basque children, along with Picasso’s painting of the Guernica outrage, contributed much to the heightened awareness of this war without pity. Picasso’s monochrome masterpiece, unveiled in July 1937 at the Paris World Fair, since reproduced in countless publications and prominently exhibited, first in New York and now Madrid, has become a defining reference point for posterity.

Abductions by killer squads and the murder of 6,800 clergy notwithstanding, there was no comparable equivalent of Guernica inflicted by the Republic. In terms of numbers killed, there were worse atrocities committed by the Nationalists and their fascist associates. Seville in July 1936, for example, witnessed the slaughter by Nationalist troops of as many as 9,000 workers; in March 1938 Italian bombing raids on Barcelona accounted for 3,000 deaths. Guernica, however, tapped a particular vein of outrage, as a massacre of the innocents in unparalleled circumstances. In the bleakest terms of human tragedy, and made indelible by the power of art, the unique place of Guernica in the collective memory is assured.

Luftwaffe Development

2010-02-23T15:37:00.000+08:00

The Luftwaffe exercised an increasingly baleful influence over European politics as the 1930s drew to a close. In March 1935 Hitler declared the obvious: that German rearmament was in full swing and that it included an independent air force. In 1936 the Germans sent a small force of 'volunteers', the so-called 'Condor Legion', to Spain to aid General Francisco Franco in his attempt to overthrow the Spanish republic. Unlike Mussolini, Hitler had little interest in seeing Franco gain a quick victory. Rather, the war served to distract Europe's Left from the real danger: German rearmament. Thus, the Germans sent only small ground and air forces to the Iberian Peninsula, compared to the large Italian expeditionary force.

Nevertheless, Spain proved a wonderful test bed for Luftwaffe aircraft and technology as well as for its ideas about air power. Barely 200 German aircraft participated in the war, but that was enough to show that current Luftwaffe aircraft were not up to the mark; the weaknesses of the Ju 52 as a bomber and He 51 as a fighter pushed the Luftwaffe's senior leadership into introducing the next generation of aircraft more quickly, particularly the Bf 109 and the He 111. Experience in Spain also helped develop the finger-four in which a four aircraft flight took up the positions of four extended fingers. That tactical approach provided the Luftwaffe with a considerable advantage in its first combat with British fighters. On the other hand, the Germans remained too optimistic about the effectiveness of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns against aircraft, although they did discover the utility of that weapon against enemy tanks.

The Spanish Civil War was also of use in allowing the Germans to redevelop the close air-support tactics they had used in March 1918. However, their tactical conceptions largely focused on the breakthrough battle and remained primitive in nature. For example, the first use of close air support with infantry involved the infantry sewing large white circles on their backs - one suspects not only for identification purposes by friendly aircraft, but also to discourage them from retreating. Ironically, in terms of the myth of the tank-Stuka team (a mirage of the Goebbels propaganda machine), the Luftwaffe developed no capability in the late 1930s to provide support to armored and mechanized forces in a mobile war. Throughout the Polish and French campaigns, the Luftwaffe inadvertently bombed German mechanized spearheads, although one army unit reported that in general the Luftwaffe hit the Poles more often than their own troops. Not until April 1940 did the Luftwaffe and army first experiment with forward observers with spearhead units. Nevertheless, the Germans were at least working on the problem; the British would not employ a similar system until 1942, and the Americans in 1943.

In 1938 the Luftwaffe's re-equipping and expansion was in full swing. Consequently, maintenance difficulties, the training of new crews and supply problems beset operating units and rendered it a military instrument incapable of sustained air operation. Thus, even a limited effort to support an attack on Czechoslovakia would have strained the Luftwaffe to breaking-point. Moreover, as war-games in August 1938 indicated, the Luftwaffe had no chance of executing a sustained strategic bombing campaign against Britain. Any such attempt would only have resulted in dropping bombs haphazardly over the British landscape. Ironically the Luftwaffe achieved its greatest success by persuading British and particularly French military and political leaders that their countries were about to come under a rain of bombs. In the end, the Munich sacrifice of Czechoslovakia was to a great extent the result of unjustified fears about German air superiority.

By 1939 the Luftwaffe's combat capabilities had improved dramatically; its impact on Europe's diplomacy was less dramatic, however. Re-equipment of its air squadrons was well in hand, and the Ju 88 was about to come into production. Moreover, the strategic situation had changed radically in the Reich's favor, especially with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The Luftwaffe was now the world's most advanced air force, capable of dealing effective blows against its enemies. Not only was it equipped to win air superiority over a rapidly moving battlefield, but it could also render significant support to the army in their efforts to break through enemy front lines. This broad-based approach allowed the Luftwaffe to play a crucial role in the German victories in the early years of the Second World War. With a wide selection of capabilities, it significantly enhanced the army's conduct of ground operations while preventing enemy air forces from interfering with the advance of German ground forces.

However, by the late 1930s Luftwaffe attitudes and thinking were already suffering from the insidious influence of Nazi ideology Wever's death undoubtedly accelerated the process, while Goering's rapid promotion of officers thoroughly imbued with Nazi ideology also contributed. This led not only to a substantial underestimation of Germany's potential opponents, particularly Britain and the Soviet Union (as well as the United States), but also their minimizing the connection between ends and means. Shortly after Munich, Hitler demanded a five-fold expansion of the Luftwaffe, an expansion that would have cost a sum equivalent to that which had been spent on German rearmament between 1933 and 1939 as a whole, and would have required 85 percent of the world's supply of aviation gasoline. When senior officers pointed this out to Hans Jeschonnek, soon to become the Luftwaffe's chief of staff, he replied, 'Gentlemen, in my view, it is our duty to support the Fuhrer and not to work against him.' On such blind faith in Hitler and in the inherent racial superiority of the German Volk the Luftwaffe would founder in the coming war.

German Innovation in the Spanish Civil War

2010-01-19T18:54:00.001+08:00

The German participation in the Spanish Civil War was an experience that incorporated a number of principal-agent relationships conducive to innovation. The Luftwaffe units in Spain were exposed to important external information, were informal in much of their organizational structure, and necessitated a very close yet unrestrictive relationship between agents experimenting in actual combat and the high-level principals monitoring them. The German Army was able, from 1936- 1939, not only to test innovation already accomplished but also to further advance existing doctrine through direct participation in the Spanish Civil War.

At the start of the Spanish Civil War, commander Francisco Franco of the Nationalist Forces passed to two German businessmen a message requesting military aid from Germany. Hitler eagerly assented and commanded Goring to begin using the Luftwaffe for aid, which began with airlifting Spanish military personnel and equipment from northern Africa to Spain. In an impressive demonstration of German military efficiency and readiness in 1936, a significant German presence was on the ground in Africa assisting only four days after Hitler’s decision. The full four years of participation with Franco’s forces, from 1936-1939, provided the Luftwaffe with a wide range of experience in air and joint land-air operations, and provided ideal testing of innovations in armor doctrine. The German participation went further than simply practicing and testing their current doctrine; the campaign was structurally unique in that the force was relatively small and tightly-knit, and necessitated a simple, informal command structure that grouped both Army and Luftwaffe units under a single Luftwaffe command, the Condor Legion.

Commanders were of high quality, forward thinking, and tactically very hands on. Junior officers had many opportunities for expressing new ideas, that they were able to directly test in actual combat. The poor quality of the opponent and near absence of air opposition encouraged realistic experimentation without fear of heavy losses, especially in the area of joint air-land operations.

By October 1936 the Spanish civil war had developed into a stalemate, prompting the Wehrmacht high command to increase the small German force there into a larger operation. The force was upgraded to over 5,000 Luftwaffe personnel using over 100 of their most advanced aircraft; the new force was named the Condor Legion—it included a bomber group, fighter group, reconnaissance group, staff, flak battalion, logistics supply battalion, and medical group. New preproduction prototype German aircraft models were included for combat testing. Army participation included a tank battalion and around two hundred military advisors, supported by the Condor Legion logistics group and all serving under Major General Hugo Sperrle and Chief of Staff von Richthofen, both senior Luftwaffe officers. During the subsequent years of combat the Germans would gain the opportunity to test a wide array of new aircraft and to assess their military faults and benefits, making the needed changes. Equally important was the constant testing of tactics and combat formations with the new weaponry.

This informal command structure, placing both the Luftwaffe and Army under the same command, was important in helping produce the air-ground coordination and blitzkrieg innovations soon to come. It was a simple structure; the commander of the Condor Legion reported directly to the Special Staff W (the high command structure in Germany coordinating the effort), which reported to the Army high command. The Condor Legion had the benefit of an easy access to the highest levels of leadership, yet enjoyed relative freedom from intrusive oversight. They were separated geographically and possessed tactical authority to control the course of the war. Hitler and the central government showed almost no interest in the day to day management of the operation, leaving the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe to direct the effort. The lack of micro-management by central command allowed Condor Legion commanders to operate as agents with more freedom to experiment and incorporate. These commanders were also principals of the Condor Legion, and the disentanglement from central command provided stronger principal-agent links between these commanders and their agents in the field.

Commanders Sperrle and Richthofen were very hands-on commanders, overseeing attacks and constantly constructing forward bases so that they could personally witness the actions. The difficulty of coordinating air-ground attacks, especially with Spanish forces, necessitated this intense involvement, but it allowed the highest command level—commander and chief of staff—to see innovative air-ground tactics employed first-hand. Richthofen had come to Spain specifically hoping to see the Luftwaffe and its equipment in action, and has been described as the “spiritual mentor” of close air support development by Karl Ries and Hans Ring in their book on the Condor Legion. The highly vested commander is an important commodity for innovation, and the command in Spain was both eager to succeed and willing to remain ever-present during innovative tactical operations. As with the German maneuver, it becomes obvious how important it can be for leaders to personally witness innovation.

Agents of course had incentives to successfully innovate because they were involved in actual combat, and despite the obviously inferior nature of the enemy, their lives were dependent on the success of the operation. Even the junior officers not directly exposed to combat were responsible for the successful execution of a real war effort. Another benefit of having a small and somewhat independent operating force was demonstrated by the ability of junior officers to express novel ideas to higher command. One young lieutenant, Werner Molders, developed ideas on tactical fighter formations that were implemented during the course of the operation in Spain. He changed the traditional three plane “V” formation into a pair formation, a superior structure which the Condor Legion used to great effect. The combination of the highly vested yet unrestricted leadership and small operating core of junior officers with incentive to innovate is a perfect example of the proper principal-agent relationship, neither excessively top-down nor bottom-up.

Another informal aspect of the German command in Spain was the necessity of operating through the Nationalist Spanish command in order to coordinate with ground units. At first this might seem like a detriment to the process of innovation, given that Spanish military leadership was of such low quality compared to their German collaborators. In the ground-support sphere, however, it led to improved communications structures. In order to better coordinate attacks, Luftwaffe personnel had to work tirelessly to find ways of jointly planning the air and ground offensives. Besides having to work hard at the command level, the Luftwaffe placed communications and liaison teams at the front lines for better information sharing. Herbert Mason describes these inter-service cooperation lessons as being very beneficial for the later blitzkrieg operations during the Second World War.

Air-ground coordination improved a great deal during the campaign based on the increased effort for managerial efficiency. The informal command link reinforced the obvious need for good air-ground coordination because the Spanish Army was repeatedly unable to follow up after Luftwaffe forward attacks. It was a constant irritation to the German commanders, who became aware of what a well-coordinated attack could accomplish and what innovative information sharing would need to take place to achieve it. Thus in only a year’s time of combat experience in Spain, the Luftwaffe had truly mastered close air support. On the December 29, 1937, they participated in a battle in Teruel, in which they executed excellent forward bombing that allowed the Nationalist ground forces to follow up, then seamlessly switched to bombing of the follow-up Republican reserve forces This battlefield proof of the effectiveness of ground attack led directly to technological innovation; Condor Legion commanders requested the development of heavily armored aircraft made specifically for ground attack. The Henschel and Focke Wulf companies produced the Henschel 129 as a result.

Incentives for the German commanders were naturally based in part on the fact that they were participating in a real conflict, trying to secure a military victory and protect the lives of their troops. Many German officers experiencing the innovative work in Spain later gained valuable promotions, demonstrated by Sperrle’s advancement in 1937 to field marshal of the Luftwaffe, and the promotion of officers Drum, Plocher, Galland, and Seidemann to the rank of general. Von Richthofen later served as a senior commander in most of the major theaters of the war, including Britain and Russia. An example of direct processing of innovation due to command promotion from the Spanish Civil War to the main Luftwaffe force came after evidence of German deficiency in night and bad weather flying. The German accidents resulting from poor visibility crashes had an immediate impact on Condor Legion commanders, and new training practices were immediately implemented. Sperrle in 1937 returned to Germany to become a commander of the Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet, and immediately strengthened the deficient night and bad weather training.

The importance of Sperrle’s promotion should not be underestimated; he later found himself in the position to directly implement exercises and experimentation designed to strengthen CAS practices. Both Sperrle and von Richthofen were two of the very few Luftwaffe officers to achieve the rank of field marshal. In Germany Sperrle ordered Luftwaffe commanders to set up joint war games with Army units, and used his influence to get Army commanders to allow the participation of the Luftwaffe in their own war gaming and exercises. His Luftwaffe officers were not allowed to merely attend these exercises, but had to participate as commanding air officers.

German air power innovation was aided, particularly in the north of Spain, by their opponents’ lack of air power. German Luftwaffe operations in the Basque region of northern Spain were carried out virtually unopposed by enemy aircraft, giving Luftwaffe command the opportunity to execute ground support, bombing and experimental operations at will. The experimental process benefited from the environmentally-constructed high error tolerance. This historical anomaly suggests opportunities for successful innovation can be abundant when competing against a highly inferior enemy. Ineffective opposition led to high error tolerance for experimentation because there was much less chance of penalty for unsuccessful attempts at actions like close air support or use of massed armor. For example, the near-perfect operating conditions for the Stuka dive-bombers, due largely to the ineffectiveness of Spanish anti-aircraft guns against them, led to tactical perfection and large-scale passing on of lessons learned to parent units in Germany.

An alternate source of information was provided by the participation of the Russian military, which committed forces on behalf of the Spanish Republic. The military value of the fighter/bomber was further emphasized for the Germans in March 1937 when Russian-piloted fighter aircraft nearly decimated a motorized corps of Italian troops. The action demonstrated the devastating potential of tactical ground bombardment. These results, in particular, were analyzed by the German command and the international military press.

A unifying military culture occurs when both commanders and sub-units envision the same set of possibilities. This was facilitated by the comprehensive exposure of large numbers of the Luftwaffe to the Condor Legion’s innovations. In the interest of providing combat experience for its officers, over fourteen thousand German personnel of all levels of rank were rotated in and out of Spain, seeing and participating firsthand the new innovations. The rapid production of combat veterans that returned to their units after a year of service in Spain ensured the rapid integration of the new tactics throughout the operating core of the Luftwaffe. The experience had an immense influence on Luftwaffe doctrine, tactics, and technology through its involvement in every type of air campaign. Commanders and managers involved with innovation also infused the Luftwaffe; in addition to Sperrle and von Richthofen, future generals Drum, Plocher, and Seidemann all gained combat experience in the Spanish Civil War. The Luftwaffe gained a command staff experienced in planning and execution of joint land-air combat operations. This heavy exposure to innovation worked the same way as the comprehensive post-War studies of the German Army’s failures and the changes that needed to be made—by saturation through involvement of a large number of officers.

The commitment by the German Army of one armored battalion to the Spanish campaign, under the leadership of the Luftwaffe, provided excellent opportunities for testing blitzkrieg tactics. These opportunities began after the Fascist forces had essentially broken the fixed Nationalist lines and initiated a war of maneuver. In what was considered one of the first true blitzkrieg operations, in 1938 the armored force was able to break through the front lines and make a thirty-six kilometer advance in one day. The Luftwaffe had to make several forward deployments to continue support to the quick-moving armor squadron, gaining valuable experience for future blitzkrieg operations. Many attribute the German experience in the Spanish Civil War as the final field test of the joint doctrinal and operational lessons that had been first introduced at Kazan and Lipetsk.

In 1937 when the German Army held the all-important autumn maneuvers in which blitzkrieg proved itself beyond a doubt, the close air support employed was a direct result of Sperrle’s participation in the Spanish Civil War and the Condor Legion’s experience with blitzkrieg. As Herbert Mason confirms, Condor Legion commander Richthofen—like Sperrle before him—became a passionate supporter of the Luftwaffe’s close air support role in blitzkrieg operations. During the invasion of Poland, Richthofen was so committed to securing the benefits of air and ground cooperation he had learned in Spain that he shared command headquarters with Tenth Army commander von Reichenau. This excellent inter-service cooperation, also learned through dealings with the Spanish officers, facilitated Richthofen’s close air support to Reichenau’s armor during that campaign and was a key element in the next year’s success in France. Indeed, Richthofen’s close air support against the French at Sedan facilitated the crossing of the Meuse and the breakout from the Meuse river bridgeheads on 15 May 1940 by Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps and the XLI Panzer Corps, the seminal event in the Allied collapse in the West.

In another irony, this German advantage was fleeting. The blitzkrieg successes against Poland and France, going down from the wide to the narrow openings of a funnel, were inverted in the following campaign against the Soviet Union where the German forces traversed the funnel from narrow aperture to wide, dissipating their mass over the vast Russian land mass and stretching their air assets to beyond the breaking point. Strategic mismanagement and over-extension will always trump doctrinal innovation and tactical brilliance.

German Panzers in Spain - German Report

2010-01-12T11:40:00.000+08:00

The German Panzers were given, not sold, to Spain, and therefore left behind no trace in the detailed export records from 1936 through 1939. Most published accounts give a figure of about 150 Pz.Kpfw.l sent to Spain. However, based on the total number produced and inventory reports, a maximum of 4 kI.Pz.Bef.Wg. and 88 Pz.Kpfw.l could have been sent to Spain. Of these, about half were Pz.Kpfw.l Ausf.A and half Ausf.B. No evidence has been found in original records that a single Pz.Kpfw.II was sent to Spain. Further details and lessons learned were recorded in the official report on the Spanish Civil War from the Generalstab des Heeres dated 30 March 1939:

At the end of October 1938, two Panzer battalions were available each with three companies. One company of each battalion was equipped with captured Russian tanks. The companies equipped with German tanks each consisted of16 Panzers.

The German tank transport column consisted of a medium cross-country Wanderer car, two BMW motorcycles with sidecars, 14 Vomag diesel trucks, 10 Buessing diesel trucks, 19 low boy trailers, and four mobile loading ramps.

German M.G.-Panzer were never used in action in a battalion-size unit. Usually in small packets, the Panzers were attached directly to and escorted the infantry as armored heavy infantry weapons.

Based on the judgment of the troops and their achievement in the Pz.Kpfw.I Krupp covering 5000 to 8000 kilometers each and the Pz.Kpfw.I Maybach covering 2000 to 4000 kilometers each, they were a success from the viewpoint of mechanical reliability.

Light tanks are useful only with flamethrowers, since they can't hit anything by firing their machine guns while moving. However, they themselves are vulnerable to machine guns firing special ammunition. The nozzle for the small flamethrower can be readily secured in the right-hand machine gun mount in the Pz.Kpfw.I. However, a longer range is desired because relatively high losses occur to the crews.

In general the Panzers employed in Spain in small numbers and without other supporting weapons has mainly been shown to be inferior, very seldom superior to the anti-tank defense that also were only available in small numbers.

The 45 mm gun of the Russian tanks shoots high-explosive shells in an arcing flight path. The effectiveness of these shells is unsatisfactory. It also shoots armor-piercing shells at a flatter trajectory. Due to poor steel quality, the penetrating ability of the Russian armor-piercing shells is significantly lower than the corresponding German armor-piercing shells. The Russian AP shells can only penetrate 40 mm armor plate at a range of 100 meters. In addition, up to 75 percent of the base fuses fail to detonate.

Initially, relatives of the first family had volunteered for the tank troops in Franco's army. However, as the first losses occurred and it became known what the inside of a burned out tank looked like, a swift reversal of the original enthusiasm set in. Today, in addition to inspired tank crews, captured Russian tanks are manned by pardoned criminals or Spaniards who have been given a choice between a prison sentence or one attack trip in a tank.

The Ebro – Last Throw of the Republican Dice

2009-12-29T14:56:00.000+08:00

After the collapse of the Republic's Aragón front, Franco was faced with the strategic decision of moving first against Catalonia, or turning south and west. He chose the latter. Between late April and the end of July, the Nationalist army edged its way down the Mediterranean coast, taking Castellón, and also mopping up the hinterland. Progress was slow and costly in casualties, and it proved impossible to dislodge the well-prepared defenders of the city of Valencia. The Republic's position was clearly perilous, but it still had men, and it received new equipment from the Soviet Union and across the briefly reopened French frontier.

Crucially, continuing the fight seemed to many preferable to unconditional surrender, which was the only alternative Franco would contemplate. In the tense international situation of the summer and autumn of 1938, Negrín hoped that if only the Republic could hold on, its troubles would be gathered into and transformed by the greater European war that he saw looming. This was the context for the last great Republican offensive, the battle of the Ebro.

The southern reaches of the Ebro river from below Lérida to the Mediterranean had become the new demarcation line between Nationalists and Republicans after the fall of Aragón. The Ebro was a great natural barrier. Republican strategists, however, planned an audacious crossing of initially about 80,000 men. The author of the plan was General Rojo, the Republican Chief of Staff, and the action would involve several of the Republic's outstanding military commanders, including Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Modesto, Enrique Lister, and the young Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Tagüeña Lacorte. The strategic aim was to draw Nationalist troops away from their advance on Valencia, and perhaps even to reunite the two sections of the Republic. The territorial aim was to gain control of the town of Gandesa, to the west of the Ebro, because of its importance as a communications centre.

On the night of 24-25 July, Republican troops crossed the River Ebro at several points, using boats, rapidly assembled footbridges of hexagonal cork floats, and pontoons. They established bridgeheads on the west bank, and then continued on. This massive, carefully orchestrated initiative took their opponents by surprise, although they soon deployed air and artillery power against the advancing forces, and severely impeded the transport of armour across the river. Within a few days, Republican troops had advanced several miles west, establishing a new front between Mequinenza and Cherta, and capturing Nationalist soldiers who were surrounded. Other Nationalists fell back on Gandesa. It was a great victory, and persuaded many otherwise pessimistic Republicans that all was not lost. It was certainly cause for celebration.

As so often in the Spanish Civil War, however, it soon proved hard to exploit the initial advance. Crucially, the attempt to take the town of Gandesa failed. But controlling Gandesa was the essential element for the success of the rest of the campaign. Fiercely as the Republicans advanced against its defences, they could not prevail. As Franco ordered several divisions and virtually the whole of the air force to the area, the Republicans dug in.

It took the Nationalists three and a half months to recover what the Republicans had taken in a few days. As early as 6 August, the Nationalists retook the northern section between Mequinenza and Fayón with heavy artillery fire followed up by the infantry. Bit by bit the Republicans were forced back, in burning summer heat, suffering constant aerial bombardment. By the end of September they had lost about one-third of the initial gain. From the end of October to 16 November, Franco pounded the Republicans from the air and from artillery batteries, before sending troops to wrest territory from them, mile by mile, settlement by settlement. By mid-November the Republicans had retreated back across the Ebro, in good order, but defeated.

The last major Republican offensive, and the greatest battle of the civil war, was over. There were almost 100,000 casualties. It was also the last engagement of the International Brigades, which were disbanded in November 1938, partly because by this stage they were largely composed of Spaniards anyway, and partly in a vain attempt by Negrín to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign participants on both sides. Meanwhile the Nationalist armies engaged in the Ebro campaign, plus those of the centre and the south, now numbered over one million men.

The two great Nationalist targets remained what they had always been - Madrid and Barcelona. These now looked very vulnerable, as all the indicators - men, material, food, economic production, territory - pointed to ever-greater dominance by the Francoists. Living conditions in both cities were appalling. In Barcelona they were to deteriorate further once the Nationalist campaign to take Catalonia began on 23 December. Three different advances from the Ebro towards the coast, to Gerona, Barcelona and Tarragona respectively, met with very little resistance from demoralised troops. By 14 January Yagüe was at Tarragona, and on 26 January Barcelona fell, as soldiers and civilian streamed north to try to escape over the French frontier.

Between 27 January and 10 February over 400,000 refugees sought shelter in France, but found themselves without protection against wind and cold, herded into makeshift open camps on the beaches, surrounded by barbed wire, with no sanitation and at first no food. Members of the Catalan and central governments, including President Manuel Azaña, crossed the frontier, now refugees themselves. It was a tragic end for several different dreams: of a democratic Spain, of an autonomous Catalonia, and of a revolutionary, egalitarian, atheistic Utopia.

The Republicans still held almost a third of the Spanish land mass, including Madrid, and there were half a million soldiers in the Republican army of the centre, under Miaja. Prime Minister Negrín, other cabinet members and many army officers returned to Spain to continue the war. But victory was impossible. On 27 February Britain and France recognised Franco's government. On the 28th Azaña resigned as President of the Republic. The fighting was not yet over, but the outcome of the war was clear.

Franco’s "Lifts"

2009-12-18T14:31:00.000+08:00

The monarchist General José Sanjurjo was the figurehead of the rebellion, while Emilio Mola was chief planner and second in command. Mola began serious planning in the spring, but General Francisco Franco hesitated until early July, inspiring other plotters to refer to him as "Miss Canary Islands 1936". Franco was a key player because of his prestige as a former director of the military academy and as the man who suppressed the Socialist uprising of 1934.

Fearing a military coup, Prime Minister Casares Quiroga sent General Manuel Goded Llopis to the Balearic Islands and Franco to the Canary Islands. On 17 July 1936, the plotters signaled the beginning of the coup by broadcasting the code phrase, "Over all of Spain, the sky is clear." Llopis and Franco immediately took control of the islands to which they were assigned. Warned that a coup was imminent, leftists barricaded the roads on 17 July, but Franco avoided capture by taking a tugboat to the airport.

Two British MI6 intelligence agents, Cecil Bebb and Major Hugh Pollard, then flew Franco to Spanish Morocco to see Juan March Ordinas, where the Spanish Army of Africa, led by Nationalist officers, was unopposed.

The Army of Africa was composed of Spanish troops as well as the Spanish Foreign Legion and locally recruited Moroccan infantry and cavalry called Regulares. In total, the Army of Africa numbered 30,000 soldiers and was the most professional and effective fighting force in the 100,000-man Spanish Army during the 1920s and 30s.

The Army of Africa was to play a key part during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. Along with other units in the Spanish Army, the Army of Africa rose against the Republic and took part in the Nacional military uprising of July 1936. On July 18, 1936, General Francisco Franco assumed the supreme command over this force.

Spanish Morocco fell to the rebels without significant opposition. The initial intention was to transport the Army of Africa to mainland Spain by sea. However the crews of Spanish warships whose officers had joined the revolt remained loyal to the Republican government in Madrid. Significant numbers of the Army of African were accordingly transported to mainland Spain in a bold airlift led by Junkers and Savoia-Marchetti transport planes supplied by Germany and Italy.

After landing in Spain, the Army of Africa was split into two columns, one commanded by General Juan Yagüe and the other commanded by Colonel José Varela. Yagüe's force advanced north, making remarkably rapid gains, and then turned north-eastwards towards Madrid and Toledo. Varela's force entered Andalucia and took control of the key cities of Seville, Granada, and Córdoba. Thanks mostly to the Army of Africa's advances, almost all of western Spain was in Francoist Nacionales hands by the end of September 1936. By early 1937 the Army of Africa's strength had been increased to 60,000 men. The Legion and Regulares spearheaded the Nacionales's operations for the remainder of the war and played a central role in the Nacional victory.

GÜNTHER PRIEN - U-BOAT TRAINING AND SPAIN

2009-10-12T12:51:00.000+08:00

U-25, the other Type IA U-boat.

WHEN a man joins the Forces he begins an entirely new life. Personal liberty is reduced to a

minimum and its place is taken by the word of command, the iron discipline of service under

arms. The sailor is always on duty. All personal experiences are reduced to unimportance

compared with the service. This is expressed in an old saying, Who swears his oath on the

Prussian flag has nothing left that he can call his own.

My naval training proceeded in this spirit The service and the great political events

overshadowed everything. After the conclusion of normal training I was posted to the U-Boats'

training school at Kiel.

In the first few weeks of the course we were stuffed full to the back teeth with theory.

At last towards the end of February came the practical training, the day on which we went to sea

for the first time in a U-Boat.

I can still clearly remember it all.

It was a clear windy day on which we sailed through the Kieler Förde, the whole U-Boat flotilla

in line ahead. Every boat carried a few officer aspirants. I was aboard the U-3.

When we arrived at the training area we climbed through the conning-tower hatch to the control

room. In spite of all our theoretical training we looked helplessly about the narrow room.

Blinding white lights glinted in glass, nickel and brass, an inextricable network of electric cables

and compressed air conduits and pilot wheels surrounded us. In the centre was the periscope

shaft and beside it the large main compass.

The noise of the diesel engines, which outside could be hardly heard above the noise of the sea,

was here so loud that you couldn't hear yourself speak. Everything was vibrating. There was a

penetrating smell of steel and oil.

The chief engineer received us. He inspected us with short sidelong glances and began his

instruction. "Never forget, gentlemen, to report off if you have to go on the upper deck when the

boat is cleared for diving. Otherwise you will suffer the same fate as the legendary Lieut. Müller

who found the boat sink under his feet. If he hadn't had a bubble of air in his pants he would

have drowned like a rat."

A short word of command from the tower, "Diving sta-tions," was answered from the stations by

the reply, "Fore ship on diving station. Midship and aft'ship on diving stations." Now the diving

exercise began. Exhaust valves were closed and the hatch cover dropped into place with a

metallic thud.

"Never forget to close the valves," explained the chief engineer with a lowered voice, "or you

will have the same trouble the old U-3 had in the Bay of Heikendorf. They also had officer

aspirants on board and forgot to close the air inlet valves. Water streamed in and flooded the

engine room. That caused a short circuit and filled the ship with deadly fumes. The commander

was suffocated and most of the crew might have lost their lives, which would have been a pity.

There were some pretty good fellows amongst them, Weddigen and Furbringer."

A clear humming interrupted his words. The electric motors took over.

The hand-wheels turned and the fan began to spin. Pressurization tests began. It felt as if the

blood were rushing to the ears.

No one spoke; there was a continuous hum of machinery and a spasmodic clatter of steering

gear.

From the tower came back the order, "Get ready to flood tanks." "Tanks ready." "Flood tanks."

Four men knelt and wrenched down the air levers. There was a hissing noise as the air escaped

and the water gurgled into the tanks.

Slowly the boat inclined forward and then backward. There was a sensation of floating as in a

balloon. Finally she came round on an even keel. It was deathly still. No one spoke, no one was

allowed to move, only the C.E. gave his orders in a low voice to the men working the

hydroplanes.

Then like a lift the periscope shot up. One by one the Commander called us into the control

room. For the first time I was going to see the world through a periscope. The horizon contracted

to a small disc of sky and water which was flooded again and again by green waves.

Then we were shown how to manipulate the hydroplanes by means of large hand-wheels which

one turned like coffee machines.

After we had been sailing submerged for a while the commander ordered. "All stations! Boat

descending to bottom. Steer for the bottom, depth 21 metres."

The C.E. reported "16 . . . 18 . . . 20 metres. Both engines stop."

There was a slight jerk which shuddered through the whole boat and then we lay at rest upon the

bottom of the sea. The C.E. reported, "22 metres diving depth, 2 tons downthrust."

Mess was at half past twelve. There was soup, rump steak and fruit for officers and crew. It was

good and plentiful, but the wardroom was a little small, rather reminiscent of a tunnel.

Occasionally the soft gurgle reminded us that we were 22 metres (or about 12 fathoms) down on

the bottom of the Bay of Kiel.

From up aft came a sound as if somebody was working a handpump.

"What on earth is that?" asked Schreiber, one of the aspirants. The Commander remained silent

but Number One grinned and said, "He's using the lavatory. We hand pump all waste matter out.

It's quite a job at 22 metres."

His round face shone with pleasure for he enjoyed the topic, and he was not going to abandon it

for some time. "But that's nothing," he continued briskly, "just imagine you are at war—then you

have to control yourself for the sake of the Fatherland, for the stuff would float upward and give

away the position of the boat.

"An old U-Boat man of the World War I told me a yarn about that. They were lying aground for

36 hours and then ..."

"With a little effort we might perhaps find another topic of conversation," suggested the

Commander.

For two hours we remained on the sea bottom. Then the exercise continued. We ascended in

stages, first to periscope depth and finally we surfaced. We were a little tired owing to the heavy

atmosphere which was saturated with carbon dioxide and a little overcome by the rancid smell of

the fuel oil.

Since that time I have done many trips under water and to be in a U-Boat has become a

commonplace for me. But the recollection of this first trip has remained vivid. Things and people

are remembered most clearly when seen for the first or the last time.

* * *

At the conclusion of the training course I was posted as First Officer of the watch to U-26, under

the command of Captain Lieutenant Hartmann. "Sharp as a razor-blade," remarked an old

comrade, "but you can learn a lot."

The U-26 was lying at Deschimag in Bremen. I broke my journey there at Hamburg and went

out to St. Pauli to visit Harry Stoewer, the old bo'sun of the Hamburg at the Star of David. I was

always mindful of his help during my time of unemployment, when he gave me food and drink.

It was late in the afternoon. The Star of David was empty. An artificial blonde slouched behind

the bar.

"Two large light ales and the landlord, please," I ordered. She gazed at me in wonder,

disappeared, and came back with a small thick-set man buckling his trousers belt as he

approached. It was not Harry Stoewer.

"What can I do for you, sir?" he asked.

"I want to find Harry Stoewer."

"Sorry, sir," he said regretfully, "Harry Stoewer is dead; he died two years ago." He turned as if

to go.

"How did it happen?"

"He hanged himself," said the landlord.

"Hanged himself? What on earth happened?" I pointed to the second glass.

The landlord nodded an acknowledgment and sat down.

"Well, you know old Stoewer wasn't a business man. He lent to everybody on the security of

their blue eyes. And at the end he had hardly anything to eat himself. A business like this has to

be learnt, you know. People think all you have to do is to stand behind the bar and dish out beer."

I thanked him and went.

All the way to the station I thought of Harry Stoewer.

I asked myself why he had not turned to his friends for help.

He had helped so many others and yet when he was in need of help himself he just hanged

himself. He had been happy to be of assistance to anybody and too good-hearted to keep afloat in

this harsh world of shopkeepers and profiteers.

* * *

I went on by the next train, and when I arrived in Bremen, I went straight out to the shipyard.

The boat lay close to the quay, moored to a buoy. From the height of the quay it looked very

small.

I climbed down and reported to the Commander who received me in his cabin. He was a thickset,

but wiry man with a hard and clear-cut face.

"Lieutenant Prien begs to report for duty in U-26." He rose and shook me by the hand.

"Well, here you are, I have been expecting you. But at the moment there is nothing here that you

can do. Haven't you still got a spot of leave coming?"

I grasped the situation at once. "Yes, sir!" I said. "Very well then, push off for a week." I thanked

him and left at once.

It seemed these days as if the past were catching up with me. On my way home I met an ensign.

We got into conversation and he showed me a photograph of a group at a New Year's ball.

Amongst all the unknown faces I spotted one that was familiar, the fair girl of the garden in

Plauen to whom I had given the kiss and the roses. The memory of the incident was still fresh in

my mind.

I asked the ensign to give me her address, and wrote to her.

Her reply soon arrived.

She thanked me for my letter which she bad found very amusing. But she claimed that she had

never been to Plauen. Six months later we were married and I have never regretted it since. So

much for romance.

* * *

My leave was cut short. Three days later I was called back by telegram.

"We are going to Spain," said the Commander when we met. "Just to guard German interests."

His face was beaming with joy.

The boat was quickly placed on a war footing; stores, fuel and munitions were taken on board

and we left the very next day. All of us believed that the heat would be oppressive on .that

occasion but the thunder passed close by and the lightening struck on land.

In the canal we did a trim dive. I was in the control room. The station reported : "Clear for

diving" ; the torpedo crew reported, "Clear". Then came the command, "Submerge".

Then a sudden cry from the torpedo hatch, "The fish, the fish." I ran forrard. A torpedo had

slipped backward out of its tube and was protruding into the hatch. Four men, gasping with

exertion, were trying to push it back.

It was clear that they would not be able to hold out much longer. The weight of the torpedo

forced them back step by step. If the stern of the boat should drop by only a few degrees, the

projectile would slide into the hatch, crush the men and tear the boat to pieces.

I rushed aft. "Fish sliding backward," I yelled to the C.E.

He understood. The hand-wheels of the hydroplane began to hum.

Running back forrard I pushed with all my weight against the torpedo. Slowly the boat swung

back on an even keel and equally slowly, inch by inch, the fish slid back into the tube until at last

the lock closed behind it with a metallic ring.

"How did it happen?" I demanded. The Petty Officer stood in front of me, wet with perspiration

and trembling all over. The veins on his forehead stood out like ropes.

"I don't know, sir," he gasped, "I cleared the torpedo and closed the lock and I suppose a bolt

must have jammed."

"So you reported 'All Clear for diving', prematurely?"

He compressed his lips,. "Yes, sir," he said in an undertone.

After I had reported to the Commander he sent for the Petty Officer and gave him the dressing

down of his life.

At breakfast later on he said calmly and apparently quite unconcerned, "It would have been just

one of those things; anyhow a U-Boat isn't an old age insurance."

There were plenty of incidents on this voyage. In the Bay of Biscay we ran into as heavy a storm

as I was ever to experience on a U-Boat. When at eight bells I went on to the bridge, wrapped in

heavy oilskins, the sky was leaden grey and the sea as black as ink. The boat ploughed through,

the hissing waves, as the pelting rain whipped across our faces. From time to time the seas broke

over the ship and we stood waist deep in icy water.

That was just the beginning. The seas rose above us, higher and more threatening, dark but

mottled with shreds of spume, and then they crashed down upon us with the force of a cataract.

Safety belts were brought up and we fastened ourselves to the rail. All save the Commander. He

stood in front on the conning tower, his hands clutching the rail and with his head lowered he

seemed to be attacking the waves like a bull.

The diesel engines laboured. Every time we were carried on the crest of a wave the screws

threshed the air. A glassy wall of water rose in front of us higher than any before, then we

disappeared under the water. As we came up again spitting and coughing one man was missing;

the Petty Officer of the bridge. The fastenings off his belt had broken and he was draped over the

rail of the tower like a wet bathing suit. In one jump the Commander was upon him and had

wrenched him back. He was sent below with two other men and we remained alone on the tower.

The seas increased in height. At times they were so tall that only the heads of the men on the

bridge showed above the water. At last we had no other choice but to dive. During the next lull

we ducked through the conning tower hatch. A flood of water poured down behind us into the

boat The bilge pumps began to splutter and finally we submerged.

The lower we went the quieter it became until nothing could be heard of the outer world but the

noises of the boat and the high whine of the electric engines.

For many hours we continued under water and when we surfaced again, the storm was over.

In front of us, the Spanish coast rose steep and dark into the grey of the morning. No lights could

be seen; only the moon shone through the tattered clouds.

The navigator cursed. Without sea marks it was impossible to fix our position. All he could say

was that we lay somewhere between Bilbao and Santander.

We started our patrol, cruising to and fro between Pesajas and Cape Finisterre. The sea was

empty, though occasionally we sighted some plumes of smoke over the horizon. The land lay

dark and silent. Only when the wind was off shore were we able to hear distant gun fire. The

sound got into our blood and aroused the desire felt by every true soldier, to be in on the fighting.

But the time was not yet ripe.

Once only did war pass us by so closely that we felt sure we would be drawn into it. That was in

front of Bilbao.

The lookout called, "Two warships on the port bow." The Commander and I went on the bridge.

We recognised the cruiser Almirante Cerdeira and the destroyer Belastro, Franco's ships,

steaming at full speed towards us, huge waves foaming at their bows, Studying them through our

glasses we saw their guns slowly turning towards us.

"They probably take us for a Republican boat," said the Commander.

It was a sticky situation. I glanced at Hartmann. What was he going to do? If we altered course

they would take it for retreat and fire upon us. If we went to meet them they would take it as an

attack. If we dived they would rain depth charges down upon us.

"Stop both engines," ordered the Commander. We hove to and lay rolling in the swell. We

hoisted our ensign at the wireless mast and our searchlight signalled at three-second intervals.

Aleman, Aleman, Aleman.

In vain; they continued to advance.

"Getting a bit hot here," I said, running my finger round my collar.

The commander laughed.

The muzzles of their guns were now pointed directly at us, but when they were about a mile and

a half away they turned away and their guns swung back to the normal position. They steamed

past and dipped their flags in salute.

Women and the Spanish Civil War

2009-10-05T09:20:00.000+08:00

From 1936 to 1939 Spanish women participated in a civil war that convulsed their nation. Women fought on both sides of the struggle; however, a surprisingly large number of Spanish women supported the Nationalist forces (Smith 1989, 474). The Nationalists, led by General Francisco Franco, represented conservative sectors like the Falange, a mass-based fascist organization, and were backed by much of the military, the Catholic Church, and large landowners. The Republicans, opponents of the Nationalists, were the governing coalition. They ruled Spain from their 1931 election, at which time they established the Second Republic, until their 1939 defeat. They received support from peasants, workers, and sectors of the middle class; the coalition included communists, socialists, anarchists, and liberals.

In the 1920s and 1930s most of Spain was mired in poverty. Unlike much of the rest of Europe, it had failed to industrialize, except in the north, or carry out agricultural reforms. As a result, the population was malnourished and lacked good housing or health care (Smith 1989, 472). Women worked in agriculture, sweatshops, and factories. Rates of infant mortality were high, as were the number of children born out of wedlock (Koonz 1998, 471). The Republican forces came to power pledging to modernize Spain and improve the population’s standard of living.

When the Republicans took control of the government, Napoleonic legal codes and conservative Catholic practices governed how most Spaniards lived. Families could “force their daughters into marriage” (Smith 1989, 473). Divorce was illegal, and husbands could imprison their wives for “disobedience and verbal insults.” Women’s literacy rate (50 percent) was much lower than that of men (70 percent) (Koonz 1998, 471). As part of its modernization project, the Republican government passed a series of laws that granted women equal status as full citizens. Women obtained suffrage rights and maternity benefits, the option of no-fault divorce, and civil marriage (Koonz 1998, 472).

Republican women fought to maintain the social gains they had won and to preserve the overall political and economic program of the government. In order to counter the threat that the growing power of fascism posed, antifascist Spanish women joined the Worldwide Committee of Women against War and Fascism (Smith 1989, 473). Initially, Republican women joined militia units and took up arms against the Franco forces. Lina Odena was the first Republican to die in battle when she committed suicide rather than surrender to the Nationalists as they overran her position (Smith 1989, 454). Dolores Ibárruri, known as La Pasionaria, called on women and men to fight against the fascists. When the Nationalist forces attacked Madrid, one of the last Republican strongholds, she urged women and men to take up arms against them.

Neither the social changes instituted by the Republicans nor their attempts to break up the large estates and set up peasant cooperatives, increase wages, or undermine the power of the Catholic Church pleased conservative forces within Spain. In 1936 the military under General Franco rebelled and initiated the civil war that, three years later, would defeat the Republican forces.

The majority of Spanish women rejected the Republicans and sided with the Franco forces. Unlike the Republican women, they embraced conservative ideas about gender and heeded the call of the Catholic Church to rally to its defense in opposition to the Republic. In the 1930s José Antonio Primo de Rivera started the Falange, using Benito Mussolini’s fascism as a model. In 1934 Pilar Primo de Rivera, José Antonio’s sister, organized the Sección Femenina (Women’s Section) of the Falange, under the leadership of her brother. It was started to “give aid to Falangist prisoners and assistance to the families of fallen members” of the movement (Enders 2002, 86). The organization grew rapidly and exponentially: from an initial group of 300 women in 1934 it grew to 400,000 in 1938, according to its own estimates. The vast majority of these women worked in Auxilio Social (Social Assistance), the Falange organization that “provided food, clothing, and shelter to widows, orphans and the destitute, and taught them to ‘love God and understand the Falange’” (Enders 2002, 87). They supported separate spheres for men and women and believed that the most important quality a woman could possess was abnegación (self-sacrifice).

Although these women engaged in very public activities, such as nursing, running soup kitchens, and in some cases taking up arms, they never did so in order to challenge male power or gender relations, as was the case with some of the Republican women. Instead, their goal was to “strengthen the family within a ‘New Spain’” (Keene 2002, 184). They fought to restore conservative ideas about gender; to establish the woman’s role in life as a wife and mother within the home, not in the streets; and to uphold the spiritual teachings of the church over all aspects of their lives.

In 1939 Nationalist forces defeated the Republic, and General Franco ruled Spain dictatorially until his death in 1975. Some of the Republican women, especially the most visible leaders like Dolores Ibárruri, went into exile. The lives of most women who stayed in Spain came under the strict control of the Franco government and the Catholic Church. The fascist government rescinded women’s right to vote, made divorce illegal, and instituted the Charter of Labor that said “women’s only proper sphere is in the nursery” (Koonz 1998, 473). Pilar Primo de Rivera continued to head the Sección Femenina of the Falange, which became the official women’s organization until Franco’s death. If women wanted to work for the state, “obtain a driver’s license, a passport, or the like, [they were] obligated to serve six months with the Sección Femenina” (Enders 2002, 87).

References and Further Reading

Enders, Victoria. 2002. “And We Ate Up the World”: Memories of the Sección Femenina. In Right-Wing Women: From Conservatives to Extremists around the World. Edited by Paola Bacchetta and Margaret Power. New York: Routledge.

Keene, Judith. 2001. Fighting for Franco. International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939. London and New York: Leicester University.

———. 2002. Foreign Women in Spain for General Franco. In Right-Wing Women: From Conservatives to Extremists around the World. Edited by Paola Bacchetta and Margaret Power. New York: Routledge.

Koonz, Claudia. 1998. The “Woman Question” in Authoritarian Regimes. Pages 463–492 in Becoming Visible: Women in European History. Edited by Renate Bridenthal, Susan Mosher Stuard, and Merry E. Wiesner. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Smith, Bonnie G. 1989. Changing Lives: Women in European History since 1700. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.

Spanish Civil War bodies exhumed

2009-06-14T21:44:00.001+08:00

By Danny Wood
BBC News, Madrid

The bodies were removed in the presence of relatives

Seven bodies have been removed from Spanish Civil War graves in the first court-ordered exhumation.

The remains were transferred from two mass graves in the cemetery of Santa Marta village to a medical lab for official identification.

Archaeologists recovered the remains, belonging to men executed by supporters of Gen Francisco Franco in 1936.

This could be the first of thousands of official exhumations that have been the focus of a lengthy legal wrangle.

Judge Garzon

The matter of exhumations is still controversial in Spain 70 years after the Civil War.

Previously, exhumations were done by volunteers with no official help.

These seven bodies were officially exhumed in the presence of relatives over five days.

Historians says tens of thousands of victims of the Civil War and the repression under Gen Franco that followed still lie unidentified in mass graves around the country.

Last October, High Court Judge Baltasar Garzon announced that mass exhumations could begin - including the grave where poet Federico Garcia Lorca is thought to be buried.

Judge Garzon named Gen Franco and more than 30 members of his regime as instigators of alleged crimes against humanity.

But the public prosecutor argued that these crimes could not be examined, because of Spain's Amnesty Law that prevents any criminal investigation into the Franco years.

Judge Garzon pulled out of his inquiry and transferred the responsibility for any future exhumations to local courts.

THE SPANISH MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II

2009-05-20T23:15:00.003+08:00

Members of the 1st Battalion, 269th ID "Blue Division of Spanish Volunteers.

By Wayne H. Bowen

Spain was not an official belligerent during World War II, but its military was deeply affected by the conflict. Born in the Spanish Civil War, the victorious armed forces of Nationalist Spain emerged in 1939 with an austere Catholic and authoritarian ethos. Partly out of necessity and partly out of the ideological preference of its master, the Spanish military maintained these principles of self-abnegation and Spartan existence for many years after the end of the Civil War. Despite the close ties of the Spanish military to the Axis, and the similarities between Spain’s Falangist Party and the fascist parties of Germany and Italy, the Spanish Army remained on its bases during the broader European war that began the year Spain’s Civil War ended. Many observers expected General Francisco Franco’s army, which had been trained and equipped by Germany, to enter World War II on the Axis side. Despite negotiations to this end, Spain did not join Nazi Germany in its war or undertake any major military operations during the conflict.

Nevertheless, some elements of his army and air force saw combat during the conflict. The Spanish Blue Division, a volunteer unit in the Germany army, served on the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1943, as did the Blue Squadron from the Spanish Air Force. Sent at the initiative of Franco, these forces demonstrated Spain’s solidarity with the Axis, without a declaration of war. Other smaller units, without authorization from the Franco regime, served in the German military and SS. The Spanish Army and security forces also fought on Spanish territory against communist-led guerrillas, the maquis, who invaded Spain from France beginning in late 1944.

The vast majority of the Spanish armed forces, however, remained in their barracks during World War II. Although its public image was one of heroism and glory, and on paper, its divisions seemed formidable, the Spanish military suffered from severe financial neglect, even as the Spanish state trumpeted the institution as the key to the Civil War victory and the foundation of the regime. Poorly equipped, so badly paid that even officers had to hold outside employment to survive, the Spanish military would have been hard pressed to defend against even a halfhearted invasion of the peninsula by the Axis or the Allies. This paper will demonstrate the weakness of Franco’s military during this critical time in the regime’s history. Although the military served as one of the key pillars of the regime, the weakness of Spain’s armed forces illustrates the overall fragility of the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. Despite an outward appearance of total unity, the Spanish government during World War II was divided between hostile factions, notoriously incompetent in almost all areas, and characterized by an ambivalent authoritarianism that reflected the broader disagreements within the government and in society at large. The armed forces echoed these divisions and magnified them at the level of general officers.

On April 1, 1939, General Francisco Franco, sick in bed with fever, issued this statement: ‘‘On this day, with the Red Army captive and disarmed, the Nationalist troops have reached their final military objectives. The war has ended.’’ The Spanish Civil War, which had begun almost three years earlier, ended with a Nationalist victory, leaving the nation in the hands of General Franco and his supporters. The Nationalists won because they had internal unity, a more cohesive and better-led army, and consistent foreign support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The defeated Republicans, surrendered or fled into exile to France, Mexico, or the Soviet Union, the latter being the only nation to provide substantial military assistance to the Republic of the Popular Front. The war was over, with the Republican army in prisoner of war camps or huddled in refugee camps in southern France.

Even though the Nationalist armed forces had won the Civil War, within a few months of the end of the conflict its readiness and strength had declined precipitously. In a rush to demobilize large numbers of soldiers, the army retained far too many officers and lost its base of enlisted combat veterans. German and Italian military aid, which had provided the bulk of Spain’s modern weapons and training, ended suddenly with the victory. As a result, by the end of 1939, even as World War II was beginning on the continent, Franco’s armed forces, so recently arrayed in triumph and effectiveness, were in no condition to fight a protracted war. The Spanish Army was large, over 500,000 when mobilized, but had no oil, little ammunition, and only two under equipped motorized divisions. The rest of the divisions marched on foot and were perpetually short of food, uniforms, boots, and rifles, most of which were from World War I anyway. Even after several years of attempting to purchase arms from the Axis and the Allies, Spain was woefully short in almost every category. The air force had only a few modern fighter aircraft, mostly German Messerschmitt Bf-109s left over from the Civil War or purchased in small numbers thereafter. Most of the navy had been sunk during the Civil War, with one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one seaworthy submarine, and a handful of destroyers able to defend Spain’s coast and maritime interests. The army had almost no tanks, trucks, or modern artillery. This weakness came despite the high percentage of the national budget which went to the military: 45% in 1941 and as high as 34% even in 1945.

This was not the face of a nation prepared for modern war or even minor offensive operations against Gibraltar or French North Africa, both of which were seriously considered by Franco during World War II. Even with an Axis victory, Spain would have suffered yet another blow to its fragile economy, leaving even more of its citizens hungry and desperate. While new territories in North Africa would have helped with food supplies, the costs would have been high, as France, even after being defeated by Germany, was more than a match for Spain’s weak military. In the case of Spanish entry into the war, it seems likely that Hitler would eventually have sought to replace Franco with a more pliable leader, as happened in Hungary in 1944. Even facing an imminent Soviet invasion of Germany, Nazi leaders maintained the wherewithal to overthrow the aged Admiral Miklo´s Horthy, who had dared to open peace negotiations with the Allies, and gave power to the fascist Arrow Cross Party in Hungary.

Despite its penury, the military remained a powerful force within Spain’s borders. The most important interest groups working within the Spanish government were the military, the Catholic Church and its lay organizations, Bourbon monarchists, the Falange, and Carlist monarchists. Of these groups, the first three were the most consistently influential over the life of the regime, with the earlier influence of the Falange fading with the defeat of the Axis during World War II. During World War II, ‘‘the Falange, Church and army shared power, with clear pre-eminence to the military.’’

During the first year of peace, Franco dramatically reduced the size of the Spanish Army, from almost one million at the end of the Civil War to 250,000 in early 1940, with most soldiers two-year conscripts. Concern about the international situation, Spain’s possible entry into the war, and threats of invasion led him to restore some of these reductions, leaving Spain with almost double the 1940 figure for the remainder of World War II. In November 1942, with the Allied landings in North Africa and the German occupation of Vichy France bringing the war closer than ever to Spain’s border, Franco ordered a partial mobilization, bringing the army to over 750,000. The air force and navy also grew in numbers and in budgets, to 35,000 airmen and 25,000 sailors by 1945, although for fiscal reasons Franco had to restrain attempts by both services to undertake dramatic expansions.

With the end of the Civil War, the Nationalist army demobilized most of its soldiers, but the internal and international situations required the maintenance of a large army. Conscription, revised in August 1940 to include all able-bodied males, provided the vast majority of enlisted soldiers, but the officer corps remained not only a volunteer force but also one that was oversubscribed by young men hoping for a military career. For every place in the Academia General Militar (General Military Academy, GMA), the service school that trained most Spanish cadets destined for military service during World War II, there were at least two applicants, a ratio rising to 4.3:1 in 1945.

Even though the armed forces consumed 35–45% of all government expenditures, figures that remained constant as the overall budget rose, procurement was very limited during World War II. One of the reasons the navy, air force, and even army had to limit construction and acquisition of new weapons systems, despite the weakness of the armed forces to cope with any external threat, was that the vast majority of their budgets, at least 49% and as much as 80%, went toward salaries. The bulk of this went to the Spanish Army’s ‘‘bloated officer corps,’’ which included both generals over the age of seventy and thousands of provisional lieutenants (alféreces provisionales) commissioned during the Civil War and kept on active duty for political reasons, even though their services were no longer needed in a smaller military. Additionally, many of the mid-level officers—majors and lieutenant colonels—had been Franco’s infantry cadets when he had been director of the GMA in Zaragoza, 1927–31, and retained loyalty for the former teacher.

Thus, the Spanish Army entered the period of World War II ‘‘with a great mass of soldiers poorly fed, clothed and shod, supplied with antiquated weapons and equipment, practically without any automobiles and using obsolete tanks and aircraft.’’ There were so few tanks in the army that many cavalry officers argued that Spain should ignore the tank and keep cavalry units on horseback. The military, especially the army, suffered from poor equipment and a lack of standardization. Even with the most basic kinds of military equipment, Spain was unable to afford one system. Instead of one type of rifle, which would have improved readiness and made training and logistics easier, the army had to rely on domestic weapons from the Spanish-American War, World War I, and eight other foreign variants. Even at the end of World War II, after six years of peace, the army still had ten different kinds of machine guns.

Despite his extensive battlefield and administrative experience, ‘‘the problem of military efficiency never seriously preoccupied General Franco.’’ Franco even argued that Spanish soldiers could make up through strength of will what they lacked in war materiel. Spain’s international defiance of Allied demands to lessen German ties also had a negative impact on readiness. For example, the British and U.S. oil embargo in early 1944 was so catastrophic that military aircraft and armored vehicles did not have sufficient fuel to participate in the victory parade on April 1, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Nationalist triumph in the Spanish Civil War.

For good reason, Franco was able to refer to the Army and Falange as ‘‘the two pillars of the Nation,’’ by which he meant his regime. This contentedness also continued despite the inactivity of the armed forces during World War II. Aside from the Blue Division, Blue Legion, and Blue Squadron, which fought on the Eastern Front as late as 1944, and the few units involved in fighting communist guerrillas in northern Spain, 1944–45, the Spanish military did not gain any experience, or even participate in any major military exercises, during World War II.

The only significant domestic use of the military, against the maquis guerrillas beginning in 1944, also had a consolidating impact on the regime. Faced with such an obvious threat to national security, the military rallied to Franco. In October 1944, the first insurgents entered Navarre, Spain, from France. This geographic choice, attempting to seize the Valley of Inclan, was a serious mistake, as it brought the communists into the Carlist heartland, surrounded by tens of thousands of conservative and Catholic peasants who had been nearly unanimous in their support of the 1936 Nationalist uprising. Still, several thousand rebels infiltrated and remained in the region for up to ten days before being crushed by the army and Guardia Civil. From Navarre, the communists spread throughout many of the mountainous areas of Spain, committing over 300 armed attacks on Spanish military, police, and civilian targets. The invasion had the effect of rallying the military around Franco, through raising fears of another Civil War. With the failure of the maquis on the battlefield, the French ended their tolerance for these incursions and closed the Spanish border on March 1, 1945.

In the summer and fall of 1940 Spain came closest to entering the war, with the Falange and military in ascendancy over more moderate monarchists, the Church, and business interests. Uncertainty pervaded the mood of Spain during those months, with Spain’s edging closer to war coinciding with the heights of the black market and corruption in postwar Spain. Most of the military believed that a Nazi victory was imminent and that Spain needed to affiliate quickly with the Axis to take its proper share of the spoils of war. Franco was still hesitant to embrace belligerency on the side of the Axis, barring financial and military guarantees from Hitler and Mussolini. When Air Force Minister Yagüe proposed at a cabinet meeting that Spain should immediately enter the war on the side of Germany, Franco told him to keep quiet and dismissed him from office shortly thereafter. The Caudillo also fired General José López Pinto, the Captain General of the frontier Sixth Military District, after allowing excessive Hispano-German fraternization at the border.

The German attack on the USSR transformed Spanish politics overnight and genuinely stimulated ‘‘a patriotic clamor’’ and anticommunist demonstrations throughout Spain. While Falangists, Alfonsin monarchists, Carlists, Catholics, and business interests may have had significant political differences, they coincided in their hatred of communism and anger at the Soviet Union for having assisting the Second Republic and prolonging the war. Franco appears to have briefly considered declaring war, as requested by Nazi Germany, but his nation’s economic dependence on Great Britain prevented this from being possible.

Instead, following the suggestion of Ramón Serrano Suñer, his foreign minister and brother-in-law, Franco offered to send a volunteer division of Spaniards to serve in the German army, a proposal accepted immediately by Nazi leaders. Recruiting began with a massive demonstration in central Madrid, during which Serrano Suñer declared: ‘‘Russia is guilty’’ of beginning the Spanish Civil War, murdering José Antonio Primo de Rivera (the founder of the Falange), and otherwise contributing to the destruction of Spain’s economy and prospects. Within a few weeks, tens of thousands of Falangists, Carlists, and other anticommunist Spanish youth had volunteered for the unit, leaving it oversubscribed several times over.

The Spanish Volunteer Division, its official name, left Spain for Germany in mid-July 1941, witnessed in Madrid by four cabinet ministers and most of the leading Falangist leaders, with the noted exception of Franco, who perhaps wanted to maintain some official distance from such an obvious breach of neutral behavior. Serrano Suñer, even though Foreign Minister, felt no such hindrance, declaring to the Nazi newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that the creation of the Blue Division signaled Spain’s position as one of ‘‘moral belligerency on the side of our friends and against the most hated of all the enemies of the Spaniards,’’ the Soviet Union.

The Blue Division received the official support of the government for its first two years on the Eastern Front. Newspapers contained frequent mentions of the heroism of the unit, memorializing fallen soldiers and denouncing the evils of communism. The Falange opened a special office in Madrid to assist families of the division and sponsored radio broadcasts featuring soldiers calling back to their friends and relatives in Spain. Congregations throughout Spain held special masses in honor of the troops, attended by prominent figures in the Falange and government, and the Women’s Section of the Falange organized drives to collect winter clothing and other gifts for the unit, especially around Christmas. Upon their return from battle, Blue Division veterans gained the same hiring preferences as those who had fought in the Civil War, and one year of service in the unit credited a soldier with two in the regular Spanish Army.

One result of the dispatch of the Blue Division was the rise of General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, the unit commander, as a popular figure. As a young officer, he had served with distinction in Morocco and had held key positions during the monarchy and republic. During the Spanish Civil War, after making a daring escape from the Republican zone, he had been a skilled Nationalist commander. With his army background, experience as Secretary General of the Falange, and proven battlefield leadership, he became the focus of a tremendous amount of attention. The Spanish press covered his speeches, which were also broadcast over Spanish radio hailing the courage of his soldiers.

Hard is the enemy, and harder still is the Russian winter. But it does not matter: even harder is my race, supported by reason and the courage of its sons who, embracing their heroic German comrades, will in the end achieve the victory, towards which we fight without ceasing.

In addition to the Spaniards who followed his exploits, Muñoz Grandes also garnered the attention of Hitler, who saw in him a potential replacement for Franco. The German leader met several times with the Spanish general, awarding him the highest military decoration and encouraging him to remain involved in politics. Franco heard about these discussions, and replaced Muñoz Grandes as commander of the division, a replacement delayed several months at the insistence of the Nazis. Hitler wanted to ensure that the Blue Division’s commander gained sufficient victories to become even more popular in Spain. Upon his eventual return, to a hero’s welcome, Franco promoted Muñoz Grandes to the rank of lieutenant general—too high to command an army division again—and appointed the general in March 1943 to head his military household. Despite the celebrations and banquets in his honor, it would not be until March 1945—just before the end of World War II—that Franco would trust Muñoz Grandes with troops, giving him command of the prestigious Madrid Military District.

Robert Capa photographs from Spanish Civil War found in ‘Mexican Suitcase’

2009-05-04T17:16:00.002+08:00

Man in beret with swastika, Basque region by David Seymour, one of the images found in the Suitcase

James Bone in New York

A mysterious “Mexican suitcase” has been unpacked to reveal a treasure trove of classic photo-journalism taken in the 1930s by Robert Capa and two other pioneers.

The three cardboard boxes contain 126 rolls of 35mm film with about 4,300 images of the Spanish Civil War, most never seen before.

They were saved from wartime Europe and appeared in Mexico City half a century later among the effects of a former Mexican diplomat, before finding their way to New York.

The photos were taken by Capa, his lover and professional partner Gerda Taro, and David “Chim” Seymour, co-founder with Capa of the photo agency Magnum. They include images of the American writer Ernest Hemingway by Capa, the French author André Malraux by Taro and the Spanish poet Federico García Lorca by Seymour.

“It is important historical material, as well as work by these three famous photographers,” Cynthia Young, curator at the International Centre of Photography in New York, said.

The rolls of film contain images by Capa of the Spanish Civil War, including destroyed buildings in Madrid, the Battle of Teruel, the Battle of Rio Segre, and the mobilisation for the defence of Barcelona in January 1939, as well as the mass exodus of people from Tarragona to Barcelona and the French border. The boxes also contain a series by Capa of the internment camps for Spanish refugees in Argelès-sur-Mer, Le Bacarès and Bram in March 1939.

“A few of those we saw published at the time. Now we have ten rolls of those images,” Ms Young said.

The film provides new insight into Capa’s working methods by showing the negatives on either side of published images. “In some cases, you can see his famous dictum: if your pictures are not good enough, you are not close enough,” Ms Young said. “In some, you can see him homing in on his subject.”

However, despite the initial hopes of experts, the discovery does not cast any light on the controversy over whether Capa staged his most famous shot, The Falling Soldier. The photograph shows a Spanish Republican militiaman falling backwards, apparently at the moment he is struck by a bullet near Córdoba on September 5, 1936. The negative of the iconic picture has never been found.

Almost all of the Capa images in the boxes date from 1937. They came into the possession of General Francisco Aguilar González, the Mexican Ambassador to the Vichy Government in 1941-42. The rolls of film were discovered among the general’s effects by the Mexican film-maker Benjamin Tarver, who inherited them from his aunt, a friend of the general. After prolonged negotiations, he sent them to the photography centre in New York.

THE POPULAR ARMY OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC, 1936–39 PART III

2009-04-26T15:00:00.004+08:00

The Draft

At the beginning of the Civil War both Spanish armies were composed of the professional forces, police forces, volunteers, and the conscripts who were undergoing their compulsory year of military service. As has been seen, the insurgent Nationalists had the advantage of being able to use the Legion and the Moroccan troops. The Republic, while it had the conscripts and the various police forces of its zone, was immensely weakened militarily because most of the professional officers had rebelled or were suspected of sympathy with the insurgents and had hidden from the hostility of murderous militias bent on killing all representatives of Spanish militarism. In the insurgent area, however, the military columns were able very soon to take the field, with almost all their own officers and noncommissioned officers and with their equipment. The militias that accompanied them were brought under strict military discipline. On the government side, however, the militia that accompanied troops in the heterogeneous columns marching out of cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia was not disciplined; the professional officers were apprehensive of them. While the militia constituted the popular strength of the insurgents, they were a source of disorder and chaos for the Republic.

Nevertheless, on both sides, the bulk of manpower came from drafting the reserves, that is those men who had completed or were still to complete their military service. Because the Popular Army steadily lost ground, it had to draft more and more classes. In September 1936, men of the classes of 1932 to 1935 were called; in 1937 even older men, many married and with families, going back to 1931. The class of 1938 was called before its time. After the battle of Teruel in early 1938, the classes of 1929 and 1930 were called, and after the great rout of April 1938, several more years were called, including boys who were not due for service until 1941. During the Ebro offensive, in September 1938 two more older classes were called, and in desperation, in the midst of the retreat through Catalonia in January 1939, the authorities drafted men of the classes of 1919 through 1922, who were in their forties, and boys, known as the Quinta del Biberón or the ‘‘baby’s bottle class,’’ who were not due for service until 1942. In all, men between the ages of seventeen and forty-five were called to the Popular Army. Communist opinion was that such total mobilization should have been undertaken long before. Yet, without sufficient equipment and commanders for them, the wisdom of such a procedure would have been doubtful. The Nationalists did not draft so many classes of reserves as the Republic because they had more volunteers in the Moroccan units, the Legion and the battalions of Falange and Carlists. In any case, the Republican territory which they overran provided, if not large numbers of recruits for the Army, at least a conscript labor force. The two armies, Popular and Nationalist, approached a total of not far short of two million men, a colossal figure for a population of under twenty-five million.

The International Brigades

The contribution of the Popular Army’s International Brigades, one of its best-known features, should be considered. By mid-October 1936, in the provincial capital of Albacete and surrounding villages, the foreign volunteers for the Republic were being formed into International Brigades. Part of the first International Brigade went into combat on November 8 and 9 facing an imminent assault on Madrid by the enemy. By this time, however, several more Spanish mixed brigades had been formed. Thus, the first International Brigade was allocated the number eleven and the others were numbered successively up to fifteen. Statistics have varied enormously, but present-day calculations suggest a maximum of about 35,000–40,000 foreign volunteers, but not more than perhaps 15,000 at any given moment. The formation of the International Brigades represented a decision by the Comintern to do something concrete for the Republic and to direct the flood of volunteers and prospective volunteers for Spain so that they would offer an example of international left-wing solidarity. As channeled through the French Communist Party, controlled and led by French and Italian communists, including some who had had training and experience in the USSR, the Internationals would be controllable in the context of the Soviet need to prevent the Democracies thinking that a major social revolution was taking place in Spain. Moreover, the crushing of the revisionist anti-Stalinist revolutionary communist party, the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista or POUM, in June 1937 was accompanied by the dissolution of its unit, the 29th Division, in which many foreign volunteers fought.

The International Brigades were seen as an example of proletarian solidarity with the Republic. Because it was also thought that they were more militarily skilled than the Spaniards, more experienced in war, and more disciplined than their hosts, the Internationals were used as shock troops. However, the records of the Internationals and the memoirs of men who participated in the International Brigades reveal that the amount of chaos and unskilled leadership that they suffered was at least as great as among Spanish units. It is inexact also to claim that any significant number of Internationals had had experience of the 1914–18 war except their commanders, which is why they were appointed. Probably only among the French volunteers, who admittedly formed the greatest individual number of Internationals, had most men completed military service. The Italians were refugees from their country, as were many of the Eastern Europeans. The Germans had come to military age during the Weimar Republic when Germany had no compulsory military service. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had obligatory service. In any case, the Internationals cannot be fairly compared for experience, training, discipline, or leadership with Franco’s shock troops, the Legion and the Moroccan troops. Losses among the Internationals, who were thrown against the Legion and the Moroccans, were thus very heavy, and by the time of the Battle of Brunete in July 1937, the International Brigades, reinforced already many times by new volunteers, included many Spaniards. By the time of the Ebro battle (July–November 1938), at least two-thirds of the troops of the International units that took part were Spaniards.

Strategy

The question of strategy may be more a matter of political rather than military decision. Proactive attacks by the Republican Army, such as those at Teruel in December 1937 and on the Ebro in July 1938, may have corresponded more to political decisions than to military appropriateness. The problem with major surprise assaults such as the crossing of the Ebro on the night of July 25–26 was that, as the Italians learnt to their cost at Guadalajara in March 1937, such movements needed air cover. They also required a clear view of what had to be done once the initial gains had been made. On the Ebro, air cover was scarcely present, so that advancing Republican troops and the pontoon bridges over which all their materiel had to come and their wounded evacuated were constantly bombed by the enemy. Advancing Republican troops, whose inexperienced commanders lacked initiative, allowed themselves to be held up by strongpoints of lesser importance. They thus lost the element of surprise. Furthermore, Franco’s logistics were of an extremely high order, which allowed him to bring up reinforcements before the Army of the Ebro, the best trained and equipped of all the Republican forces, could take full advantage of its initial success.

On a more theoretical point, it seems arguable that, although officers on both sides had imbibed the same military ideas because they had attended the same military academy, on the Republican side it was French defensive concepts, highly respected in the Spanish military academy, personified in confidence in the Maginot Line, and encouraged by the communist view that even an unskilled army could force a favorable decision by resistance, that seemed to predominate, while few shared the more aggressive concepts of colonial warfare. Did this contrast arise because Africanistas, many of whom had taught at the General Military Academy that he himself had commanded in the 1920s, commanded Franco’s armies?

Perhaps such contrasts were more applicable to tactics. Were company and platoon movements taught better in Franco’s army than in the Popular Army of the Republic? If this was not so, can the clearly better infantry performance of Franco’s army, even excepting the Moroccans and the highly trained Legionaries, be explained in terms of better officer and noncommissioned officer training, an absence of revolutionary rhetoric or better morale? Alternatively, was it all merely a matter of more arms, better discipline, and greater confidence in the professional quality of commanders at all levels?

Once the Republic, because of its inner political chaos, had made a number of incoherent and mistaken strategic decisions, such as abandoning the blockade of the Moroccan coast and not backing the initiative by militia from Valencia to recapture the port and naval base of Palma de Mallorca, its inability to defeat Franco’s insurrection was probably inevitable. Nevertheless, without the refusal of foreign countries to supply arms to the Republic, in contrast to the regular supplies that Franco received from Germany and Italy, a stalemate might have been possible. The construction of a new army in such a situation can be seen, in retrospect, to have been a substantial achievement.

Postscript - The Casado Uprising

Communist influence was strongest in the Army of the Ebro commanded by militia Colonel Juan Modesto. This army crossed into France in February 1939 after Franco had overrun Catalonia. Communist power in central and southern Spain must have been much weaker, for, when Colonel Segismundo Casado and the professional officers rebelled against the Negín government, which they considered without authority once the President of the Republic had resigned, the Spanish communists and the foreign Comintern delegates flew out of Spain and into exile. Resistance to Casado by some communist-led units was crushed.

Casado and his colleagues had been in touch for some time with Franco’s agents in Madrid. The concern of the anti-Negrín conspirators was to achieve a reasonable peace settlement, to save what could be preserved and to allow time for those in peril to escape. The professional officers seem to have believed, naively, that their colleagues on the other side, men whom many of them knew as friends and old colleagues, would welcome them back into the military family. After all, the professional officers of the Popular Army had obeyed their oaths of loyalty and had done their duty. They had not been guilty of any criminal acts, and many of them were socially conservative and Catholic. The Republican professional officers were, in the event, misled. Every officer was courtmartialed after the war by Francoist tribunals. At the present stage of research, it seems that sentence of execution was confirmed only against those officers who were seen, because of their rank, to have been responsible for the deaths of their fellow officers sentenced by court-martial for their rebellion in 1936 and perhaps against others who were strongly associated with political forces of the Left. Many officers, nevertheless, spent years in prison, or purging their sentence in labor camps. Most were expelled from the Army and eked out difficult lives in postwar Spain.

THE POPULAR ARMY OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC, 1936–39 PART II

2009-04-23T13:50:00.004+08:00

By Michael Alpert

Militia

The social and political circumstances of Spain in 1936 created a revolution, indeed on both sides of the lines of battle. In Insurgent Spain, however, all political and military power was centralized and soon put into the hands of General Franco although, paradoxically, it seems that a larger element of autonomy of command decision was given to his commanders than to those of the Republic. Any argument or attempt to organize some form of structural autonomy in Franco Spain, however, was crushed, so that the militia volunteers of the Fascist Falange and the Traditionalists or Carlists were rapidly brought at once under military authority. In the government zone, in contrast, militia columns characterized the early months of war. They lasted until the end of 1936 in central Spain, but in Catalonia, where the anarchists dominated until May 1937, some consequences of the militia epoch, such as the indiscipline, the disorganization, and the political infighting, continued until the end of the war.

Observers of the first few months of the Spanish war transmitted their pictures of the immensely newsworthy militias, the disorganized, untrained, and barely armed defenders of the Republic against Fascism, who were at the same time carrying out a revolution. The militias wore overalls and miscellaneous items of military uniform and carried the weapons that they had managed to seize when they had sacked the barracks after defeating the rebellious officers. Later, after some hesitation, the government had ordered the arsenals to be opened and rifles to be issued to the militias.

The militias were not, however, totally disorganized. In August 1936, the Ministry of War set up the Militia Command (Comandancia Militar de Milicias). This institution continued its functions until all the militia units were formed into units of the army. The units or columns of militia bore sonorous and revolutionary names such as ‘‘Lions of the Republic’’ (Leones de la República) or titles originating from the occupation of the men: printers, steelworkers, railway employees, and even bullfighters. They might bear the name of a politician or a political party. Professional officers, noncommissioned officers, or anyone who was trusted and had some military experience commanded some. The new heroes who came from the labor unions, men who had led strikes, and members of political committees led others. None of these militias could compete with the Moroccans or legionaries of Franco’s African Army, who were trained and ruthless though often fewer in number, and infinitely more skillfully led, which accounts for the retreats of the Republican militia all through the late summer and autumn of 1936 and the loss of substantial amounts of equipment.

In August 1936, the Republican militias were militarized and, in theory at least, made subject to military law. Regulations were issued for appointing officers, confirming the commanders who up to then had been elected by the militia columns themselves. The carefully kept registers of the Comandancia Militar de Milicias list the militia columns. At their height, in mid-October 1936, in central Spain the militias totaled somewhat over 85,000 men. The Militia Command did not register lists of anarchist militias operating in Aragon and the Levant, but other calculations would estimate these at about 30,000. There was also a sizeable number of men enrolled in militia battalions in the northern zone of the Republic, the Basque Country, Santander, and Asturias. To receive finance, equipment, ammunition, and orders and be recognized as a battalion by the Ministry of War, a militia column had to have a properly enrolled minimum of 300 men. Altogether, there were about 150 of such units in the lists of the Comandancia Militar de Milicias. Since each column was required to have a paymaster and the senior major of a regular Spanish battalion had this responsibility, the latter’s title of mayor was given to militia officers holding that rank. The disintegration of the Republican zone caused by the insurrection itself led to a situation not foreseen by the framers of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1932 and the Basque one of October 1936. Although these charters reserved matters of Defense and War to the central government, nevertheless, until the crushing of the disturbances of 1937 in Barcelona, the Catalan government, the Generalitat, ran its own militarized militias as the Army of Catalonia (L’Exercit de Catalunya), based on divisions rather than the brigade as the basic unit. The Basques also ran their forces with little reference to the general sent to command them from the central government.

The Fifth Regiment

Many, if not most of the militia columns, were substantially larger than the minimum stipulated of 300 men, especially the communist-organized Quinto Regimiento or Fifth Regiment, so-called probably because the government asked five loyal officers to organize a volunteer battalion each. The fifth battalion became linked with a communist-organized recruitment drive. It took over an abandoned convent in the working class suburb of Cuatro Caminos in Madrid and used it as a training depot. Because of its propaganda but also to a considerable extent because of its merits, the Fifth Regiment came to occupy an important place in the left-wing historiography of the Spanish Civil War. The Quinto Regimiento was the pride of the Spanish Communist Party and nursery of many of the later militia commanders. It trained many thousands of men, though one may doubt the propagandist figure of 70,000 and perhaps reduce it to a still very substantial 40,000 who passed through the building in Cuatro Caminos, and in branches in the Calles Hortaleza and Lista.

Communist Views on the Army

From the first week of the war, the need to organize proper regular-style nonrevolutionary military forces was recognized by the Communist Party and proclaimed in its newspaper Mundo Obrero and in Milicia Popular, the brilliantly edited newspaper of the Fifth Regiment, through whose pages one can trace the early careers of future leaders of the Popular Army who emerged from the Fifth Regiment, such as Juan Guilloto León, known as ‘‘Modesto,’’ and Enrique Líster.

Both Modesto and Líster, having had some training at the Soviet Frunze Academy in 1935 while political refugees, would occupy very high positions in the new Popular Army, Modesto becoming a general and Líster a corps-commanding colonel, and both would hold ranks in the Soviet Army after going into exile in 1939. The recruits of the Fifth Regiment received the best training possible and the best weapons and uniforms. Unlike the situation in other militias, men in the Fifth Regiment were trained not to question orders and to respect and salute professional officers. The Fifth Regiment introduced the Political Commissar, an institution which soon became common to all units of the Popular Army down to the level of company. It was the communists, probably because of their political education and the history of the Russian Civil War, who understood that, while the new army had to use professional officers so long as they were loyal, even if they were conservatively inclined, and while absolute obedience was essential, raw new recruits, often illiterate, had to be taught as well as ordered to obey. It had to be explained to them that war required discipline, cleanliness, and the proper care of weapons. They had to receive political education and to understand why the war was being fought. A corps of officers to be mentors and guides was necessary for this. Because the communists understood this better than other political bodies, who looked on the Commissar merely as a method of controlling the professional officer, it was the former who would predominate in the Corps of Political Commissars established in October 1936, at least in central Spain. Alternatively, one might say that the type of young man who would be suitable as a Commissar or a political and educational or welfare officer would be attracted to the Communist Party because its leaders were young, because its thinking was clear, and, most of all, because from October 1936 onward the Soviet Union was the only country save Mexico to dispatch war materiel to the Republic.

The Anarchists and the Army

The problem for the anarchists and their organization, the National Confederation of Labor, or CNT, lays in the circumstance that their long history of hostility to the bourgeois State and particularly to the Spanish Army, to hierarchy and to authority in general, made it difficult for them to accept that, while a new army to defend the Republic against the insurgents was needed, this new army, if it had any chance of being victorious, would have to have a regular structure, with ranks, uniform badges, and salutes, and be authoritarian rather than one where every order or decision was subjected to democratic vote. Nevertheless, in central Spain, the leader of the anarchist militias, a construction worker called Cipriano Mera, would, like a small number of other anarchist figures, become a lieutenant colonel and head an army corps. He and a few other leaders from their movement came to realize that anarchist principles would not function in a war situation.

The Mixed Brigades

From October 1936, at the height of the militia period, the government began to organize an army by forming Mixed Brigades. These were soon linked into divisions, the latter into army corps and these into armies. After Franco’s advance had split the Republic into two in April 1938, the armies would be organized as the Army Group of the East (Grupo de Ejércitos de la Región Oriental) and the Army Group of the Centre (Grupo de Ejércitos de la Región Central), the former covering Catalonia and the latter an approximate triangle with its apex in Madrid and its other angles at Valencia and the sea between Cartagena and Málaga.

The basic unit of the new army was the mixed brigade, so-called because its four infantry battalions were, at least in theory, supported by detachments of artillery, engineers, signals, and other units, as well as a staff, with the aim of making it a small self-contained autonomous tactical force. Generally speaking, however, the Spanish prewar army was based on regiments and divisions. It may be, as some insisted, that the mixed brigade was advocated by the Soviet advisers who came to Spain during the Civil War, but it was also similar to the column which was the traditional way the army had fought in the Moroccan wars, as well as being the easiest way to militarize the militia battalions.

Franco’s army was in many ways more responsive to the changed situation of real war. It was not subject to the bureaucracy of a War Ministry nor the control of a civilian government, and of course, not the targets of any press criticism or political pressure. Paradoxically, the Popular Army of the Republic was less flexible than Franco’s army in many ways, not the least in its attachment to military structures of the past. In the case of the organizational tables of units, structures were minutely laid down for the new mixed brigades and down to the level of battalions, companies, platoons, and sections. The mixed brigades consisted of four infantry battalions, each with three companies of riflemen and one of machine guns, together with units of mortars, light artillery, signals, engineers, and medical personnel. Unfortunately, what was complete on paper was not always so in fact. From the beginning, it was rarely possible to launch a complete brigade into combat. After major battles, brigades were often undermanned, dissolved, or merged with others.

The first six mixed brigades were created in October 1936 in various cities of the Republican zone such as Ciudad Real, Alcázar de San Juan, and Albacete. The speed with which the columns of militia were organized into brigades, provided with at least a rudimentary military structure and supplied as far as possible with uniforms, weapons, and military impedimenta in general, despite the apparent collapse of the State in the summer of 1936, the shortage of suitable military personnel for organization and training purposes, and the chaos of the War Ministry, is a reflection of the intense work put in by the new General Staff, a creation of Largo Caballero. That Largo Caballero was defenestrated in May 1937, among other reasons for his possibly misplaced loyalty to senior officers who could not accept the new type of army, who were inefficient or idle, or who were uncertain of their loyalties, ought not to ignore the credit due to him for reconstructing the War Ministry, which he headed as well as the government, and for identifying and appointing officers of great capacity. Among these was Major Vicente Rojo, Professor of Tactics for many years at the Military Academy of Toledo, who became Chief of Staff in the defense of Madrid and then overall Chief of Staff of the entire Popular Army. Rojo would go into exile at the end of the war and return in later years, to be tried for his responsibilities in leading what the court-martials called ‘‘Marxist’’ forces. While the thirty-year sentence handed down was suspended, Rojo neither recovered his rank nor his pension rights. Despite his great personal prestige as a strategist and despite his fervent Catholicism, Rojo was ignored by the Francoist military establishment.

By spring of 1937, eighty to ninety mixed brigades had been constituted. Sometimes the numbers allocated to new brigades were transferred from brigades that had been destroyed earlier in battle. Sometimes the brigade was never actually formed, particularly toward the end of the conflict, but the total of functioning brigades created during the war was about 150. The mixed brigade was, however, probably not the best tactical unit in the circumstances. It needed a large number of trained junior officers and noncommissioned officers, which was precisely what the Popular Army lacked. The mixed brigade was not the ideal unit for poorly trained soldiers. It suited a hardened professional and independent group of men. Furthermore, the theoretical artillery, engineers, and other services that the tables of organization required were in reality lacking. In contrast, Nationalist army did not use the brigade as a unit of organization and merely formed a brigade where necessary, from battalions and accompanying artillery and engineers, rather like the columns of the Moroccan war. Once the particular operation was over, the brigade was dissolved. This could not happen in the Popular Army precisely because the War Ministry rigidly laid down military structures. Franco’s army, in contrast, used its units in the form demanded by military requirements at the given moment. It published no fixed establishments for its battalions and companies, and even its divisions might vary greatly in composition. The Republican Army suffered from bureaucracy of the prewar type, a lack of professional junior and noncommissioned officers, an irregular and always insufficient supply of war materiel, and, despite all efforts, over-politicization.

Despite the theoretical concept of independent mixed brigades, those of the new army were soon grouped into divisions (three brigades per division). This process was more rapid in central Spain where eight divisions were formed by December 1936. Successive numbers were allocated to Andalusia. The numbering of divisions in Catalonia and the Levante started in the twenties because in those areas militarization was slower. It is significant that there were more divisions in the Popular Army than in the Franco army even though the latter, at least toward the latter part of the war, had more men. Yet these divisions all required staffs and the various divisional units of artillery, engineers, etc. Yet these were the elements in which the Popular Army was often deficient. Soon afterwards, the divisions were grouped in army corps, first in central Spain, then a corps in Andalusia, and another in Extremadura. Further numbers were allocated to corps formed in Catalonia and to the Basque Country, Santander, and Asturias.

The Popular Army, for the reasons already suggested, created units rapidly, but lacked the infrastructure of a professional officer and noncommissioned officer body, as well as the superstructure of a professional leadership except at the highest levels of command. It may well be described as a army on paper. At its height, in October 1938, as the Popular Army of the Republic was fighting its last great battle on the River Ebro but had been divided into two by Franco’s successful offensives of that spring, it consisted of two army groups, six armies, twenty-three corps, seventy divisions, two hundred brigades, and several other groups and units. Where had all these men come from?

THE POPULAR ARMY OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC, 1936–39 PART I

2009-04-15T15:35:00.002+08:00

By Michael Alpert

In the press of the wartime Republic, the Popular Army (the Spanish adjective popular means ‘‘of the people’’ but to call it ‘‘People’s Army’’ would suggest a similarity to forces which did not exist at the time, as well as begging the question of communist influence) was often called the Spanish army, to underline that Franco’s forces were foreign, as indeed they were to a greater extent than those of the Republic. The Popular Army consisted of the remains of those parts of the Spanish Army, its war materiel, and its professional and noncommissioned officers, who had not rebelled and in some cases had taken part in the crushing of the rebellion of their fellow officers on the weekend of July 18–19, 1936. From these the Republic created a military force that fought the war that arose from the coup launched by the larger part of the officers and the garrisons and led by General Francisco Franco. The Popular Army became a full-size force of several hundred thousand men, who fought for two years and eight months in particular conditions of inferiority.

Its interest for historians and Hispanists in general lies in the issues that arose during the Civil War from arguments about the nature of the army and from the political tensions suffered at the time as they affected the character of a national army fighting a civil war, together with questions of armament and politico-military issues regarding appropriate strategy. For military, social, and political historians, the significant questions lie in the area of the extent to which an army can be ‘‘revolutionary,’’ how this term is interpreted, and how far discussion of the nature of the Spanish Popular Army can be understood and assessed against the criteria of successful forces created in comparable situations elsewhere. The Soviet Russian advisers of the Popular Army inevitably thought in terms of their experience of the Russian Civil War of 1918–20. In historical terms, references were made to the armies of the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century and even to the New Model Army in the English Civil War of the seventeenth century. In their turn, historians of the future may perhaps look at the Spanish Popular Army against the model of the People’s Army of China or Vietnam.

First Reactions

Once the immediate crisis caused by the uprisings of the military garrisons all over Spain was over and the approximate extent of success of the coup was known, the Republic’s new government, under José Giral, had to decide how to tackle the threat posed by the advance on Madrid by insurrectionary troops from garrisons to the north of the capital and from Andalusia. These units were composed largely of young men undergoing their compulsory military service, together with volunteers from rightwing political movements. The authorities in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and the other cities where the coup had been defeated could probably have faced the insurgent columns successfully even though the former had released the conscripts from their oaths of obedience to their rebellious officers and were issuing arms to undisciplined and disorderly militias. The greatest threat, however, came from the forces in Spanish Morocco, which were professional and experienced in colonial warfare and which soon managed, with German and Italian naval and air support, to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and begin to march toward Madrid. The Republican or Loyalist—as they were called in the United States at the time—columns of labor union and left-wing militia, mixed with small army forces and units of the National Assault Police, Carabineers (customs police), and the Civil Guard (renamed National Republican Guard), were unable to resist the professional ruthlessness of the Foreign (though mostly Spanish) Legion and the native Moroccan troops at the service of the Insurgents. By early autumn, the latter were advancing swiftly toward Madrid, while other insurgents were either holding an unbroken line in eastern Spain, which militias from Barcelona and Valencia could not penetrate, or defending positions won in the north of Spain and cutting the Republic off from France at the western end of the frontier. It seemed as if the Francoist insurgents, soon well equipped, particularly in the air, by Italy and Germany, would take Madrid and end the war by the fall of 1936.

The Creation of an Army

By the time the battle for the capital began, however, on November 6, 1936, considerable progress was being made in the construction of the new Popular Army of the Republic. By this date, the Giral government had been replaced by a widely based administration headed by the veteran socialist Francisco Largo Caballero. This government would soon include representatives of the anarchist movement. Given that the anarchists, of great importance in the Spanish working-class movement, were hostile to the formation of a traditional-style army, their agreement to take part in a government that proposed creating a new regular-style army rather than the loose guerrilla style warfare that anarchists favored indicated that the steady militarization of the undisciplined militias was going to continue.

The governments of the Spanish Republic during the Civil War were hardly revolutionary. All of them worked hard to restore law and order, to put an end to murders and robbery that had occurred, particularly in the early weeks of the war, and to establish the Republic as an internationally respected State. Creating a disciplined army echoed the urge to present Republican Spain as a bourgeois, liberal State threatened by foreign-aided rebels. This in turn reflected the stance of the Soviet Union and the Comintern, whose Popular Front policy was to hold back revolution and to defend liberal parliamentary regimes against the fascist threat. Indeed, the communist ministers who joined the Largo Caballero government did so even though the Comintern had tried to prevent Largo Caballero from heading an administration because of his recent revolutionary record which would make the Democracies suspicious. The communists took portfolios because they recognized that unless they did so they would be unable to impose their views of the type of army that was appropriate in the circumstances. The Comintern representatives and the few hundred Soviet military advisers, who arrived following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR at the end of August 1936 and in October once the Soviet Union was sure that Germany and Italy were ignoring the European agreement not to sell arms to either side in the Spanish war, were convinced that only a unified command and a conservatively structured army would have a chance of successfully resisting the rebel forces, who insisted on being called Nationalists in the foreign press rather than Insurgents or Rebels. From mid-October 1936 onward the USSR sent substantial quantities of war materiel, almost certainly saving Madrid, but this had to be done clandestinely and, as will be seen, not with the regularity or in the quantities which Germany and Italy supplied to Franco.

The Question of Officers

The view of the approximately 2000 prewar professional officers who served in the Popular Army was that many more would have been willing to do so had their loyalty not been unjustly suspected. This may be so even though only a small number were members of the loyally Republican Unión Militar Republicana y Antifascista or UMRA, which took over the War Ministry in the first chaotic days. Very frequently, as new units of the Popular Army were being formed, their training was entrusted to a professional officer, either retired or on the active list, but who had not taken part in the coup. Yet when the new unit was ready for active service, the field commander appointed was a war-temporary officer from the political or labor union militias. On the other hand, the uprising of March 6, 1939, led by professional officers against the Republican government of Dr. Juan Negrín, and the surrender of Republican forces to Franco at the end of that month may throw some doubt on the loyalties of those who did serve the Republic in the war. Besides, the Russian advisers, looking at the Popular Army from outside and with fixed ideas of the role of professional officers based on their experience with Tsarist ones, frequently accused many of them not so much of treason, but of sabotage, an accusation which in Soviet terms can better be interpreted as idleness and incompetence. Without prosopographical studies of the several thousand officers who were living or stationed in the cities of the Republican zone and had not taken a part in the failed uprisings but were nevertheless rejected by the new Army, counterfactual history of what might have been is impossible. In contrast, however, the Franco or Nationalist army rejected only those officers who had opposed the coup or were known to have strong Republican or left-wing sympathies.

By the time both armies had constructed divisions, army corps, and armies, it was obvious, as command lists reveal, that the Nationalists had an adequate professional officer corps to lead units down to the level of companies. They were able to organize an efficient program to train new junior officers—the alfé reces provisionales. In the Popular Army, however, commanders at every level were too low ranking and inexperienced for their commands. Ex-captains were leading divisions and ex-majors were army corps commanders. Most commanders at brigade level and below were not professionals. Franco’s corps and army commanders were mostly young lieutenant colonels and colonels of infantry on the active list, who had enjoyed fast promotion during the Moroccan campaigns of the 1920s. Few such Africanistas served in the Popular Army where senior commanders might well be from the Artillery or Engineers, branches that in the Spanish military tradition had a very different military education from infantrymen.

The process of forming the Popular Army implied militarization of the militias and the creation of a new corps of junior officers up to the rank of major or comandante. Later in the war militia, officers often led divisions and, by the latter part of the war, even army corps. While these were often outstanding men, it is noticeable that many who carried the responsibility of serving as chiefs of staff, particularly at brigade level, had not had the training or experience that was enjoyed by their Nationalist equivalents. A small number of these militia leaders were allowed to rise to the rank of lieutenant colonel, but the militia officers remained on a separate seniority list, as did the several thousand war-temporary officers selected for brief training in officers’ schools and commissioned as tenientes en campaña or temporary lieutenants. Only a few of these obtained promotion to captain’s rank.

HE 59 IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR

2009-04-06T10:46:00.001+08:00

One of the first aircraft acquired by the Luftwaffe, the big He 59 was a versatile machine capable of many functions. It saw active service in World War II and even helped stage daring commando missions.

The He 59 was originally designed in 1930 as part of a clandestine program to equip Germany with military aircraft. Although posited as a twin-engine maritime rescue craft, it was in fact intended as a reconnaissance bomber capable of serving off both water and land. The first prototype, designed by Reinhold Mewes, flew in 1931 with large “trousered” wheel spats, but subsequent versions were all fitted with twin floats. Like many aircraft of this era, the He 59 was of mixed construction, having a fuselage made from steel tubing, wings of wood, and entirely covered by fabric. The bomber seated a crew of four comfortably and was well armed with machine guns in nose, dorsal, and ventral positions. Both flight and water performance were adequate, so the German government ordered 105 machines built in several versions.

The He 59 first saw combat during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1938), where it functioned as a patrol- bomber. Production of the He 59B-2 which introduced an all-metal nose with glazed panels for the bomb-aimer, plus a glazed ventral position housing an MG 15 gun to supplement those in nose and dorsal positions. It was this version that was first to see operational use, being used by the Legion Condor in Spain for night bombing, or for anti-shipping patrols when the nose machine-gun was replaced by a 20-mm MG FF cannon. At night the big craft would glide over an intended target unannounced, then drop bombs upon astonished defenders.

He 59s were pushing obsolescence in 1939 when World War II erupted, but for many months the lumbering craft performed useful work. Most He 59s equipped coastal reconnaissance groups, but others operated with the Seenotdienststaffeln (air/sea rescue squadrons). These craft were conspicuously painted white with large red crosses in the early days of the war and left unmolested by Royal Air Force fighters—until they were discovered directing German bombers by radio. But the most important service of the He 59 was in transporting Staffel Schwilben (special forces). On May 10, 1940, a dozen He 59s landed in the Maas River, Rotterdam, and disgorged 120 assault troops, who paddled ashore and stormed the strategic Willems bridge. They were all finally retired by 1943.

The He 59 and He 115 floatplanes were intended to be torpedo bombers, but they never carried out an operation. The Germans were aware of their limitations, but because of their indifferent attitude, they failed to exploit the equipment at hand. The Air Staff believed that the larger German warships received adequate service from their Arado and Heinkel floatplanes.

In spring 1939 the OKL did in fact formulate plans for the formation of a "maritime strike force", appointing General Hans Geisler, under command of Luftflotte 2 responsible for the planning and recruitment of suitable resources to strike enemy merchant and military shipping, mine their ports, and generally hinder the free-flow of commerce and war materiel. Upon the outbreak of hostilities his command was redesignated 'Fliegerdivision 10', and a former naval officer (of the Seeluftstreitkraefte) and veteran of the Spanish Civil War with several anti-shipping strikes beneath his belt, Major Martin Harlinghausen, became Geisler's Operations officer. He had already used the technique of ‘masthead bombing’ - attacking shipping from abeam at very low level - in the Spanish Civil war flying a He 59 float-biplane.

Exhibition explores dark era of the Spanish Civil War

2009-04-02T21:25:00.002+08:00

Guttman photographed Republican loyalists in Barcelona

The Spanish Civil War is considered by many to have been a prologue to World War II. This is the topic of an exhibition at the Willy Brandt Haus in Berlin to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the civil war.

On April 1, 1939 Spain became a land of winners and losers. With the capital of Madrid firmly under his control, General Francisco Franco officially ended the bloody Spanish Civil war, which had killed more than 500,000 people.

Much has been written about the role of German and Italian military support in Franco’s victory, yet the new exhibit in Berlin tries to paint a more complete picture, also telling the stories of Germans who fought against Franco’s forces.

The 70th anniversary exhibition includes photos by the German photographer Hans Gutmann, a volunteer in the International Brigade, and other photographs from the archives of the Spanish EFE news agency. In Spain, Gutmann changed his name to Juan Guzman and in 1936 he joined the anti-fascists. From within their ranks he began to document the war through his photography.

Germans fighting Germans in Spain

Nazi SS Chief Heinrich Himmler at a famous bullring in Madrid, October 20, 1940

Germans fought on both sides in this civil war: the International Brigade volunteers for the Republicans and the Wehrmacht soldiers sent by Hitler as the Condor Legion for the nationalists. About 2,800 Germans took part in the International Brigade while the Condor Legion became infamous for the deadly aerial bombing of Guernica in 1937.

“Without the German and Italian military support, Franco would never have won this war," Carlos Collado Seidel, a professor at the University of Göttingen and author of "The Spanish Civil War: History of a European Conflict" told Deutsche Welle. After the civil war ended, the right-wing Franco became the dictator of Spain, ruling until his death in 1975.

The city of Madrid fell to Franco’s troops on March 28, 1939. Four days later Franco wrote, "On this day, the Red Army has been captured and disarmed, and the national troops have reached their ultimate military objectives. The war has ended." In September of that same year, World War II broke out.

Supposed Neutrality

The German Condor Legion marched through the streets of Leon

Despite the help of Hitler and Mussolini during his own fight for power, Franco and Spain remained ostensibly neutral to the events of the World War II. But a previously unpublished photograph in the Berlin exhibition from the EFE archive shows the dreaded Heinrich Himmler in the Plaza de Toros de las Ventas, the famous bullring in Madrid.

"The historical research all comes to the same conclusion, that Franco was officially neutral, but that in fact he did everything to support the Axis powers and the Third Reich," explained Collado Seidel. "This included the supply of strategic materials, tolerating and supporting the German secret services in Spain, especially against Allied operations in the Atlantic, as well as supplying German U-boats from the Spanish coast."

Dealing with the Past

After the war ended, many of those who had fought on the Republican side were persecuted and oppressed during Franco’s decades-long dictatorship. After Franco’s death and as Spain formed its democracy, all of the political parties agreed to bury the past. Those who had committed crimes under the general’s rule were granted amnesty. This "pacto de olvido" or " "pact of forgetting" has only recently begun to come undone.

Two years ago the Socialist government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero passed the "Law of Historical Memory," which seeks to make amends with the victims of the civil war and Franco’s regime. Some have criticized the law for opening up old wounds, while others think the painful process is necessary.

Giving some dignity to the victims is "Spain’s duty, which it has not yet fulfilled, " Silvino Martin, the chairman of the Vallodolid Association for Historical Memory, told Deutsche Welle.

“It isn’t about opening wounds,” he added. “It’s about healing them.”

Author: Holly Fox/Luna Bolivar/Mirra Banchon/AFP

Editor: Trinity Hartman

FRANCO’S NATIONALIST ARMY PART VI

2009-03-29T08:58:00.001+08:00

Nationalists troops march into Madrid.

By George Esenwein

Nationalist Military Engagements, 1937–38

Although the Nationalist army had, by the summer of 1937, developed into a fighting force that was capable of defeating its enemies, Franco’s timetable for winning the war was no more definite than it had been at the outset of the conflict. This was due in part to Franco’s belief that it was necessary to wage a war of attrition against the Republicans. In practice, this meant that Nationalist troops tended to move much more slowly and cautiously than they otherwise needed to given their superiority over the forces they were fighting. While this strategy caused his foreign military advisors to complain loudly that the Spaniards were squandering their many opportunities to defeat the Republicans, Franco himself was confident that, by taking its time, the Nationalist army would prepare the ground for an uncontested victor.

Political developments in the Nationalist zone during the spring and summer of 1937 also contributed to a slow down in the progress of the war. We saw earlier that, after having been designated as both the military and the political leader of the Nationalist cause, Franco began laying the foundations for his new regime. As we have also seen, however, his early efforts to establish his absolute rule did not go unchallenged. Franco faced a particularly thorny situation when the Falangist leader, Manuel Hedilla, refused to relinquish control over his party and movement. After a brief and tense confrontation with him, Franco made it clear that he was prepared to deal swiftly and summarily with anyone who opposed him and his government. By acting in this way, he effectively eliminated future challenges to his authority. Above all, Franco’s confrontations with Fal Conde and Hedilla illustrated that his role as commander in chief of the army could not be divorced from the political world to which he now belonged.

Meanwhile, Nationalist advances toward Santander and Asturias during the summer months were delayed by a series of unexpected Republican attacks along the Madrid front. In July 1937, the Republicans sought to relieve Nationalist pressure in the northern zone by mounting their first major offensive of the war. The Battle of Brunete, as this operation came to be known, began in the early hours of July 6 on a sparsely manned Nationalist front just fifteen miles west of Madrid. Unlike their ill-fated attacks at La Granja and Huesca a few months earlier, the Republicans’ assault on Brunete was a well-guarded secret that enabled them to achieve complete surprise. Altogether, some 59,000 Republican troops organized into ten divisions and three army corps were thrown into the initial stage of fighting. Backed for the first time in the war by effective artillery, tank (Russian T-26), and aerial support, Republican forces were buoyed by the prospects of a great victory. After taking Brunete, Republican forces took only two days to occupy the nearby villages of Quijorna, Villanueva del Parillo, and Villanueva de la Cañada. The air superiority that the Republicans enjoyed during the opening phases of the assault helped to underscore their initial successes.

But it did not take long before the shortcomings of the Republican military organization were revealed. Their biggest challenge was how to exploit their early gains. Rather than pressing forward and broadening the scope of the offensive, field officers allowed their troops to be tied down by the vastly outnumbered Nationalists who were doggedly defending nearby villages. Above all, this allowed the defenders enough time to send in much-needed reinforcements.

From the beginning, the discipline and organization of the Republican troops were also put to the test. Apart from being exposed to the withering effects of a scorching summer heat, ground troops were subject day and night to unrelenting machine-gunning and shelling from artillery and air strikes. On top of all of this, Republican communications were so poor that soldiers often found themselves unable to communicate with each other or with their superior officers. In these appalling conditions, it was hardly surprising that many soldiers lost their will to fight and that the discipline of the frontline units began breaking down. Not surprisingly, the Republican offensive ground to a standstill.

Though initially caught off guard, the Nationalists moved rapidly and effectively to bring down reinforcements from the north. Bolstered by the arrival of a fresh shipment of German aircraft (including the formidable Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters), the better-equipped and better-organized Nationalist forces took only a week to recover much of the territory that had been captured by the enemy. By July 25, the Republicans were in full retreat, and the battle itself ended a few days later.

Given the huge losses on both sides—some 25,000 Republican and 17,000 Nationalist casualties—neither side could claim victory. As far as the Republicans were concerned, the results of the campaign were not entirely negative. Primarily, the Republicans had forced Franco to transfer some of his best troops and most of his air units (Italian, German, and Spanish fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft) from the northern sector, which inevitably interrupted the Nationalists’ preparations for their assault on Santander. No less significant was the fact that the Brunete campaign demonstrated that the Republicans were capable of going on the offensive. And, though their territorial gains had been rather small— they had only succeeded in lengthening the front by some twenty square miles—the hope was that the newly reorganized Popular Army would inspire Spaniards and foreigners alike to have faith in the fighting capacity of the Republican side.

With the return of some of their best troops to the northern zone, the Nationalists were able to renew their campaign to conquer Santander and Asturias. Commanded by General Fidel Dávila, who had replaced General Mola after he was killed in a plane crash in July, Nationalist forces began their attack on Santander in mid-August. Despite facing heavy resistance from around 80,000 Republican defenders, the Nationalists managed to take control of the city on August 24.

Defeating the remaining Republican strongholds in Asturias proved to be more problematic. Shielded by the natural defenses of the mountains of Asturias, Republican guerrilla forces scattered throughout the region were able to hold out against their enemies for several more months. Nationalist advances were also delayed by yet another spoiling offensive launched by the Republicans on the Aragon front in the northeast. Only two days before Santander fell to the Nationalists, some 75,000 Republican troops were sent into action on an 80–100 kilometer front. The heaviest fighting took place in and around the villages of Belchite and Quinto. In Belchite, fierce resistance from a small contingent of Nationalist troops (1,500) met Republican forces. The town fell on September 3, but at the cost of many casualties on both sides. Attacks in the direction of Zaragoza were even less successful. By early September, the campaign was already winding down, though sporadic fighting—including a concerted effort to take the town of Fuentes de Ebro—continued until October 24. In the meantime, the key Asturian cities of Gijón, Avilés, and Oviedo had fallen to the Nationalists. However, it was not until the end of October that the Nationalists could claim victory in their hard-fought seven-month campaign.

Though it had taken his army much longer to conquer the north than even he had anticipated, Franco was finally able to redeploy his troops to the main battlefronts in the center and the south. In addition to having built up his troop strength to the point that his army was now nearly equal in size to its Republican counterpart (approximately 600,000), Franco had successfully overseen both the reorganization of his forces into five army corps and the creation of the formidable Army of Maneuver. Confident that he could now take Madrid, Franco believed that the time had come to mount another major offensive.

Upon learning of the Nationalists’ plan to attack in the Guadalajara region, the Republicans decided to undertake a preemptive strike in the provincial capital of Teruel. The surprise attack started on December 15, just as a particularly fierce winter storm began to blanket the region with a thick layer of snow. For the first week, the offensive went as planned, with the Republicans managing to capture the surrounding towns of Campillo, San Blas, and Muela de Teruel. Nevertheless, after having successfully navigated the harsh weather conditions and rocky terrain around Teruel itself, the Republicans faced stiff resistance from the contingent of Nationalists defending the town. It took nearly two weeks of heavy street fighting, from December 22 to January 7, before they finally conquered the city.

News of their sudden and unexpected victory immediately created a stir in both camps. From a political standpoint, the fall of Teruel caused Franco to lose face in front of his fascist allies. Overnight, their confidence in him and the Nationalists’ fighting abilities had been badly shaken. As one German diplomat put it at the time, ‘‘While before Teruel the end of the Spanish Civil War seemed to be in sight, today the end of the war seems once again to have moved into the far distant future.’’ Mussolini in particular was now threatening to cut off aid to the Nationalists if they did not bring a quick end to the conflict.

The Republicans’ successful attack on Teruel disturbed Franco so much that he decided to postpone his assault on Madrid in order to launch a counteroffensive aimed at recapturing the town. On December 29, 1937, he ordered Generals Varela and Antonio Aranda to relieve the defenders holed up in the city, but appalling weather conditions prevented them from aiding their besieged comrades. For the next two weeks, the Republicans were subjected to heavy shelling from artillery and bombers, the latter of which began flying sorties as soon as weather conditions permitted. Inside Teruel, conditions were rapidly deteriorating for the Republican troops, most of whom were cold and hungry and desperately short of supplies. By February 20, 1938, the Republicans faced certain encirclement and were thus forced to abandon the town. A few days later, their forces were in full retreat.

Undeterred by the humiliating setback he suffered at Teruel, Franco began massing his troops along the entire Aragon front in preparation for a major offensive. Just two weeks after reconquering Teruel, the Nationalists smashed through Republican lines as part of a large-scale operation along a sixty-mile front that involved over 100,000 troops, 200 tanks, and some 1,000 aircraft. Meeting only nominal resistance from the other side (disorganized and demoralized Republican forces had not anticipated such a sweeping attack), it took them only six weeks to reach the Mediterranean. Republican Spain was now split in two. For the Nationalists, it appeared as though the war would soon be over. However, as events would soon show, their hopes for an imminent victory were premature.

With the Nationalists closing in on Valencia, the Republicans decided that the only chance they had of forestalling their defeat was to mount another offensive. Hoping once again to achieve complete tactical surprise, Republican commandos crossed the Ebro River (between Mequinenza and Tortosa) on the night of July 24–25, 1938. Catching Yagüe’s Moroccan army completely by surprise, the leading units of Juan Modesto’s Army of the Ebro first cut Nationalist communication lines and then proceeded to occupy a wide bridgehead, which they used to drive deeper into Nationalist territory. By the end of the week, they had advanced nearly 40 kilometers and were at the point of taking Gandesa, the center of an important network of roads and communications. However, it was at this stage of the attack that the offensive began bogging down. Instead of moving forward and exploiting their initial successes, a small but determined group of Nationalists tied down Republican forces. The defenders managed to hold on long enough for Yagüe’s troops to stabilize their lines. In the following weeks, the battle was transformed into a war of attrition.

The initial phase of the Ebro campaign had achieved its desired goal, namely, to take pressure off Franco’s drive toward Valencia. The scale of the Republicans early successes had also forced Franco to suspend his offensive operations in Estremadura. Furthermore, the offensive had once again undermined the confidence of the Nationalists, who, only a few weeks earlier, were convinced that the end of the war was in sight. Now it was the Republicans’ turn to be lifted by a surge of optimism. Nevertheless, while Republican propagandists were declaring Ebro to be another turning point in the war, Franco began concentrating his forces for a major counterattack. As he had done throughout the war, Franco was prepared to abandon his own military objectives in order to prevent the Republicans from gaining ground in Nationalist territory.

From August until the end of October, the two sides were locked in a series of bloody confrontations. The tide of battle finally turned when the Nationalists launched an offensive into the Sierra de Pandols on October 30. By November 16, the Republicans had been driven back from all the territory they had conquered since July 25. The longest and most grueling contest of the war was finally over.

Dissension in the Nationalist Camp

In spite of the fact that few believed in the spring of 1938 that the Republic would survive another Nationalist offensive, victory continued to elude Franco. As we have seen, his slow and tedious conduct of the war was not popular among his fascist military advisers, who were critical of Franco’s slavish commitment to a strategy of attrition. When, after the division of Republican Spain, it appeared to most senior military strategists on both sides as though the Republic could be defeated rapidly by an offensive in Catalonia, Franco once again defied conventional military logic by launching an attack toward Valencia. In this instance, however, his decision nearly provoked a minor rebellion among his own commanders.

Franco’s questionable military decisions were not the only source of problems developing in the Nationalist camp. Ever since 1937, news of disaffection among Franco’s troops—particularly among Carlists, Moorish, and Foreign Legionaries—began making their way into the foreign press reports and diplomatic dispatches emanating from Nationalist Spain.

After 1937, there were also signs, if not of dissatisfaction, of growing war-weariness among the rank-and-file soldiers. This most likely accounted for the inconsistent performance of Nationalist units on the battlefield. While they were better-equipped and fed than their Republican counterparts, the morale of Franco’s soldiers was daily being undermined by several factors. The unexpected setbacks they experienced when the Republicans struck an offensive blow was one source of declining morale as was the high casualty rates that invariably accompanied these bloody slogging matches. While there was no way of knowing for certain how far this particular malaise had advanced among Nationalist troops, there was the ever-present danger that it could spread as long as the war continued.

By the spring of 1938, the generally optimistic mood of the population in Nationalist territory was increasingly being tested. Ironically, this might have owed something to the triumphal rhetoric underpinning Franco’s regime. The accuracy of the regime’s indulgent predictions of the imminent demise of the Republic was called into question every time the Republican army forestalled defeat. As a result, disillusionment began to sink in among those who were beginning to believe that the end of the war was not forthcoming. The mounting number of civilian casualties late in the war also generated rumblings of discontent, particularly among the die-hard Nationalists. This was particularly evident in the period when the Nationalists were conducting heavy bombing attacks against the civilian populations on the other side. Though Nationalist censors suppressed accurate news of these raids, rumors of the carnage they were causing circulated more freely.

The fact that Franco’s fascist allies (particularly the Italians) were largely responsible for these bombing missions caused a certain number of Falangists and Carlists to begin calling for ‘‘Spain for the Spaniards,’’ a subversive refrain that echoed the Republican view that the Germans and Italians were acting like foreign invaders. The problems referred to here were serious, but they were not major impediments to Franco’s rule. For the most part, the authoritarian state apparatus he was constructing withstood the challenges of dissent and disillusionment. Franco himself managed to weather each crisis with characteristic aplomb—such as his clash with Yagüe over the Caudillo’s decision not to advance on Catalonia—and his grip on power remained firm throughout his frustratingly slow and deliberate march to total victory.

The Fall of Barcelona and Madrid

The Republicans’ defeat at Ebro paved the way for the Nationalists’ final offensive. Toward the end of December, some 300,000 of Franco’s troops attacked all along the Catalonia front. Although the tattered remains of the Republican defense forces put up a spirited fight, their resistance was in vain. By January 3, 1939, the Nationalists were well on their way to victory. Their primary target, Barcelona, held out until January 25 and was occupied by General Yagüe’s troops the following day. The collapse of the regional capital sparked off one of the greatest mass exoduses of modern times. Behind the fleeing members of the Republican government, who had just days before taken refuge near the French border in the small town of Figueras, there followed tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers.

With the fall of Catalonia, the last Republican stronghold, Madrid, was now surrounded by a sea of Nationalists. Short on ammunition and weapons and with their food supplies running out, it is hardly surprising that the Republicans’ will to continue resisting was rapidly dissipating. The faint hope that Spain’s conflict could be drawn out until the outbreak of a general European war was extinguished in early March, when a mini- Civil War between anti- and pro-communist elements erupted in the Republican zone. The establishment of an anticommunist junta (Defense Council) was seen by some as the only chance the Republicans had of negotiating a peace settlement with Franco. By this point, however, Franco’s quest for a total victory was now within his grasp. He, therefore, felt no need to reach an understanding with anyone or any group on the opposing side. A few days after the fighting between the communists and their leftist enemies ended, Franco gave the order for his troops to occupy Madrid. On March 27, Nationalist troops began slowly marching into the capital, and four days later, Franco declared that the war was over.

FRANCO’S NATIONALIST ARMY PART V

2009-03-25T14:07:00.001+09:00

By George Esenwein

Foreign Contributions to the Nationalist Army

While it is true that Franco did not look to foreigners to supply the manpower he needed to wage war, his army, navy, and, above all, his air force relied on the military experience and technical knowledge provided by outsiders. This was particularly true after 1937, when it became apparent that the Nationalists were able to achieve air superiority thanks to the Germans and Italians, who were supplying him with aircraft that were superior to those that the Soviet Union was making available to the Republican side.

In addition to the transport planes and fighter aircraft they supplied over the course of the conflict, Italy and Germany contributed much needed transportation vehicles, ammunition, armaments (including artillery and light tanks), military advisers used for training personnel, and, in the case of Italy, ground troops. The fact that both Germany and Italy were willing to act as allies rather than as rivals in Spain also redounded to the benefit of the Nationalists. Nevertheless, despite Franco’s efforts to coordinate German and Italian assistance, the two ‘‘Axis’’ countries generally operated independently of one another. While the Italians saw their participation as a means to promote the prestige and effectiveness of Mussolini’s military forces, the Germans were interested in exploiting their intervention for other purposes. Besides seeking mining concessions that could be used to subsidize Germany’s rearmament plans, the Germans wanted to use the war in Spain as a training ground for their army and air force. The fact that all the important fighter planes—Messerschmitt Bf-109s and Junkers Ju-87s (Stuka)—the Luftwaffe put into action during Hitler’s early blitzkrieg offensives had been introduced in the Spanish conflict attests to the extent to which the Germans used the Civil War as a laboratory for testing their aircraft.

The quantity and quality of foreign assistance also deserves mention here. While the Italians sent some of their latest Fiat tanks and fighter planes, these were not always used to great effect during military operations. The former were considered too light—compared to the more heavily armored Russian ‘‘Vickers’’ medium tanks—and too unreliable to be battle worthy. In terms of their performance characteristics, Italian aircraft (Fiat CR.32 fighters and Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 bombers) were also of good quality and comparable to their German counterparts in the early phases of the conflict. However, the Italians’ commitment to using bomber aircraft to terrorize the civilian population in the Republican camp proved to be a major miscalculation. This became apparent late in the war, when such bombing attacks stirred up negative publicity for the Nationalists both at home and abroad. A series of Italian bombing raids over Barcelona in March 1938, for example, provoked a storm of international protests against Franco’s policy of bombing undefended cities. No less significant was the fact that growing numbers of Nationalists began to deeply resent the ‘‘foreigners’’ who, despite being under the command of Franco, were seen as butchering fellow Spaniards.

Even though the Italians sent many more ground forces to fight for Franco (an estimated 72,000 over the course of the war) than the Germans did (approximately 19,000 military personnel), German contributions were viewed by both the Nationalists and the foreign observers as being of far greater value than that being offered by the Italians. This was partly because of the generally high quality of their military equipment—such as their state-of-the-art 88-mm guns—and partly because, unlike their Italian counterparts, German ‘‘instructors,’’ pilots, and other military personnel tended to be both respected and well received by their Spanish hosts.

It should be emphasized that, however dependent he became on foreign assistance, Franco did not easily yield to German and Italian efforts to interfere with his command of Nationalist military operations. Thus, whenever it proved impossible for Franco and foreign military advisors to reach an agreement on planned operations—such as when he clashed with the Italians during the Nationalist offensive in the Basque region—the Generalissimo made certain he maintained the upper hand.

Foreign Volunteer Forces

In contrast to the men and women who enlisted in the International Brigades of the Republican army, foreign volunteers who went to fight for the Nationalist side have not received much publicity. This is partly due to the fact that the Nationalists themselves did not want to generate any diplomatic waves by drawing attention to outsiders who were fighting on their behalf. Because they wanted to avoid any ‘‘international complications,’’ the Germans also tended to downplay the full extent of their military contributions. It was also true that, unlike the Republicans, the Nationalists were either unwilling or unable to capitalize on the propaganda value of having foreigners join what was, according to their own rhetoric, a national crusade. In the event, several thousand anticommunist volunteers hailing from Portugal (who provided the largest foreign contingent of volunteers known as the Viriatos), France, Romania, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland joined Franco’s crusade against ‘‘red’’ Spain. The vast majority of these volunteers were organized into military units (banderas) that served in the Foreign Legion, though most did not see action throughout the war. Moreover, due in part to language and cultural barriers and in part to the uneven quality of their fighting abilities, most of the foreigners, like the some 700 blue shirts of Eoin O’Duffy’s Irish Brigade, saw themselves and were widely seen by the Nationalists as outsiders.

FRANCO’S NATIONALIST ARMY PART IV

2009-03-23T11:54:00.002+09:00

General Orgaz y Yoldi

By George Esenwein

Early Military Engagements: 1936–37

When Franco’s troops reached the outskirts of the capital in early November, everyone, including the Republican government, believed that the city would soon fall to the Nationalists. On November 6, Prime Minister Francisco Largo Caballero and his Cabinet transferred the Republican seat of government to Valencia, leaving the administration of the defense of the city in the hands of a provisional ruling body known as the Defense Council (Junta de Defensa). Meanwhile, the citizens of Madrid readied themselves for the inevitable attack. Overnight civilian groups were mobilized into work battalions used for digging trenches and fortifying the city’s defenses. While the Nationalists attempted to undermine the morale of madrileños by circulating the rumor that a ‘‘fifth column’’ of their supporters would be waiting for Franco’s troops to enter the city, the largely pro-Republican citizens thundered back with defiant slogans such as ‘‘Madrid will be the tomb of fascism’’ and ‘‘They shall not pass.’’ The arrival on November 8 of the first shipments of Soviet arms and the newly formed units of the International Brigades reinforced the spirit of defiance among the besieged Republicans. The battle itself began a few days later. In their initial assault, the Nationalists sent some 4,500 troops into western Madrid. Arrayed against them were more than 18,000 armed defenders of the Republican army. Some of the fiercest fighting took place in and around University City, where Franco’s men became pinned down in a bloody slogging match with mixed Republican militias and fresh units of the communist-led International Brigades. Unable to overcome the unexpected resistance it encountered in the first two weeks of fighting, the Nationalist offensive soon ground to a standstill.

When it became apparent in late December that he would have to abandon his frontal offensive, Franco sought to end the stalemate in Madrid by undertaking a series of flanking operations. On February 6, 1937, the Nationalists attempted to encircle the capital from the south by attacking Republican defenses along the Jarama River. But after only a few days of fierce fighting on the ground and in the air, this initiative had to be abandoned. The ferocity of the attack tested the mettle of the Republic’s new army and the International Brigades, whose units were seriously demoralized by the staggering number of casualties (2,800) they suffered in combat. Yet because they had halted the Nationalists’ advances and had for the first time in the war inflicted heavy casualties on their enemy (estimated to be between 6,400 and 10,500), the battle represented a ‘‘defensive victory’’ for the Republicans.

One month later, the Nationalists suffered another humiliating setback when Republican forces at Guadalajara repulsed an Italian-led offensive. This was the first major military operation involving the recently organized assault troops of the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV), which was placed under the command of the inexperienced battlefield commander, Major General Mario Roatta. Partly because he was not ready to mount another offensive so soon after Jarama, Franco allowed the Italians to play a leading role in an attack aimed at cutting off Madrid from the northeast. However, far from becoming the guerra di rapido corso which he had hoped, Roatta’s mechanized infantry units of the much-vaunted Black Flames and Littorio Divisions were halted by a combination of bad weather and the constant strafing by squadrons of Russian Polikarpov I-15 Chato fighter planes. The CTV’s slow and hesitant offensive also bought the Republicans enough time to launch a stunning counterattack. While they incurred as many if not more casualties than the Italians did during the two-week battle, the Republicans successfully blocked another one of Franco’s efforts to encircle Madrid. They thus viewed the Battle of Guadalajara as their first important victory against the Nationalists.

Above all, the difficulties the Nationalists experienced at Jarama and Guadalajara demonstrated that defeating the Republicans was not as easy as it had been during the first few months of the conflict. Better armed and organized than before, the formidable qualities of the Republican army forced Franco to reconsider his plans to cut short the war by conquering Madrid. Urged on by his German and Italian advisers (Generals Hugo Sperrle and Roatta), Franco decided to shift Nationalist military operations to the relatively quiet northern zone. Conquering this isolated sector of Republican territory would achieve two much-desired objectives: the Nationalists would gain control over the important coal and steel industries in the region, and Franco would be able to free up troops that could be used for more concentrated offensives in the Madrid area.

Backed by the Italians’ esteemed Black Arrows Division, the German Condor Legion, four well-trained Carlist Navarrese Brigades (each numbering between 4,000 and 6,000 men), and some 50,000 Spanish troops, General Mola launched a major offensive in the Basque Country at the end of March. Warning the citizens of Vizcaya that he was prepared to conduct a total war against his enemies, Mola made full use of the foreign airpower at his disposal in the opening phases of the invasion. The undefended Basque towns of Elorrio and Durango were the first to be heavily bombarded by German Junkers Ju-52s and Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.81s. Less than three weeks later one of the most politically controversial and emotionally stirring episodes of the war occurred. On the afternoon of April 26, a squadron of German bombers sent on orders of the Nationalist high command dropped high explosive and incendiary bombs over the small market town of Guernica. In the space of a few hours, the ancient capital of the Basque homeland was reduced to a heap of smoldering rubble. Equally shocking was the fact that an estimated 900 innocent civilians had been either killed or injured during the raid. News of the atrocity was soon broadcast around the world. In an effort to preserve their public image, the Nationalists denied that they were responsible for the attack, insisting that the ‘‘reds’’ had deliberately destroyed their own town. The scandal nevertheless refused to die down, not least because the renowned Spanish artist, Pablo Picasso, was inspired to immortalize Guernica’s tragedy in his famous mural shown at the Paris Exhibition in June 1937.

Further Nationalist advances soon followed the destruction of Guernica into the Basque Country. In the course of the next few weeks, surviving sections of the relatively small (less than 30,000 troops) Army of Euzkadi took up positions behind the series of fortifications surrounding Bilbao known as the Cinturón de Hierro or Iron Ring. The Nationalist assault on these defenses began on June 12, and four days later the city of Bilbao was under siege. Yet, with the port to the city blockaded and supplies rapidly running out, the citizens of Bilbao were forced to capitulate on June 19. Not long afterwards, the rest of the Basque territory fell under Nationalist control. In the course of the next few months, the Nationalists launched further military operations aimed at conquering the remaining pockets of Republican territory in the north.

The Nationalist Army at War

Nationalist successes in their northern campaign were in part the result of major operational and structural changes to the army that had occurred in the previous months of fighting. As we have seen, in the early days of the conflict, the Nationalist army relied on the support they received from a variety of civilian militias. Both the Carlists and the Falangists proved to be indispensable allies, not least because they provided the enthusiasm and sheer numbers needed to overwhelm Republican resistance. As soon as possible, the volunteers from both movements were organized into fighting units—sections, companies, and banderas (battalions)—and most of these were incorporated into the ranks of the regular army. Though it reared its head from time to time, civilian opposition to being placed under the military’s chain of command never became a major issue. This was made clear at different points during the war, such as when, in December 1936, the truculent Carlist leader Manuel Fal Conde sought to create a separate training facility for the Requete´s. Because such a move challenged the supremacy of the army’s control over military matters, Franco acted quickly to put a stop to this plan. He also sent a pointed message to anyone else with similar ambitions by banishing Fal Conde from the Nationalist camp.

Once it became apparent that the rebellion had evolved into a full-scale Civil War, Nationalist military leaders set about expanding their forces. Beginning in August 1936, conscription was imposed in the Nationalist zone, and, by the spring of 1937, the army had mobilized 350,000 recruits. Further call-ups in the following months added tens of thousands of more men to the Nationalists’ rolls.

In response to its growing numbers, the army greatly expanded its training programs. Following the creation of the MIR (Mobilization, Instruction, and Recuperation) bureau in March 1937, the army increased the number of its training schools to twenty-two, making use of German advisers whom Franco and the supervisory head of the MIR, General Orgaz y Yoldi, heavily relied upon to assist in instructing officer candidate courses. After Franco was named as commander in chief of the Nationalist army, a special effort was made to train junior officers or alféreces provisionales, who were desperately needed to provide internal cohesion to the lower-level command structures of the rapidly expanding armed forces.

In the first phase of the Civil War, the Nationalists used the independent battle-column formations—ranging in size from 200 to 2,000 men—with the battalion as the major unit. By the spring of 1937, however, the ever evolving conditions of the war demanded a transition from column formations to that of mass movement. As a result, the Nationalists began to reorganize their columns into tactical divisions, many of which were commanded by lieutenant colonels who had seen service in Morocco as junior officers.